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7CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
Since the earliest dawn of civilization, self-control has been recognized as one of the 
highest virtues. Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle considered self-control 
of equal value to courage, wisdom, and justice. Mastery over one’s desires, faults, 
and lusts was argued to be indispensable in the human pursuit of happiness. Lucius 
Seneca, a first century Roman philosopher captured the essence of this rationale by 
stating that “Most powerful is he who has himself in his own power.” Even in today’s 
modern society, the interest in self-control as a central human capacity seems unal-
tered. Self-control is associated with a diversity of both social and economic develop-
ments and has often been referred to as the “cornerstone of civilization”. This analogy 
seems justified: many of the problems that confront our society can be explained in 
terms of self-control failure. Widespread problems like obesitas, drug addiction and 
violence reflect people’s inability to control their food intake, cravings and aggres-
sive impulses. Unfortunately, these problems do not only emerge on an individual 
level, but go beyond the individual as well by representing significant disruptions on a 
societal level. For instance, self-control failure in the form of unsafe sexual intercourse 
is not only hazardous for the individuals involved but, in a larger context, also con-
tributes to the spread of sexual transmitted diseases. Moreover, deficient self-control 
has been identified as one of the most important factors contributing to the pervasive 
problem of criminality (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Research in the field of crimi-
nology has found that individuals who possess low self-control abilities have a higher 
likelihood of criminal activity than those with high self-control abilities (e.g., Burton et 
al., 1998; LaGrange & Silverman, 1999; Vazsonyi et al. 2001). Not surprisingly, given 
these negative consequences of low self-control, good self-control abilities have been 
found to contribute to overall quality of life. Recent research findings support what was 
preached by the ancient philosophers ages ago: self-control and happiness are strongly 
related (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). As compared to people low in self-
control, this research found that people who possess relatively good self-control skills 
not only showed fewer impulse control problems, but also higher self-esteem, better 
relationships, better interpersonal skills and more optimal emotional responses (see 
also Lu & Shih, 1997; Larson, 1989; Finkel & Campbell, 2001). In addition, a longitu-
dinal study by Mischel, Shoda and Peake (1988) considered the impact of self-control 
abilities from a long-term perspective. It was found that 5 and 6 year old children, who 
were better able to resist immediate temptations and choose delayed gratifications, 
grew into more successful and well-adjusted adolescents, as rated by their parents a 
decade later. More specifically, these children were rated as more academically and so-
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cially competent, verbally fluent, rational, attentive, planful, and able to deal well with 
frustration and stress. Together, these findings illustrate the value of self-control and 
stress the importance of gaining more insight in the ability to control ourselves. The 
purpose of the present dissertation is to gain a better understanding of the processes 
that underlie self-control performance. To do so, the emphasis will be on the identifica-
tion of distinct factors that influence (effective) self-control. Uncovering these factors 
will not only reveal more of the underlying processes of self-control, but will also pro-
vide insight in possible ways to improve self-control performance.  
Self-control defined
Self-control can be regarded as an ability that underlies a wide range of human behav-
iours. As a result, it has become a common theme in many of today’s different fields of 
research. Over the past thirty years, a large but diverse body of research covering dif-
ferent aspects and viewpoints of self-control has been presented in the literature (for 
overviews see Boekaerts, Pintrich, & Zeidner, 2000). As an inevitable consequence of 
this diversity, the present dissertation was compelled to address a specific perspective 
on self-control. In the current work, the focus will be on a social cognitive perspective 
on self-control. From this point of view, self-control can be defined as the overriding 
or inhibition of urges, behaviours or desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1993). For instance, a dieter must control the desire to eat from a 
pie in order to prevent him or herself from breaking the diet. Controlling your weight 
or giving up smoking implies that you have to say ‘no’ to yourself instead of giving in to 
craving or appetite. 
 Although self-control is often used as a synonym for self-regulation, in the present 
dissertation it will be used in a more narrow sense. Self-regulation refers to a broad, 
regulatory cycle of comparing the self against a relevant standard, operating on the 
self to reduce a possible discrepancy, testing again and continuing the process until a 
test reveals that the standard has been reached, whereupon the person exits the circle 
(test, operate, test, exit (TOTE), cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981). According to Baumeister 
and Exline (2000), self-control refers to the “operate” phase, in which the self alters 
itself in order to move closer to the desired standard. In practice, this often means the 
overruling of one incipient pattern of response and replacing it with another (Baumeis-
ter, 2002). Thus, the individual suppresses an unwanted thought and tries to think of 
something else, or he/she ignores the elevator and takes the stairs instead. This active 
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control process serves to reduce the risk that any thought, feeling or behaviour that is 
incompatible with the desired standard could take over. It is exactly this phase of active 
self-control that entails the main focus of the present dissertation. 
 As is the case with many psychological constructs, self-control can be understood 
as a relatively stable, enduring personality trait, as well as a behaviour that is suscep-
tible to momentary changes. Thus, self-control is the outcome of both personality and 
situational influences. Trait self-control refers to an individual’s general self-control ca-
pabilities. Trait self-control develops during lifetime and can be defined as a relatively 
stable characteristic of the person possessing it (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004). 
State self-control, on the other hand, concerns the intra-individual variability of self-
control over time or situations (Hong, 1998; Nesselroade & Bartsch, 1977). State self-
control is relatively changeable and can be influenced by situational factors. Trait self-
control and state self-control are strongly related, since an individual with high trait 
self-control is more likely to successfully exert self-control in a given situation (Hong, 
1998). In the present dissertation, both state and trait self-control will be addressed. 
The strength model
According to the so-called strength model (also known as the ego-strength model or 
resource model), the capacity to control ourselves is defined by our own restrictions 
(Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). These restrictions 
are a direct consequence of self-control drawing on a fixed and limited resource, akin 
to strength or energy. After an act of self-control, the resource becomes temporarily de-
pleted leaving the individual in a state of ego depletion. Therefore, performance on a 
subsequent self-control act will be impaired because of lack of resources. The strength 
model ascribes a number of features to the concept of energy resource. First, the re-
source is non-specific and used for a broad variety of self-control operations such as 
overriding or inhibiting impulses, regulating emotions, making choices and so on. Sec-
ond, the resource is limited, that is, the energy required to inhibit the desire to eat a fat-
tening snack is no longer available to suppress a negative emotion. Third, self-control 
is similar to a muscle. Like a muscle, self-control becomes tired after use and needs rest 
to recover. In addition, similar to training a muscle, self-control should also become 
stronger with repeated practice. This strengthening may offer a strategy to counter 
regulatory failure (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006). 
 The first empirical demonstration of the assumption that self-control depends on 
11
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available energy comes from Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998), who 
reported a series of four experiments on the ego depletion phenomenon. In the most 
appealing experiment, Baumeister and colleagues invited 3-hour food-deprived par-
ticipants to a laboratory room that was filled with the aroma of freshly baked choco-
late cookies (Experiment 1). Participants were confronted with two displays of food: a 
stack of fresh chocolate cookies and a bowl of radishes. Next, some participants were 
instructed to eat only from the radishes and not from the cookies (high self-control), 
whereas other participants were instructed to eat the cookies (low self-control). In 
each condition, participants were instructed to eat at least some of the food item they 
were allowed to eat (some radishes in the radish condition or a cookie in the chocolate 
condition). This manipulation intended to manipulate participants’ self-control; par-
ticipants in the radish condition were hungry, and then confronted with deliciously 
smelling food. However, they were only permitted to eat the radishes and not allowed 
to touch the cookies. After that, all participants took part in a ‘problem-solving task’ 
that consisted of a series of geometrical figure-tracing puzzles. What participants did 
not know was that these puzzles were in fact unsolvable and that the time they spent 
on this frustrating task served as a measure of their self-control. A group of control 
participants was not subjected to the food part of the experiment but started directly 
with the puzzle task. The exertion of self-control, that is, resisting chocolate cookies, 
was found to undermine subsequent persistence with unsolvable puzzles. Participants 
who refrained themselves from eating cookies spent relatively less time and made less 
attempts to solve the puzzles than participants who were allowed to eat chocolate 
cookies and control participants who were neither hungry or exposed to food. Thus, 
initial exercise of self-control (refraining from eating attractive food when hungry), 
hampered participants’ behaviour on a second, unrelated self-control task (persisting 
on a frustrating task). 
 By now, the phenomenon of ego depletion is a well-researched phenomenon and 
empirical tests have shown that self-regulatory resources underlie a wide range of be-
haviour. Examples of findings are that the regulation of thoughts (i.e., suppressing a 
specific thought), altering one’s emotional state (i.e., suppressing or exaggerating hap-
py or sad emotions), and decision making involve self-control and that each of these 
activities results in impaired performance on a second self-control activity (see for an 
overview, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2004). For instance, a recent study by Stucke and 
Baumeister (2006) investigated the relationship between ego depletion and aggres-
sive behaviour. In this study, participants were depleted by resisting the temptation to 
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consume tasty food (Experiment 1) or by sitting motionless and expressionless while 
watching a boring movie (Experiment 2 and 3). Next, participants were asked to com-
plete a so-called creativity task. After completing this task, the experimenter insulted 
participants by making rude comments on the way they completed the task. In order 
to measure aggressive responses toward the experimenter, participants were asked to 
evaluative the experimenter. Participants were aware that their evaluation would in-
fluence the academic position of the experimenter. A negative judgement was likely to 
have negative or even harmful consequences for the experimenter. The results showed 
that depleted participants gave more negative evaluations and thus responded more 
aggressively than control participants. 
 In sum, according to the strength model, self-control relies upon a limited resource 
of energy. When people control themselves, they use an amount of energy that is un-
available for future self-control demands, resulting in decreased performance. Find-
ings across studies have supported the strength model and have illustrated the nega-
tive impact of repeated self-control on a diversity of behaviours.  
Underlying processes
Despite the substantial body of literature illustrating the ego depletion phenomenon, 
the precise nature of limited strength and the psychological process underlying this 
limitation remains unclear. So far, most of the studies on ego depletion attempted to 
identify behaviours and outcome measures that are affected by ego depletion. Although 
the identification of these different outcome measures can be considered as a valuable 
contribution to the field, it does not provide more insight in the processes that underlie 
self-control and ego depletion. The concept of energy is, as Metcalfe and Mischel put it 
“much in need of a theory that specifies how it comes about and operates and when it 
goes up and down, and who has it and who lacks it” (1999, p. 16). Stated differently, 
the strength model seems to lack process and, at this point, the concept of energy may 
be best compared to a black box. The present dissertation will address this issue so as 
to gain more insight in the processes that underlie self-control performance and ego 
depletion. In doing so, a perspective was adopted that approaches self-control from a 
rather different angle than the earlier described strength model. Whereas the limited 
energy model is mainly concerned with the limits of our capacity to exert self-control, 
the research reported in the present dissertation was mainly guided by a focus on the 
flexibility and relativity of regulatory capabilities. Instead of considering self-control 
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failure as an inevitable consequence of prior consumption, the current work was di-
rected by a different view on self-control in which regulatory limits are considered less 
static and more susceptible to adjustment. It was argued that by focussing on possible 
ways to improve self-control and to circumvent ego depletion, the strength model can 
be extended and room can be created for identification of additional factors and pro-
cesses that contribute to self-control performance. 
 Indeed, previous studies have found some evidence for the view that the limits of 
self-control are less static than suggested by the limited strength model. For instance, 
Muraven and Slessarava (2003) conducted a series of experiments in which they dem-
onstrated that ego depletion may be compensated by increasing people’s motivation 
to perform well on subsequent self-control task. They showed that initially depleted 
individuals persevered longer at a subsequent self-control task if they were led to be-
lieve that their persistence would be beneficial to others or to themselves. Depleted 
participants, who were not motivated, lowered their persistence and thus showed ego 
depletion. Muraven and Slessarava explained the compensatory effect of motivation 
on ego depletion in terms of incentives that motivate people to use more of their energy 
resources. If such an incentive is absent, individuals who already used up a part of their 
resources tend to conserve their leftover energy, which is reflected in impaired self-
control performance on a subsequent task. Yet, if breaking into one’s reserves seems 
worthwhile (either for one’s own benefit or that of others), the tendency to mobilize 
costly energy will overrule the tendency to conserve. Thus, Muraven and Slessarava 
concluded that the natural (not necessarily conscious) tendency of depleted individu-
als is to conserve their scarce resources, and what is left will only be brought to action 
in the presence of an important goal. In other words, although the strength model and 
its muscle analogy may seem powerful and appealing, these findings illustrate that the 
role of the athlete is put somehow out of action. After all, self-control does not only in-
volve (mental) muscles but also a brain: it is the athlete who decides whether the game 
is important enough to give it all or to save some for the next. Obviously, determining 
whether the stake is high enough and acting upon it, is a consideration that requires a 
brain, and not only muscle. 
 The flexibility of our self-control abilities was also demonstrated in a study by 
Richards and Gross (2001). This study illustrated the strategic nature of self-control 
and showed that construing an emotional situation in a way that decreases its emotion-
al relevance (antecedent-focused regulation), is considerably less cognitively costly 
than regulating one’s emotional reactions during the occurrence of this situation (re-
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sponse-focused regulation). For instance, in one experiment it was found that suppres-
sion of emotions while watching photos of heavily injured people required less effort 
if participants were instructed to watch them with the cool, distant eye of a medical 
doctor so as to turn away from one’s own emotional reactions (fear, disgust). Together, 
the findings of this study suggest that the cognitive costs of emotion regulation vary 
according to how emotions are regulated. By using appropriate strategies, self-regula-
tion may be facilitated and less cognitively demanding. Thus, the loss or maintenance 
of self-control does not only seem to be a matter of strength but also of strategy. 
 Further evidence for the relativity of limits was provided in a in a study by Martijn, 
Tenbült, de Vries, Dreezens, and Merckelbach (2002). These authors demonstrated 
that the perceived boundaries of one’s self-controlling abilities are apt to change. In 
this study, participants watched a highly disgusting video fragment and were asked to 
suppress their emotions. A control group watched the same video, but received no sup-
pression instructions. Immediately after, half of the participants who suppressed their 
emotions were informed that “often people think they have to rest after an effortful 
task. However, scientific investigations prove that this is not the case after emotional 
effort…” (Martijn et al., 2002; p. 446, Experiment 1). On a subsequent self-control 
demanding task, participants who received this information outperformed control 
participants and participants who received no such information. These results suggest 
that people expect that exercising self-control leads to fatigue and, hence to worse per-
formance on a second self-control demanding task. If such expectancy is challenged, 
decline in performance is less evident and people may even achieve better.
 Taken together, recent findings suggest that depletion of strength is less inevita-
ble and automatic than assumed by the limited strength model. Whereas the strength 
model stresses the limits of our capability to control ourselves, the studies described 
above rather stress the flexibility and relativity of these limits. These studies give rise to 
the idea that the concept of energy is likely to be more complicated and dynamic than 
initially suggested. 
The present dissertation
As already discussed in the preceding section, the aim of the present dissertation is to 
gain more insight in the processes that underlie self-control performance. The studies 
presented in the following chapters address the role of distinct types of psychological 
processes on self-control performance and the occurrence of ego depletion.
15
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Previous research on self-control has suggested that self-control performance and the 
occurrence of the ego depletion phenomenon may be influenced by expectancies or 
schemata about self-control (Martijn et al., 2002; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2005). The 
results of these studies imply that not the existence of a limited energy resource per se, 
but the (naïve) expectancy that self-control is dependent on limited energy may ex-
plain self-control failure. In Chapter 2, three studies will be described that address this 
possible link between self-control related beliefs and self-control performance. More 
specifically, we tested whether the extent to which people believe that self-control is 
dependent on limited energy correlates with their own perception of their self-regula-
tory skills.   
 Chapter 3 examines the impact of automatic processes on self-control. Previous 
studies addressing the possible counteraction of ego depletion have relied on various 
means such as training or explicitly increasing the benefits of enacting self-control. 
However, these studies relied on explicit manipulations, requiring a certain amount 
of conscious attention and processing. In chapter 3, two studies will be described that 
investigate whether the manifestation of ego depletion can also be reduced or even 
eliminated by means of manipulations that are known to operate at an automatic, un-
conscious level. More precisely, by means of different priming procedures, it was tested 
whether unconscious activation of the concept of persistence could help to prevent loss 
of self-control. The central hypothesis in Chapter 3 was that activation of persistence 
induces automatic control behaviour and, consequently, does not require active in-
volvement by the self. Since the strength model postulates that ego depletion emerges 
as a result of a conscious, active self-control (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), it 
was expected that by unconsciously activating persistence, self-control performance 
will be enhanced and the occurrence of ego depletion may be circumvented.  
 Prior research has suggested that the direction in which people focus their atten-
tion while performing a task can have serious implications for task performance (see 
for instance Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Heatherton, Polivy, Herman & Baumeister, 
1993; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006; Mercer, McNevin, & Guadagnoli, 2004). 
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 present two studies that tested the role of attentional pro-
cesses in active self-control operations. Chapter 4 examined the effect of focusing at-
tention on the control demanding situation (internal focus) versus directing attention 
away from the self-control action (external focus). Indirect findings from past research 
imply that awareness of one’s regulatory efforts is an important factor contributing to 
self-control failure (Karniol & Miller, 1983; Yates & Revelle, 1979). Consistent with this 
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reasoning, we expected that self-control performance will suffer when attention is fo-
cused internally; i.e. on the control demanding action and the feelings that are present 
during this action. In contrast, we hypothesized that an external focus of attention will 
help to shift attention away from one’s regulatory efforts, thereby increasing self-con-
trol performance. The effect of attentional processes on self-control performance was 
further elaborated in Chapter 5. Previous studies investigating the effects of self-fo-
cused attention on self-control performance have revealed a mixed pattern of findings; 
part of these studies highlight the self-control enhancing effect of self-focused atten-
tion (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998), while others illustrate the regulatory 
downside of self-directed attention (e.g., Gill & Strom, 1985). The research presented 
in Chapter 4 was designed to provide more insight in these contradictory findings. It 
was reasoned that it is critical to differentiate between distinct types of self-focused 
attention. On the one hand, self-focused attention may involve the type of attention 
that was addressed in Chapter 4, namely attention directed towards the self-control ac-
tion and internal sensations during this action. On the other hand, self-focus may also 
involve what is known under the term self-awareness. When self-focus concerns self-
awareness, people become aware of the self’s existence in the world and the salience 
of an internalized, social and/or situational standard is increased (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972; Carver, 2002). Chapter 5 attempted to establish a direct comparison between 
both types of self-focused attention. In order to isolate the effect of cognitive associa-
tion, both types of self-focus were combined. More specifically, some participants were 
exposed to a manipulation that increased only self-awareness, whereas others received 
a manipulation that increased both self-awareness and cognitive association. We hy-
pothesized that when self-focus involves self-awareness, self-regulatory performance 
will improve. Moreover, when self-focus involves both self-awareness as well as aware-
ness of ones regulatory efforts, we expect it to result in worse performance compared 
to self-awareness alone. Importantly, Chapter 5 also examined the impact of both types 
of self-focus on the emergence of ego depletion. 
 In Chapter 6, the role of self-control and ego depletion is discussed in an applied 
context. More specifically, results presented in the present dissertation as well as other 
related findings are discussed in the light of criminality in order to provide more insight 
in the emergence of impulsive criminal behaviour. Moreover, based on this theoretical 
framework, practical guidelines for self-control improvement and prevention of impul-
sive crimes are offered. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the content and results of this dis-
17
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sertation and provides directions for future research. Note that most of the chapters of 
the current dissertation were written independently from one another. As an inevitable 
consequence, the reader may sometimes experience overlap in terms of content.  
1
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CHAPTER 2
Self-control related expectancies and self-control abilities
Published as: Alberts, H. J. E. M., Martijn, C., & De Vries, N. K. (submitted). 
Self-control related expectancies and self-control abilities.
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Abstract
The research presented in the present chapter aimed to investigate the relationship 
between self-control related expectancies and self-control abilities. By means of three 
questionnaire studies it was investigated whether the extent to which people expect 
self-control to be dependent on limited energy relates to their self-reported self-control 
abilities. Results show that when people are more inclined to expect self-control to be 
dependent on limited energy, they report relatively worse self-control abilities.
Introduction
Many of us hold the idea that our energy is limited. When we come home after a de-
manding day at the office, a surprise visit of our mother in law may be more than we 
can take. In that case, lying on the couch seems the only attractive option. However, 
imagine the pleasant visit of a good friend after the same tiring day at the office. Sud-
denly, our tiredness has vanished. This example illustrates that mental exhaustion can 
be regarded as a flexible construct.
 An empirical illustration of flexible limits comes from the field of biology. Ellen 
Langer describes the so-called “Coolidge effect” (1989, p. 30). When a male animal’s 
sexual appetite is sated, and he has finished copulating, he needs a rest period. How-
ever, if a new female of the species is brought in, he will immediately resume mating 
(Dewsbury, 1981). This phenomenon clearly exemplifies the flexibility of exhaustion 
or, in a broader sense, the subjective nature of limits. According to Langer “ …fatigue 
and satiation do not necessarily occur at fixed points. To a large extent, mental and 
physical exhaustion may be determined by premature commitments; in other words, 
unquestioned expectations dictate when our energy will run out” (Langer, 1989, 
p. 135).
 The idea that limits are flexible, contrasts with developments in the field of self-
control. Self-control entails the override or inhibition of competing urges, behaviours 
or desires (Barkley, 1997; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 
1993). According to the strength model, the capacity to control ourselves is defined 
by our own restrictions (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). These restrictions are a direct consequence of the idea that self-control draws 
on a fixed and limited resource, akin to strength or energy. After an act of self-con-
trol, the resource becomes temporarily depleted leaving the individual in a state of 
ego depletion. Therefore, performance on a second self-control act will be impaired 
21
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because of lack of resources. Regarding the energy resource a number of assumptions 
are made. First, the resource is non-specific and used for a broad variety of self-con-
trol operations such as overriding or inhibiting impulses, regulating emotions, mood, 
thought or behaviour, etc. Second, the resource is limited; thus, the energy employed 
to inhibit the desire to eat a fattening snack is no longer available to suppress a negative 
emotion. For example, in one of their first studies on the ego depletion phenomenon, 
Baumeister, Muraven, Bratslavski and Tice demonstrated that food-deprived partici-
pants who were not allowed to eat desirable food, were less persistent on a subsequent, 
second self-control demanding task than food-deprived participants who were allowed 
to eat (1998; Exp. 1). Third, operating self-control is similar to operating a muscle. Just 
like a muscle, self-control becomes tired after use and needs rest to recover. 
 In the present article, we address the role of expectancies that people have about 
self-control. To continue the muscle-athlete analogy: does it matter whether the 
athlete thinks of his or her resources as limited or unlimited? In a study by Martijn, 
Tenbült, de Vries, Dreezens, and Merckelbach (2002), it was demonstrated that the 
notion of limited energy is relative and flexible, and that the perceived boundaries 
of one’s self-controlling abilities are apt to change. In this experiment, participants 
watched a highly disgusting video excerpt and were asked to suppress their emotions. 
A control group watched the same video but received no suppression instructions. Im-
mediately after, half of the participants who suppressed their emotions were informed 
that: “Often people think they have to rest after an effortful task. However, scientific 
investigations prove that this is not the case after emotional effort…” (Martijn et al., 
2002; p. 446, Experiment 1). At a subsequent self-control demanding task, participants 
who received this information outperformed control participant and participants who 
received no such information. These results imply that people expect that exercising 
self-control leads to fatigue, and hence, to worse performance on a second self-control 
demanding task. If such expectancy is challenged, decline in performance is less self-
evident and people may even achieve better.  
 The aforementioned findings imply that not the existence of a limited energy re-
source per se, but rather the belief or expectancy that self-control is dependent on lim-
ited energy contributes to self-control failure. Such expectancies may be called “mind-
sets”, premature cognitive commitments, or an implicit or lay theory (Langer, 1989, 
Dweck, Chui, & Hong, 1995; Furnham, 1989). The present studies were designed to 
gain more insight in the relation between self-control abilities and self-control related 
beliefs. Three questionnaire studies were conducted that aimed at testing whether 
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there exists a relation between the extent to which people believe that self-control is 
dependent on limited energy and their self-reported self-control abilities. An individ-
ual who strongly believes that self-control is a matter of limited energy, is likely to be 
concerned with minimizing loss and the possible obstacles when exerting self-control. 
Such beliefs may cause one to quit self-control attempts sooner in order to minimize 
future failure. Holding the belief that self-control is dependent on limited energy may 
therefore have serious implications for self-control performance and long term goal 
achievement. Consistent with this reasoning, a recent series of studies of Mukhopad-
hyay and Johar (2005) showed that persons who think that self-control is an unlimited 
and malleable ability tend to set more goals than persons who believe their capacity is 
finite. Based on this line of thought, we expected that the more people are inclined to 
expect self-control to be dependent on (limited) energy, the less good self-control abili-
ties they report. 
Study 1
Method
Participants. A total of 54 (19 men and 35 women) psychology students of the Univer-
sity of Maastricht participated in exchange for course credit. The age of participants 
ranged from 16 to 54 years (M = 22, SD = 5.0). 
Measures
Self-control Scale. To measure trait self-control, a Dutch translation of the Self-control 
Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) was administered to participants. The 
present study used the full version of this questionnaire, consisting of 36 items. Ex-
amples include “I do many things on the spur of the moment” and “Sometimes I can’t 
stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong”. All questions were an-
swered on a 5 point scale ranging from “not at all like me”(1) to “very much like me 
(5)”. The Self-control Scale showed adequate reliability (Cronbach’s α =.80) in the 
present sample.
 Energy Expectancy Scale. In order to measure the extent to which people consider 
self-control to be an energy consuming activity, a scale was developed that consisted of 
10 propositions (see Table 1).  These propositions were partly derived from a previous 
study by Martijn et al. (2002). Examples include “Controlling myself requires a lot of 
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energy” and “A lack of energy causes me to become unable to resist temptations”. The 
questionnaire was preceded by the following instruction: “The following statements 
concern self-control. Self-control means exerting control over the self. It entails sup-
pression, change or continuation of acts, thoughts or emotions, even if this is in conflict 
with what you really want. An example of self-control is to continue studying, while 
you prefer to stop. Another example is saying “no” to a tempting piece of pie, because 
you are on a diet.  Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statement be-
low”. The statement were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from “totally disagree”(1) to 
“totally agree”(5). Cronbach’s α (.73) for the Energy Expectancy Scale (EES) demon-
strated sufficient reliability for the current sample.
Table 1.  Overview of Items of the Energy Expectancy Scale
1.   A lack of energy causes me to become unable to resist temptations
2.   It costs me energy if I try not to think about something unpleasant
3.   Often, the reason why I fail controlling my emotions is a lack of energy
4.   It costs me a lot of energy when I am reading a boring textbook
5.   Often, after completing an unpleasant task, I am not able to complete another 
       unpleasant task
6.   If I plan to do something that costs energy, I’ll try  to be well rested
7.   If I am unable to control my temper, this is caused by a lack of energy
.   I find it hard to control myself when I am tired
9.   Controlling myself requires a lot of energy
10. Being able to successfully control ones emotions is  rather determined by energy than by  
       motivation
Results Study 1
Correlational analyses revealed a significant negative correlation between the scores on 
the ESS and the scores on the Self-control Scale, r = -.31, p =.03 (2-tailed), Ms = 2.55 
vs. 3.29, and SDs = .82 and .42, respectively. In accordance with our primary hypoth-
esis, this finding implies that when people are more inclined to consider self-control as 
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dependent on (limited) energy, they report relatively worse self-control abilities.
 Factor analysis was conducted in order verify distinct theoretical dimensions under-
lying both scales. Principal component analysis with varimax rotation using a forced 2 
factor model confirmed unique dimensionality of the scales by showing that the items 
of the Self-control Scale loaded the highest on Factor I, whereas the items of the ESS 
loaded highest and exclusively on Factor II. Analysis of variance showed 25.68% of the 
explained variance to be attributable to factor I and 10.0% to factor II.
Study 2
The findings of Study 1 suggest an association between people’s beliefs about the op-
eration of self-control and their self-control abilities. It was found that the less people 
are inclined to expect self-control to be dependent on (limited) energy, the better self-
control abilities they report. However, it is possible that these findings can be explained 
in terms of a sequence or order effect. Since the ESS was completed after the Self-
control Scale, it remains possible that participants who indicated that they possessed 
relatively low self-control abilities, tried to “make up” for this response by indicating 
that self-control is demanding and dependent on energy. According to this alternative 
explanation, higher scores on the ESS are not necessarily a reflection of true expecta-
tions, but rather an expression of justification for possessing relatively low self-control 
abilities. Study 2 aimed at investigating the impact of this possible sequence-effect by 
reversing the order of the two questionnaires. Thus, in Study 2, the Self-control Scale 
was administered after the ESS. In addition, since Study 1 concerned a relatively small 
sample size, Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a larger sample 
size. In Study 2, a total of 288 (78 men and 210 women) first-year psychology students 
of Maastricht University participated. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 27 
year (M=19, SD=2.9). 
Results Study 2
Again, a significant negative correlation between scores on the ESS (Cronbach’s a = 
.77) and the Self-control Scale (Cronbach’s a = .83) was found, r = -.24, p < .001 (2-
tailed), Ms = 3.22 vs. 2.39, and SDs = .49 and .39 respectively. This finding is in line 
with findings of Study 1 and shows that stronger energy related beliefs of self-control 
are associated with decreased perceived (or reported) self-control abilities. 
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 In order to check for interrelated dimensions between the two scales, principal 
component analysis with varimax rotation using a forced 2 factor model was conduct-
ed. This analysis showed that the items of the Self-control Scale loaded the highest on 
Factor I, whereas the items of the ESS loaded highest and exclusively on Factor II. Fac-
tor I explained 24.81% of the variance, whereas 8.18% of the variance was explained 
by factor II. 
Study 3
Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 by showing that higher scores on the EES 
were associated with lower self-reported self-control abilities. Study 3 was designed 
to test the robustness of this finding by selecting a different self-control measure-
ment. Instead of measuring self-control abilities by means of the Self-control Scale, 
we used a questionnaire that assessed impulsivity. Impulsivity is a construct that is 
inherently related to self-control. Whereas self-control is the choice of a larger, more 
delayed outcome over a smaller-sooner outcome, impulsiveness is the opposite choice. 
Impulsivity has been defined as the counterpart of self-control (Ainslie, 1974; Green & 
Myerson, 1993; Logue, 1988).  In order to measure impulsivity, the Barratt Impulsive-
ness Scale–11 (BIS–11; Barratt, 1994) was used. This scale is a self-report measure of 
general impulsiveness and was chosen due to its widespread use and fine psychometric 
properties. The BIS–11 consists of 30 self-descriptive items that measure general im-
pulsiveness using a 4-point scale ranging from “Rarely/Never” (1) to “Almost always/
Always” (4). Based on the findings of Study 1 and Study 2, we predicted that higher 
scores on the ESS would be positively associated with higher scores on the BIS-11. In 
Study 3, a total of 167 (42 men en 125 women) first-year psychology students of the 
Maastricht University participated. The age of participants ranged from 17 to 48 year 
(M = 20.5, SD = 7.05).
Results Study 3
In accordance with our expectations, analysis revealed a significant positive cor-
relation between the scores on the ESS (Cronbach’s a = .74) and the scores on the 
BIS-11 (Cronbach’s a = .80), r =.27, p < .001 (2-tailed), Ms = 3.09 vs. 2.14, and 
SDs = .57 and .30, respectively. This finding suggests that when people are more in-
clined to consider self-control as dependent on (limited) energy, they report higher 
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levels of overall impulsiveness.
 Principal component analysis with varimax rotation using a forced 2 factor model 
showed that the items of the BIS-11 loaded the highest on Factor I, whereas the items 
of the ESS loaded highest and exclusively on Factor II. This suggests that the two scales 
concern distinct theoretical dimensions. Factor I explained 13.98% of the variance, 
whereas 9.05% of the variance was attributable to factor II. 
General Discussion
Indirect findings from previous studies on self-control and ego depletion suggest that 
expectancies about the operation of self-control may have an influence on self-control 
performance (Martijn et al., 2002; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2005). More specifically, 
these findings suggest that self-control performance might be guided by the fact that 
people think that self-control depends on (limited) energy. The present research aimed 
to test this link more directly. A scale was developed to reflect participants’ beliefs 
about the extent to which self-control is dependent on (limited) energy. In order to as-
sess their self-control ability, participants completed the Self-control Scale (Tangney, 
Baumeister & Boone, 2004) (Study 1 and Study 2) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(Barratt, 1994) (Study 3). Correlational analysis of these list revealed that stronger 
energy related beliefs of self-control are associated with decreased self-reported self-
control abilities (Study 1 and Study 2) as well as higher levels of overall impulsiveness 
(Study 3). Whereas much of previous research on the link between beliefs and self-
control has examined beliefs about one’s ability to exert self-control (see for instance 
Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985; Lent & Hackett, 1987; Strecher, 
DeVillis, Becker, & Rosenstock, 1986), these findings suggest that it may be worthwhile 
to consider people’s beliefs about the operation of self-control as well. Future research 
may integrate the current findings with previous findings by investigating the relation-
ship between beliefs about the operation of self-control and beliefs about self-control 
ability. 
 Although the present findings provide additional evidence for the existence of an 
association between energy related expectancies and self-control abilities, they do not 
provide information about the causality of this relation. Based on the findings from 
Martijn et al. (2002) and Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2005), it seems reasonable to 
assume that expectancies of self-control guide self-control performance. However, it 
also remains possible that expectancies are shaped by people’s self-control abilities. 
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Future research should therefore address the nature of causality and the possible in-
teraction between energy related expectancies and self-control abilities. Moreover, it 
has to be acknowledged that the correlations that were found in the present studies 
were significant, but modest.  The present findings may therefore best be considered as 
preliminary and may well function as a starting point for future research. 
 A limitation of the current research concerns the fact that self-control ability was 
measured by means of self-reports. Future research should investigate the impact of 
energy related expectancies in more depth by using one or more behavioural measures 
instead of relying solely on questionnaires. This is relevant from both a theoretical as 
well as practical point of view. After all, many health related interventions are aimed 
at improving behaviour that involves self-control, like for instance quitting smoking or 
condom use. According to the limited strength model, such interventions should be 
directed at increasing people’s energy reservoir, by means of training (Muraven, Bau-
meister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006). The present findings offer an alternative 
and suggest that it may be valuable to identify and systematically alter ineffective self-
control expectancies. 
2
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CHAPTER 3
The role of automatic processes in overcoming ego depletion
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Abstract
Research has shown that repeated exercise of self-control leads to impaired perfor-
mance on subsequent self-control tasks, a phenomenon labeled ego depletion. The 
current research investigated the influence of automatic processes on self-control per-
formance. Study 1 showed that activation of persistence leads to stable self-control 
performance and may help to overcome effects of ego depletion. Initially depleted 
participants kept their physical self-control performances constant when primed with 
persistence. If such a prime was absent, self-control performance of depleted partici-
pants decreased indicating ego depletion. Using a different manipulation, these find-
ings were replicated in Study 2.
Introduction
Self-control entails the override or inhibition of urges, behaviours or desires (Barkley, 
1997; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1993) and can be re-
garded as an essential ingredient for many successes and achievements in life. Recent 
developments in the field of self-control suggest that self-control is costly (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). According to Muraven and colleagues, our ca-
pacity for self-control is limited (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Muraven & Bau-
meister, 2000). These researchers state that self-control draws on a fixed and limited 
resource, akin to strength or energy. After an act of self-control, the resource becomes 
temporarily depleted causing a state of ego depletion. Therefore, performance on a 
subsequent self-control act will be impaired because of lack of resources. In the current 
paper, we focus on ways to overcome the effects of ego depletion and to improve self-
control performance. 
 The literature on ego depletion ascribes a number of features to the concept of 
energy resource. First, the resource is non-specific and used for a broad variety of self-
control operations such as overriding or inhibiting impulses, regulating emotions, 
making choices and so on. Second, the resource is limited, that is, the energy required 
to inhibit the desire to eat a fattening snack is no longer available to suppress a negative 
emotion. Third, the resource is similar to a muscle. Like a muscle, self-control becomes 
tired after use and needs rest to recover. Today, a wide range of studies have indeed 
shown that when people exert self-control, performance on a subsequent act of self-
control is likely to decrease (cf. Baumeister et al., 1998; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Bau-
meister, 2001; Muraven et al., 1998). Together, the results of these studies illustrate 
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that after repeated self-control, ego depletion seems to emerge automatically, causing 
almost inevitable failure of future self-control attempts. 
 Given the advantages of successful self-control, an important question is whether 
the negative effects of ego depletion can be prevented. To date, most studies on self-
control and ego depletion focussed on the conditions under which ego depletion oc-
curs and only a few studies investigated if and how ego depletion may be prevented 
or counteracted. A first study by Muraven, Baumeister and Tice (1999) showed that 
self-control may be strengthened by a regime of training. Students were instructed to 
engage in self-control trainings (such as keeping food diaries or improving posture) for 
a 2-week period. After that period, students showed improved performance on a physi-
cal self-control measurement when compared to a control group. Martijn, Tenbült, De 
Vries, Dreezens and Merckelbach (2002) demonstrated another way to overcome the 
negative effects of ego depletion, namely by changing people’s expectancies. In this 
study, participants watched a highly disgusting video fragment and were asked to sup-
press their emotions. A control group watched the same video, but received no sup-
pression instructions. Immediately after, half of the participants who suppressed their 
emotions were informed that “often people think they have to rest after an effortful 
task. However, scientific investigations prove that this is not the case after emotional 
effort…” (Martijn et al., 2002; p. 446, Experiment 1). On a subsequent self-control de-
manding task, participants who received this information outperformed control par-
ticipants and participants who received no such information. Ego depletion may also 
be compensated by increasing people’s motivation to perform well on a subsequent 
self-control task. A recent series of experiments by Muraven and Slessarava (2003) 
demonstrated that depleted individuals persevered longer at a subsequent self-control 
task if they were led to believe that their persistence would be beneficial to others or to 
themselves. Depleted participants, who were not motivated, lowered their persistence 
and thus showed ego depletion. 
 To sum up, recent studies on overcoming ego depletion showed that self-control 
can be improved by various means such as training or explicitly increasing the benefits 
of enacting self-control. Although the above described studies use different manipula-
tions to improve self-control, they share the way these manipulations are presented; all 
studies use explicit manipulations, requiring a certain amount of conscious attention 
and processing. An important question in the light of these findings is whether ego 
depletion can only be diminished or even eliminated by ways that depend on conscious 
attention or conscious processing. In other words, is it possible to circumvent the ne-
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cessity of conscious self-control? 
 In the present series of experiments we try to extent the current findings on self-
control and ego depletion by investigating whether the emergence of ego depletion 
can be reduced or even eliminated by means of manipulations that are known to op-
erate at an automatic level and do not require conscious awareness to be effective. 
More precisely, we will investigate whether activation of the concept of persistence 
can help to prevent loss of self-control. As described by Baumeister et al. (2000) (see 
also Schmeichel et al., 2003, p. 87), ego depletion is not a sign of complete exhaus-
tion, but a tendency to conserve a remaining amount of energy. However, Baumeister 
and colleagues do not mention whether strength conservation involves a conscious 
and deliberate decision or a more or less automatic process that does not necessarily 
require conscious awareness. In our opinion, the latter view is most likely to be true. In 
this view, the tendency to conserve resources can best be interpreted as a standard or 
default reaction after enactment of self-control. After an act of self-control people may 
automatically switch to a standby or “energy conservation” mode, that enables them to 
them to deal in the most careful way with the remaining amount of energy. If the reac-
tion of depleted individuals to future self-control attempts is guided by this standby 
modus, then it seems worthwhile to know whether and how it is possible to switch to 
the “full operation” mode again. Previous research of Webb and Sheeran (2003) pro-
vided preliminary evidence suggesting that automatic processes can help to overcome 
the effects of ego depletion. The influence of automaticity was demonstrated by using 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). These are action plans and refer to spe-
cific goal behaviour as well as to the situational context in which the planned behaviour 
will be enacted (e.g., when I encounter situation x, I will initiate goal-directed behav-
iour y). Since behavioural control is overtaken by anticipated environmental cues, the 
process of control becomes automated. In two experiments it was consistently found 
that participants who formed implementation intentions that specified when and how 
to act during a depletion task, performed significantly better on a subsequent self-con-
trol task than depleted participants who did not form these implementation intentions. 
In other words, implementation intentions conserved self-regulatory resources. 
 In the present studies, we examined whether activation of concepts related to the 
maintenance of control behaviour, such as persistence, is also capable to offset the ef-
fects of ego depletion. Whereas previously discussed studies on self-regulation and au-
tomatic goal pursuit mainly addressed activation of self-regulatory goals (e.g., Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; Shah & Kruglanski , 2002), the 
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present studies focus on activation of self-regulatory behaviour. Instead of applying 
directly to one specific (self-regulatory) goal, persistence is clearly a behavioural con-
struct that is (a-specifically) related to the maintenance of control behaviour in gen-
eral. Activation of persistence may produce automatic control behaviour and, hence, 
circumvents the need for active and conscious self-regulation. Because of the absence 
of such need, this may be in particular useful for individuals who already suffer from 
resource depletion.  In order to activate persistence, we used different priming proce-
dures. In a series of experiments by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), it was already 
shown that when a trait construct or stereotype is activated by means of a priming 
procedure, behaviour changes accordingly, even in an unrelated context. That is, the 
thought of a specific behaviour was sufficient to increase the tendency to behave in that 
way. Likewise, in the present series of studies, we expect self-control related behaviour 
to be affected by activation of persistence. We expect that low depleted participants 
outperform high depleted participants. We also hypothesize that under condition of 
ego depletion, activation of persistence leads to relatively better self-control perfor-
mance than no activation of persistence.  In Study 1, low and high depleted partici-
pants were primed with persistence related concepts such as “perseverance” and “hold-
ing on” by means of a scrambled sentences procedure. Study 2 aimed to replicate these 
findings and activated persistence by means of a visual priming procedure.
Study 1
The aim of the first study was to investigate whether activation of “persistence” im-
proves people’s self-control performance. The first part of the study consisted of the 
manipulation of initial self-control induced by presenting participants either with 8 
solvable, but extremely difficult labyrinths (high self-control) or 39 relatively easy 
labyrinths (low self-control). The labyrinths were selected on the basis of a pilot study. 
That study showed that difficult labyrinths were judged as significantly more difficult 
and almost impossible to solve as compared to easy labyrinths. Moreover, pilot partici-
pants expressed that they wished to quit solving difficult labyrinths after a few minutes 
and judged the task as exacting1. Although in a different form, a conceptually similar 
1 Labyrinths were pre-tested in an unrelated sample of 16 participants. Each participant received a 15-page booklet with a 
different labyrinth printed on each page: half of the booklets consisted of 15 extremely difficult labyrinths, the other half of 15 
relatively easy labyrinths. Each participant was allowed to work exactly 10 min on the labyrinths and was then asked to evaluate 
the extent to which they judged the labyrinths as difficult and frustrating, and whether they had wanted to quit the task before 
the 10 min were over. Judgments were gathered on three 5-point scales varying from (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). In the 
difficult labyrinth condition, only one participants completed the first labyrinth, the other seven did not manage to solve one 
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manipulation to induce ego depletion was used in a study by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven and Tice (1998) who exposed food-deprived participants to desirable but for-
bidden food for a fixed period of five minutes. Persisting with unattractive actions such 
as solving difficult labyrinths or refraining from tempting food, while one experiences 
the urge to quit, can be regarded as a task that requires self-control. 
 The second part of the study intended to increase the salience of self-control en-
hancing behaviour by means of priming. Half the participants were presented with 
a Scrambled Sentence Task (SST, Srull & Wyer, 1979) including sentences related to 
persistence and perseverance, holding on, and so on, whereas the other half received 
a SST with neutral sentences (see also Araya, Akrami, Ekehammer, & Hedlund, 2002). 
We chose for a SST because this is an implicit priming technique that reduces demand 
characteristics or other self-presentational concerns (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).
 The third task of the study was a physical stamina task adapted from Muraven 
et al. (1998) and consisted of squeezing a handgrip. Although squeezing a handgrip 
seems primarily a matter of muscular strength, it has proven to be a successful mea-
sure of self-control in prior research (see for example Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 
1998, Study 1; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001, Study 2). Because squeezing 
a handgrip becomes fatiguing after a short period of time, the person feels the urge to 
stop squeezing. Overcoming this fatigue and overriding the urge to quit, requires self-
control. We adopted the physical stamina measure as main dependent variable for two 
reasons. First, because most people think that a handgrip primarily depends on mus-
cular strength, it is a relatively unobtrusive measure of self-control. Second, because 
squeezing a handgrip is quite distinct from the tasks we used  in this experiment to 
induce depletion and to prime persistence, participants were less likely to suspect any
connection between the tasks. In order to be able to control for individual differences 
in hand strength, handgrip performance was measured twice: before the labyrinths 
task and after the SST. Because of this baseline measurement, all participants started 
with a self-control task and thus exercised some self-control before starting with the 
actual self-control manipulation (easy vs. difficult labyrinths). Thus, strictly speaking 
the comparison was between groups of participants that differed in their level of deple-
tion. 
 
labyrinth within 10 min. In the easy labyrinth condition, participants solved 13.2 (SD = 1.4) on average. This was reflected in 
the judgments of the difficulty level of the labyrinths (M difficult = 4.3, M easy = 1.5, t(14) = 8,78, p < .01) and frustration (M 
difficult = 3.1, M easy = 1.6, t(14) = 3.14, p < .01). Moreover, participants who tried to solve difficult labyrinths indicated a 
stronger desire to quit the task earlier than allowed to (M difficult = 3.3, M easy = 1.9, t(14) = 2.28, p < .05).
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Our hypothesis was that participants who exercised initial self-control will perform 
better on a subsequent self-control task under conditions of high accessibility of persis-
tence than under conditions of low accessibility of persistence. 
Method
Participants and procedure
Eighty (72 women and 8 men) undergraduates of Maastricht University were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (self-control: easy vs. difficult labyrinths) x 2 (priming: neutral SST vs. 
persistence related SST) between-subjects design. Participants were individually tested 
in 30 min sessions and received a monetary reward for their participation. In order to 
minimize experimenter effects, the experimenter used a written protocol throughout 
the whole experimental procedure (all instructions to participants were equal). The 
experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of our faculty.
 After a short and neutral briefing on the study (“This study consists of a series of 
unrelated cognitive and physical tasks”), participants performed the first physical self-
control measurement that functioned as an individual baseline against which to com-
pare the second physical self-control measure. The experimenter asked participants to 
place a handgrip in their dominant hand and inserted a coin between the two handles 
as the participant squeezed them together. Participants were instructed to squeeze the 
handgrip as long as possible. The moment the participant relaxed his or her grip, the 
coin fell out. The experimenter started a stopwatch at the moment he placed the coin 
between the handles and stopped timing when the coin fell out. 
 Following the first hand grip task, participants received a booklet with relatively 
easy labyrinths (low self-control) or extremely difficult labyrinths (high self-control). 
They were instructed to solve as many labyrinths as possible within 10 min. After fin-
ishing the labyrinths, participants filled out the Brief Mood Inspection Scale (BMIS, 
Mayer & Gaschke, 1988), containing 16 items and 6 items that were added to obtain ad-
ditional data about the energy and tiredness component of participants’ mood. In total, 
there were 8 (2 original BMIS and 6 extra) items pertaining to tiredness. Subsequently, 
we induced high accessibility of persistence by presenting a “verbal ability task”. In 
fact, this was a scrambled sentence task (SST) that intended to prime participants with 
the concept of persistence. Participants unscrambled 25 scrambled sentences of which 
15 were related to persistence (e.g., “Peter keeps going”); the other 10 were neutral 
and were not related to persistence or self-control (e.g., “Sam buys bread”). Persistence 
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related and neutral sentences were presented in a random order that was the same for 
all participants in the persistence prime condition. Participants in the neutral prim-
ing condition received 25 neutral scrambled sentences. A pilot study revealed that the 
writing activity during the scrambled sentence task interfered with performance on 
the subsequent handgrip task. A majority of pilot participants indicated that their poor 
performance on the second handgrip task was due to their fast speed of writing during 
the SST. Therefore, we adapted the procedure and asked participants just to read the 
correct sentences aloud. After completing the SST, participants squeezed the handgrip 
for the second time, following the same procedure as for the first handgrip measure-
ment. Next, participants once more completed the 8-item “energy and tiredness” mood 
scale. This scale consisted of two original BMIS adjectives related to energy and tired-
ness and the six additional items. Participants were finally asked to write down what 
they thought the experiment was about. The latter served to determine whether par-
ticipants were aware of a possible influence of the SST. Participants were debriefed and 
thanked.  
Dependent measures 
The Dutch translation of the BMIS (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) was used to check for a 
possible difference in mood between participants in the easy and difficult labyrinth 
conditions (Cronbach’s a = .85). The BMIS is a selection of 16 adjectives tapping eight 
mood states: (a) happy (happy, lively), (b) loving (loving, caring), (c) calm (calm, 
content), (d) energetic (active, peppy), (e) fearful/anxious (jittery, nervous), (f) an-
gry (grouchy, fed up), (g) tired (tired, drowsy), and (h) sad (gloomy, sad). The Dutch 
translation of the BMIS was scored on 16 5-point scales ranging from “definitely not 
feel” (1) to “definitely feel” (5). Six additional items were scored on the same 5-point 
scales in order to obtain additional information about the energy and tiredness compo-
nent of participants’ mood (Cronbach’s a = .88). These items were I feel fit/I feel that I 
can handle the world/ I feel lethargic/ I feel exhausted /I feel not like doing anything/ 
I feel dull. The total mood scale was completed directly after the first physical self-con-
trol measure. After the second physical self-control measure, a selection consisting of 
two original BMIS adjectives and the six additional items was administered, all per-
taining to energy and tiredness (Cronbach’s a = .90). 
 In order to control for individual differences, physical performance was measured 
twice: at the beginning of the experiment and directly after the labyrinth task. Using a 
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stopwatch, time (in msec) was measured that a participant squeezed the handles of the 
handgrip together. 
Results
First, we checked whether any of the participants in the experimental SST condition 
were aware of the fact that the majority of these sentences were related to persistence. 
Not a single participant recognized the specific content of the sentences. Hence, none 
of out participants was aware of the main hypothesis of the experiment about the rela-
tion between activating persistence and reducing ego depletion. 
 Four participants had deviant scores on the first handgrip time (z > 3) and were 
recognized as outliers (outlier procedure cf. Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001). 
Therefore, further analyses described below included the data of the remaining 76 par-
ticipants (easy labyrinths + neutral prime N = 19, easy labyrinths + persistence prime 
N = 18, difficult labyrinths + neutral prime N = 19 and difficult labyrinths + persis-
tence prime N = 20). 
 In order to check the effectiveness of our self-control manipulation, we tested 
whether solving difficult labyrinths consumed more self-control than easy labyrinths. 
To test this, we compared within the neutral priming conditions the handgrip perfor-
mance of participants who solved difficult labyrinths (high self-control) with the per-
formance of participants who solved easy labyrinths (low self-control). As expected, 
an ANOVA with the mean scores of the two handgrip times as a repeated measurement 
factor, and initial self-control as between subject factor revealed a significant interac-
tion effect of the two factors, F(1, 36) = 7.37, p = .01, h2 = .17.  Under neutral prim-
ing conditions, participants who were exposed to the difficult labyrinths performed 
significantly worse than those who solved the relatively easy labyrinths (Ms handgrip2 
– handgrip1 = -13.54 vs. 0.17, and SDs = 15.64 vs. 15.51; resp.). Moreover, in order 
to investigate the alternative explanation that the above described differences in per-
formance can be explained in terms of excessive performance on the first measure-
ment or second measurement, we calculated correlations between the first and second 
measurement within the neutral priming condition for high and low initial self-control 
participants separately. Analysis ruled out this alternative explanation by revealing a 
comparable and significant positive correlation between the two measures in the high 
self-control condition, as well as in the low self-control condition (r  = .72, p < .01 vs. 
r = .71, p < .01; resp.).  
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 One-way ANOVA with condition as independent variable and time on handgrip 1 
as dependent variable checked for initial differences in handgrip strength and yielded 
a marginally significant effect, F(3, 75) = 2.54, p = .06, h2 = .10. Although only mar-
ginally significant, this effect might imply that differences in self-control performance 
at time 2 were the result of inter-group differences in the initial time measurement in 
stead of changes across groups. For this reason, in all further analyses of self-control 
performance, handgrip 1 was included as covariate in order to control for pre-existing 
personal differences in handgrip strength.
 Multiple regression analyses were used to test the main hypothesis that under con-
dition of ego depletion, activation of persistence leads to relatively better self-control 
performance than no activation of persistence. Multiple linear regression was utilized 
since it permits the specification of which comparisons to be made, without any loss 
or reduction of statistical power. In line with the two-way design of the study, both the 
factors initial self-control and priming were dummy-coded, comparing main effects of 
initial self-control and priming, plus their interaction. 
 Regression analyses revealed a main effect of initial self-control, b =.20, t(75) = 
2.36, p = .02, indicating the standard ego depletion effect. That is, participants who 
solved difficult labyrinths (high initial self-control) performed worse at the second 
handgrip measure than participants who received easy labyrinths. A second main ef-
fect was found of type of priming, b = -.23, t(75) = 2.86, p < .01. Participants who 
received a persistence prime performed relatively better at the second handgrip mea-
surement than participants who received a neutral prime. The two-way interaction 
failed to reach significance, b = -.05, t(75) = .60. As can be seen in Table 1, in which 
the handgrip performances per condition are summarized, the absence of the interac-
tion is caused by the fact that both the difficult and easy labyrinth condition, profited 
from the persistence prime.
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Table 1.  Self-control Performance in Study 1
Condition Time 1 Time 2 Change
Difficult labyrinths  + neutral prime 53.13 (21.30) 39.59 (20.37) -13.54 (15.64)
Difficult labyrinths  + persistence prime 40.24 (2.44) 39.46 (27.76) - 0.7 (19.17)
Easy Labyrinths  + neutral prime 31.2 (21.69) 31.46 (1.40) 0.17 (15.51)
Easy Labyrinths  + persistence prime 3.60 (27.00) 50.32 (29.33) 11.72 (23.33)
Note. Values under Time 1 and Time 2 represent mean times (in sec) that participants squeezed the handgrip. Standard devia-
tions are given in parentheses. Values under Change represent change in performance (in sec), from Time 1 to Time 2.
 One-way ANOVA revealed that solving easy versus difficult labyrinths resulted in 
a mood differences, F(1, 75) = 9.45, p < .01, h2 = .11. Participants who solved easy 
labyrinths reported a somewhat better mood than those who solved difficult labyrinths 
(Ms = 3.68 vs. 3.46 and SDs = .30 and .34; respectively). To investigate the possible 
influence of this mood effect on self-control performance, we included mood as a co-
variate in the previously described regression model. 
 Most important, the covariate mood was not found significant, b = -.12, t(75) = 
1.25, p = .22.  The remaining effects replicated our previous pattern; although the ef-
fect of initial self-control was non-significant, it directionally supported our previous 
pattern of results, b = .12, t(75) = 1.65, p = .11. In addition, a main effect for type of 
priming was found significant again, b = -.25, t(75) = 3.10, p < .01. No interaction ef-
fect was found, b = -.029, t(75) = .35, p = .73. These results suggest that differences 
in mood cannot fully account for the significant differences in self-control performance 
between conditions.
 To investigate the possible influence of the priming procedure on participants’ 
mood, we analysed the 8-item “energy and tiredness” mood scale, obtained directly 
after the second handgrip. This revealed that exposure to neutral or persistence primes 
did not lead to a significant difference in reported mood, F(1, 75) < 1.0, h2 = .011 (Ms 
= 3.58 vs. 3.49, and SDs = .42 vs. .45; respectively). 
 Furthermore, changes in mood were analyzed by computing the difference be-
tween the second “energy and tiredness” mood scale and the same 8 items of the first 
mood questionnaire. ANOVA did not result in any significant main or interaction ef-
fects (all p’s > .05).  The absence of changes in mood indicated that participants did 
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not experience a change in mood during the course of the experiment. 
 In order to test the possible influence of mood changes on the performance on the 
physical self-control task, we included the difference between the second “energy and 
tiredness” mood scale and the same 8 items of the first mood questionnaire as a co-
variate in the regression analysis. Again, a significant main effect of initial self-control 
b = .19, t(75) = 2.29, p = .025, as well as type of priming was found b = -.23, t(75) 
= 2.85, p < .01. In addition, no significant interaction effect was found, b = .05, t(75) 
=.60, p = .56, whereas the covariate failed to reach significance b =.01, t(75) = .09, 
p = .93. These results indicate that the differences in physical self-control performance 
cannot be attributed to changes in mood.  
Discussion
The data of Study 1 provide support for the hypothesis that increasing the accessibility 
of persistence may help to overcome effects of ego depletion. 
 Participants in the both the high and low self-control condition, kept their perfor-
mance relatively stable as a result of priming. The findings indicate that initially deplet-
ed participants kept their physical self-control performances constant when primed 
with persistence. In the absence of such a prime, physical self-control performance of 
depleted participants went down, indicating the standard effect of ego depletion. Thus, 
although the interaction between x and y was non-significant, the pattern of means 
was in the predicted direction. In addition, the pattern of results of Study 1 suggests 
that the effect of ego depletion is not fixed or absolute, but nevertheless persistent. 
Low depleted participants who were exposed to a persistence prime outperformed 
high depleted participants who were exposed to the same priming manipulation. The 
finding that these groups differ can be held as an indication of fatigue or depletion. 
However, this effect of fatigue is not absolute. After all, high depleted participants who 
were primed with persistence performed better than high depleted participants who 
received a neutral prime.
 Another important aspect with regard to the findings of Study 1 concerns the effect 
of priming of persistence on future self-control demands. Does the finding that no signs 
of ego depletion are present when people are depleted and exposed to the persistence 
prime indicate that ego depletion has been reduced or even eliminated, or does this 
finding implicate that a delay of ego depletion has occurred? According to the theoreti-
cal assumptions of the strength model, one may assume that depleted participants who 
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were primed with persistence, should have used more of their (last) energy resources 
in order to be able to keep their self-control performance stable (cf. Muraven & Sles-
sarava, 2003). This explanation was exploratory examined in Study 2.
Study 2
In order to test the assumption that depleted participants who are primed with persis-
tence use more of their (last) energy resources, the experimental procedure of Study 2 
was extended with an additional task. When depleted, people display a shift towards 
preferring activities that require less effort (Holding, 1983). Moreover, as suggested by 
Muraven and Slessarava (2003), the decision to invest effort in a task strongly depends 
on a person’s motivation for that task and his or her perception of the amount of en-
ergy left. Therefore, a task was selected that would be sensitive to such appraisals and 
participants were asked to indicate the preferred difficulty level for the last task. We 
reasoned that if priming of persistence causes people to invest more energy, this extra 
investment of energy should be reflected in a decreased willingness to invest in a third 
self-control task. As a consequence, people who were primed with persistence were 
expected to prefer a relatively lower difficulty of an additional task. 
 In summary, Study 2 was designed to provide converging evidence with the results 
of Study 1 and to exploratory investigate the effect of priming on future self-control 
demands. Although we relied on the same experimental procedure as in Study 1, some 
changes were made. Beside the addition of an extra task, we also used an alternative 
ego depletion manipulation and an alternative way to increase the accessibility of “per-
sistence”. In Study 2, ego depletion was induced by means of an attention control task 
and, instead of a verbal priming procedure, we used a visual priming procedure.  In 
other respects, the experimental procedure of Study was similar to that in Study 1. As 
in Study 1, a depleting task was followed by a muscular endurance test. Performance 
on this physical self-control task represented the main dependent variable. We antici-
pated that depleted participants who were primed with “persistence” would perform 
relatively better on the second muscular endurance task than depleted participants 
who received no such prime. 
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Method
Participants and procedure
Eighty undergraduates (60 women and 20 men) of Maastricht University were ran-
domly assigned to one of four conditions. It consisted of a 2 (self-control: low vs. high) 
x 2 (type of prime: neutral prime vs. persistence prime) between-subjects design. All 
participants were individually tested in 40 min sessions. During the whole experimen-
tal procedure, the experimenter used a written protocol in order to minimize experi-
menter effects. The experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of our 
faculty.
 The experiment was presented as a series of unrelated tasks that tested partici-
pants’ cognitive and physical abilities. After signing a consent form, all participants 
took part in the muscular endurance test to furnish a baseline against which to com-
pare the second endurance task. Participants were instructed to hold a 1.5 kg weight as 
long as possible with their arm stretched in a 90o angle with their torso while sitting on 
a chair in front of a computer screen. They were situated in such a way that their hand 
holding the weight was exactly 5 cm above a bell. When participants were not able 
to hold the weight in the earlier described position anymore, their arm dropped and 
consequently the weight hit the bell. The experimenter stopped timing when the bell 
rang.
 Next, high self-control was induced through an attention control task. This 8 min 
task required participants to calculate and name the sum of digits presented on a com-
puter screen. The difficulty of the calculations increased throughout the task. In the 
high attention-control conditions, these calculations involved various 2-digit numbers. 
Additionally, participants were auditively distracted while performing the task: by 
means of headphones, participants were exposed to a voice randomly naming one and 
two number digits and thereby interfering with their calculations. Thus, participants in 
the attention-control conditions had to focus their attention on the calculations on the 
screen and try to override their impulse to listen to the interfering noise. In the no at-
tention-control condition, participants summed combinations of two 1-digit or 2-digit 
numbers without being exposed to auditory interference. Hence, participants could 
successfully perform the (relative easy) calculations without having to ignore the in-
terfering stimuli. Similar manipulations of attention control have been successfully 
used to elicit depletion in previous studies of self-regulatory resources (Schmeichel et 
al., 2003; Faber & Vohs, 2004). After finishing the calculations, participants filled out 
the first mood scale which included 16 items of the Brief Mood Inspection Scale (Mayer 
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& Gaschke, 1988) (Cronbach’s a = .86) and 6 additional items concerning the energy 
and tiredness component of participants’ mood (Cronbach’s a = .87).
 Subsequently, regulatory performance was measured again. Participants were 
seated in front of the computer screen and held the 1.5 kg weight with outstretched 
arm. At this point, the visual priming manipulation took place. Suddenly, while par-
ticipants were holding the weight, the experimenter activated (by inconspicuously 
pressing a button) a screensaver which appeared on the computer screen. Participants 
were led to believe that this screensaver appeared by accident. In the persistence prime 
condition, the screensaver depicted a winning young man in a business suit and a logo 
saying: “www.you-can-do-it.com, wallpapers and screensavers”. In the neutral prime 
condition, the screensaver showed a picture of a vase and a similar logo saying:  “www.
myscreensaver.com, wallpapers and screensavers”. Next, participants completed an 8-
item “energy and tiredness” mood scale (see Study 1) (Cronbach’s a = .84). 
 Thereafter, participants were asked to perform the final task. The experimenter ex-
plained that the next task varied in level of difficulty and asked participants to choose 
a difficulty level ranging from very easy (1) to very hard (5). They were led to believe 
that the level they selected represented a corresponding task difficulty. In fact, all par-
ticipants received the same task, irrespective of their choice of a particular difficulty 
level. This final task was presented in a booklet and consisted of two pairs of drawings 
that were almost the same, but with a certain number of differences. Participants’ goal 
was to detect and report these differences. 
 Finally, a short questionnaire was used to determine whether participants recog-
nized the true nature of the study. To assess the effectiveness of our depletion manipu-
lation, participants were also asked to what extent they thought the calculation task 
was dull, easy, and required mental effort. After completing these final questionnaires, 
participants received a careful debriefing and they were probed for any questions or 
concerns.
Dependent measures 
Most of the dependent measures were identical to Study 1. As in Study 1, performance 
on a physical task served as the main dependent variable. Beside the questionnaires 
concerning mood, we also included a manipulation check in the form of a short ques-
tionnaire about the depletion task.   
 To investigate whether prior exercise of self-control might cause people to prefer 
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a task with lower difficulty, we registered the difficulty level participants chose. The 
selected level (1-5) on the last task represented the dependent measures on this task. 
Results
No participants showed deviant scores on the first physical measurement (z > 3). 
Therefore, all 80 participants were included in the analyses. 
 As far as can be inferred from the description of the study given in their own words 
in the final questionnaire, none of the participants realized the true purpose of the 
experiment. In general, participants regarded “the link between difficult tasks and 
physical power” as the main purpose of the current experiment. On a 5-point scale, 
participants rated the distraction calculation task as relatively more exhausting than 
the no distraction calculation task (M = 2.9, SD = .70 vs. M = 2.3, SD = .84; resp.) F(1, 
79) = 13.12, p < .01, h2 = .14. Meanwhile, participants liked the distraction (M = 3.3, 
SD = .98) and the no distraction calculation task (M = 3.6, SD = .63) equally well, 
F(1, 79) = 2.5, p = .12, h2 = .03. Likewise, the distraction calculation task was rated 
equally interesting (M = 3.3, SD = .84) as the no distraction calculation task (M = 3.4, 
SD = .86), F(1, 79) < 1.0, h2 = .004. 
 In order to investigate whether the attention control task successfully induced ego 
depletion, we compared the physical performance of participants who solved difficult 
calculations with the performance of participants who solved easy calculations under 
neutral priming conditions. An ANOVA with the mean scores of the first and second 
physical measurement as a repeated measurement factor, and initial self-control as be-
tween subject factor revealed a significant interaction effect of these two factors, F(1, 
38) = 26.15, p < .01, h2 = .41. This suggests that the attention control task successfully 
induced ego depletion (Ms physical measurement 2 - physical measurement 1 = -5.07 
vs. -17.68, and SDs = 6.11 vs. 9.17; resp.). Additional analyses revealed a significant 
correlation between the two physical measures in the depletion condition, as well as 
in de no depletion condition (r =.97, p < .01 vs. r = .98, p < .01 respectively). This 
rules out the possibility that lowered performance on the second handgrip measure-
ment should be attributed to relative extreme effort on the first measurement or vice 
versa. One-way ANOVA showed that the scores on the first physical task did not differ 
by condition, F(1, 79) < 1.0, h2 = .002.
 Regression analyses were conducted in order to analyze the effects of initial self-
control (easy versus difficult calculations) and priming (persistence prime versus neu-
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tral prime) on self-control performance. As in Study 1, the main dependent variable, 
self-control performance, was measured by entering the second physical measurement 
as dependent variable, whereas the first measurement was included as covariate in the 
regression analyses. In order to compare main effects of initial self-control and priming 
and analyze their interaction, initial self-control and priming were dummy-coded. 
Regression analyses revealed a main effect for initial self-control, b = .11, t(79) = 3.67, 
p < .01, and a main effect for priming, b = -.20, t(79) = 6.66, p < .01. More important, 
an interaction effect of physical self-control (holding the weight), initial self-control 
and priming was found, b = .081, t(79) = 2.7, p < .01. Mean times on both physical 
self-control performances and their difference per condition are summarized in Table 
2.
Table 2.  Self-control Performance in Study 2
Condition Time 1 Time 2 Change
Difficult calculations  + neutral prime 72.12 (43.42) 57.44 (42.50) -17.6 (9.17)
Difficult calculations  + persistence prime 77.04 (37.42) 77.35 (2.41) .31 (11.42)
Easy calculations  + neutral prime 74.90 (31.54) 69.3 (2.61) -5.0 (6.11)
Easy calculations  + persistence prime 72.66 (34.53) 75.51 (29.92) 2.5 (12.94)
Note. Values under Time 1 and Time 2 represent mean times (in sec) that participants squeezed the handgrip. Standard devia-
tions are given in parentheses. Values under Change represent change in performance (in sec), from Time 1 to Time 2.
 In order to further explore this interaction effect, dummy coding was used to 
compare self-control performance among the four groups. First, we compared the ef-
fect of priming within the two high initial self-control conditions. The two high initial 
self-control conditions were dummy coded as -1 and 1, whereas the two low initial 
self-control conditions were both coded as 0. Regression analysis revealed a significant 
effect, b= - .20, t(79) = 5.87, p < .01. Depleted participants who were exposed to the 
persistence prime outperformed depleted participants who received a neutral prime. 
Next, the effect of priming for individuals who exerted low initial self-control was in-
vestigated by dummy coding the two low initial self-control conditions as -1 and 1 and 
the two low initial self-control conditions as 0. Again, a significant effect was found, 
b = -.12, t(79) = 3.18, p < .01, indicating that within the low initial self-control condi-
tions, participants who were exposed to the persistence prime performed significantly 
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better than those who received the neutral prime. Moreover, our main prediction was 
that under conditions of high self-control, handgrip performances will not suffer from 
ego depletion when offered a persistence related prime. Also, under conditions of 
low self-control, handgrip performances were also expected to remain stable. Thus, 
a decrease in handgrip times was only predicted for participants who exercised high 
initial self-control and who received a neutral prime. Therefore, regression analysis 
was performed in which the difference between the two handgrip performances of the 
high self-control, neutral prime participants (dummy coded as 3) was tested against 
the other three conditions (each condition dummy coded as -1). Results showed that 
decline in self-control performance of high self-control participants who were exposed 
to the neutral prime was significantly greater than the decline in performance of the 
other three conditions, b = -.22, t(79) = 7.19, p < .01. 
 In contrast with Study 1, we found that solving easy or difficult calculations did 
not result in a mood difference [F(1, 79) < 1.0, h2 = .03]. This makes it unlikely that 
differences in physical self-control measurements between the four conditions can be 
attributed to a mood effect. 
 A one-way ANOVA on the 8-item “energy and tiredness” mood scale questionnaire, 
taken directly after the second physical task, revealed that exposure to prompts did not 
lead to a difference in reported mood, F(1, 79) = 1.3, p = .28, h2 = .05. 
 Furthermore, changes in mood were analyzed by computing the difference be-
tween the second “energy and tiredness” mood scale and the same 8 items of the first 
mood questionnaire. ANOVA did not result in any significant main or interaction ef-
fects (all p’s > .05).  The absence of changes in mood indicated that participants did 
not experience a change in mood during the course of the experiment.  
 In addition, a regression analysis with the difference between the second “energy 
and tiredness” mood scale and the same 8 items of the first mood questionnaire as a 
covariate in the regression analysis revealed a significant main effect of initial self-
control b = .11, t(79) = 3.57, p < .01, as well as type of priming b = -.19, t(79) = 6.41, 
p < .01. In addition, a significant interaction effect was found, b = .08, t(79) = 2.65, 
p = .01, whereas the covariate failed to reach significance b = .01, t(75) = .09, p = .93. 
Together, these findings indicate that differences in physical self-control performance 
are unlikely to be caused by changes in mood.  
 Finally, a similar ANOVA on preferred difficulty level yielded no significant main or 
interaction effect, F(1, 79) < 1.0, h2 = .01. In other words, participants did not differ in 
their preferred difficulty for the last task (M = 3.50, SD = .73). 
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Discussion
In line with Study 1, results of Study 2 provided further evidence that activating “per-
sistence” helps participants to overcome ego depletion. High depleted participants 
who were exposed to a “persistence” prime did not display the “standard” ego deple-
tion pattern. That is, in these participants no decline in self-control performance was 
observed. In contrast, high depleted participants who received a neutral prime showed 
a significant drop in performance on the second self-control measurement.
 Interestingly, whereas Study 1 revealed no significant interaction between priming 
and initial self-control, Study 2 did find an interaction effect. As discussed previously, 
the pattern of results of Study 1 implies that the ego depletion effect was not over-
ruled completely. However, the interaction effect found in Study 2 suggests that ego 
depletion can be totally overridden by priming persistence. A possible explanation for 
these inconsistent findings may lie in the influence of the different priming manipula-
tions. The fact that both high and low depleted participants profited from the persis-
tence prime in Study 1, whereas only high depleted participants were influenced by the 
prime in Study 2, may imply a relatively stronger influence of the priming procedure 
used in Study 1.  
 Study 2 also investigated the effect of priming of persistence on future self-control 
demands. It was hypothesized that if exposure to a persistence prime causes people to 
invest more of their available energy, this should be reflected in a decreased willing-
ness to invest in a subsequent self-control task. This was measured by asking partici-
pants to indicate the preferred difficulty level for an additional task. The results show 
that there are no significant differences among groups; all participants select about the 
same difficulty level. We recognize that this absence of differences between groups is 
a null-effect, which makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions. Yet, it does suggest 
that future self-control demands are unlikely to neither suffer nor benefit from expo-
sure to the priming manipulation. 
General Discussion
Successful self-control performance has repeatedly been shown to be dependent on 
previous acts of self-control. When people exert self-control, they generally perform 
worse on subsequent self-control tasks. According to the strength model, decreasing 
self-control performance is caused by a limited energy resource. Self-control consumes 
energy and leads to an automatic depletion of this limited resource, leaving less en-
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ergy available for further successful self-control. In the current paper, we questioned 
whether the automatic emergence of ego depletion can be reduced or even eliminated 
by means of manipulations that are known to operate at the same automatic level as 
the occurrence of ego depletion itself. Whereas previous studies have shown that self-
control can be improved by means of explicit manipulations that require conscious at-
tention or processing, the current experiments investigated whether the same effects 
can be accomplished by ways that do not require conscious attention or awareness 
to be effective (Muraven & Slessarava, 2003; Martijn et al., 2002). We investigated 
this by conducting two studies in which we activated the behavioural concept of per-
sistence by means of different priming procedures. The results of both studies reveal 
that activation of the behavioural concept of persistence can have significant effects 
on self-control. Depleted participants who were primed with persistence performed 
significantly better on a subsequent self-control task than depleted participants who 
were exposed to a neutral prime (Study 1). These results were replicated in Study 2 
by means of a different priming procedure. Priming of persistence caused initially 
depleted participants to overcome ego depletion: their performance on a subsequent 
self-control task remained equal. In contrast, depleted participants who were exposed 
to the neutral prime displayed the classic ego depletion pattern: their performance 
dropped significantly. 
 To summarize, in line with recent studies on ego depletion and self-control, we 
have demonstrated that enactment of self-control does not inevitably lead to poorer 
performance on subsequent tasks. Ego depletion can be overcome when a behavioural 
construct, that is essential to successful self-control, becomes activated. Moreover, the 
present studies show that no conscious awareness of this activation is required. 
 One important question concerns the underlying processes of the present find-
ings. Although we have shown the influence of priming, little is known about the exact 
nature of these manipulations in relation to the self-control process. There are sev-
eral possible explanations for the control enhancing effects we found. To begin with, 
activating persistence might somehow encourage people to use up their last energy 
resources. However, Study 2 showed that depleted individuals who were primed with 
persistence did not differ in their preference for difficulty on a third self-control task. 
In other words, even when priming causes people to invest more energy in a second 
control task, they are not more likely to choose a lower difficulty level on a third control 
task. This indicates that these people are not inclined to make things easier because of 
energy depletion or because of their need to save a last amount of energy.  Moreover, 
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one might argue that the effect of priming continues to work on the final self-control 
task. If this view is correct, differences should be observed because depleted people 
who benefit from the control enhancing manipulations should prefer a higher diffi-
culty on a third control task than depleted people who are not primed. As the results 
of Study 2 made clear, this is not the case. Another possible reason for the absence of 
any differences between groups on final control tasks may be that priming does not 
fully deplete the energy resource and therefore does not lead to any significant differ-
ence in performance on or difficulty preference for a third task. However, the strength 
model is silent about the total amount of energy that people have. As a consequence, 
the possibility that a self-control task may not have depleted the energy system is dif-
ficult to test. Even when no differences in performance are found after exposure to a 
large number of depleting self-control tasks, one still might argue that total depletion 
is not reached. In other words, the strength model is not easy to falsify and questions 
arise when testability comes into play. For instance, it remains questionable whether a 
complete depletion of the energy resource is (a) ever the case and (b) can be manipu-
lated within an experimental setting.
 Another mechanism that may underlie our findings is that priming may restore the 
depleted self. In other words, activating persistence possibly replenishes the depleted 
self. In that case, self-control can best be regarded as an interactive process, in which 
the presence of a self-control enhancing state of mind functions as an important mod-
erator. Clearly, this issue warrants further research.
 Finally, the current findings may be explained in terms of implicit beliefs or expec-
tancies. Heightened activity of the concept “persistence” might resemble guidance by 
positive self-control related beliefs. In other words, a person who is primed with persis-
tence may behave in the same way as a person whose most dominant expectancies are 
characterized by motivation, self-efficacy and so on. In a prior study, we found some 
evidence that people distinguish between two classes of beliefs about exercising self-
control (Martijn et al., 2002, Experiment 2). The first class of beliefs characterizes self-
control as energy and comes close to the strength model of Baumeister and colleagues. 
Thus, people expect and believe that they have only a limited amount of energy avail-
able for their self-control operations and that they are likely to fail when demands are 
too high. Furthermore, laymen believe that for optimal performance one needs to be 
well-rested and free of other self-control demands. At the same time, albeit to a lesser 
extent, people adhere to the belief that self-control is primarily a matter of motivation: 
if you really want to, you can do it and if you really make an effort you can do much 
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more than you think. Moreover, the distinction between these two classes of beliefs 
about self-control was recently corroborated by a comparable classification by Mukho-
padhyay and Johar (2005) who showed that participants who think that self-control is 
an unlimited and malleable ability tend to set more goals. The issue is also reminiscent 
of the concept of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) in the sense that people who believe 
that self-control is a matter of motivation may be expected to experience more control 
in a self-control demanding situation than people who believe that their capacity to 
control themselves depends on their energy level. A similar impact of beliefs on self-
control was demonstrated in three different studies by Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeis-
ter (2001). It was shown that when participants believe their moods are susceptible to 
change, they respond to bad moods by increasing several impulsive behaviours such 
as eating, procrastination, and immediate gratification. However, when people are led 
to believe that their moods cannot be repaired by enacting impulsive behaviours, all 
these effects are eliminated. In sum, the above discussed studies raise the possibility 
that implicit theories or expectations underlie the current findings. However, future 
research should address this issue more directly by, for instance, considering the role 
and impact of interpersonal differences in self-control related beliefs and their impact 
on self-control. 
Limitations
In present series of studies we used different supraliminal priming procedures in order 
to activate persistence related concepts. Although supraliminal priming procedures 
may reduce demand characteristic and other self-presentational concerns, they do not 
warrant complete elimination of these side-effects. A possible solution of this limita-
tion may be offered by the implementation of subliminal priming procedures. With 
regard to future research, it seems worthwhile to consider whether the current find-
ings can be replicated by the implementation of subliminal manipulations. The use 
of subliminal priming procedures may also provide a stronger test for the currently 
hypothesized influence of automaticity. 
 Another limitation of the present research concerns the way we tested the effect 
of priming on future self-control demands. In Study 2, this issue was addressed by 
asking participants to indicate the preferred difficulty level for an additional task. It 
was hypothesized that if exposure to a persistence prime causes people to invest more 
of their available energy, this should be reflected in a decreased willingness to invest 
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in a subsequent self-control task. The results revealed that there were no significant 
differences among groups; all participants select about the same difficulty level. As 
discussed before, this suggests that the possible explanation that priming encourages 
people to use up their last energy resources seems unlikely. Although this finding is in 
line with previous research (Martijn et al., 2002), three critical points can be raised 
with regard to the finding of this null-effect. First, it is possible the sensitivity to detect 
interpersonal differences was not sufficient in current method of testing. Second, we 
used a method that was based on introspection. By asking people to select a difficulty 
level, people have to rely on their experienced depletion. However, their scores on the 
subjective mood scales show, that even when objective signs of depletion are present 
(e.g. worse performance on physical self-control tasks) people still report no signifi-
cant differences on the fatigue related items. Therefore, it remains possible that the 
current results reflect the inability of participants to correctly report their mood or in-
ner states of fatigue. Second, asking people to select a level may have caused them to 
adopt a middle course. In other words, the primary reason to select a particular level 
may be based less on their state of depletion and more on their need to conform to the 
standard norm. Future research should consider these limitations concerning the way 
we tested this hypothesis, by for instance measuring future self-control performance in 
stead of preference. Moreover, future research is likely to benefit from exploring alter-
native, more affirmative ways of testing whether participants expend their last energy 
resources after activation of persistence, for instance by implementing an additional 
exposure to persistence primes during the final task. 
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Abstract
In the present study, we addressed the influence of attentional control strategies on 
self-control performance. Our central hypothesis was that awareness of self-regula-
tory efforts negatively influences self-control performance. Indirect findings from past 
delay of gratification studies suggest that directing attention away from the control 
demanding action (external focus) improves self-control performance. The present re-
search aimed to extend these findings by using an alternative, more active measure of 
self-control performance and by also testing the implications of increasing awareness 
of regulatory efforts. In order to increase awareness of regulatory efforts, we asked 
participants to pay attention to their arm and hand muscles that were involved while 
they were performing a physical self-control task (internal focus). It was found that 
participants who were distracted by a calculation task (external focus) while exerting 
physical self-control outperformed both participants who focused their attention on 
the physical self-control task (internal focus) as well as control participants.  However, 
no significant difference in self-control performance was found between participants 
in the internal focus condition and control participants.
Introduction
Controlling oneself is often difficult: attempts to quit smoking are accompanied by 
withdrawal symptoms and intense craving, physical exercise is tiresome and may even 
hurt, and it can be immensely effortful to stay friendly to a blunt colleague or a difficult 
teenage daughter. What strategies may people employ to help them to control them-
selves successfully in order to reach their longer term goals?
 In this paper, we concentrate on the type of attentional strategies that facilitate 
goal-directed behavior. More specifically, we address the role of attentional focus in 
self-control processes. In doing so, we differentiate between an internal and external 
focus of attention. Internal focus, also known under the term cognitive association 
(Goode & Rot, 1993; Masters & Ogles, 1998) can be described as directing attention to 
the self’s (regulatory) efforts. For instance, a dieter who is constantly aware of the fact 
that he or she should not give in to the tempting food presented at a party, is focusing 
attention internally. The focus is on the feelings he or she experiences. This person pays 
attention to the relation between the self and the tempting stimulus and is aware that 
he or she is exerting self-control. In contrast, a dieter who neglects the presence of the 
tempting food at a party and seeks distraction by talking to other guests is focusing at-
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tention externally. External attentional focusing, also referred to as cognitive dissocia-
tion or distraction is defined as concentrating on aspects of the environment that are 
outside the self. In the current example, it involves attending to information unrelated 
to the self-control demanding stimulus or situation. 
 Previous research on attentional foci and effective self-control has mainly em-
phasized the benefits of external attentional focusing. For instance, in their delay of 
gratification paradigm, Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) posed children to the dilemma 
of choosing between an immediate, small treat or a delayed larger reward. An impor-
tant observation in these studies was that some children were noticeably better able 
to delay gratification than others. It appeared that the success of these children was 
due to the usage of control strategies: they were able to shift their attention to other 
objects in the room, or dissociated themselves by focusing on the abstract properties 
of desired stimuli (thinking about sweets as little clouds, or imagining that they were 
just a picture and not real) (see also Rodrigues, Mischel & Shoda, 1989). In a later 
study on delay of gratification by Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss (1972), the impact of at-
tentional strategies was tested by externally supplying (instead of observing) the use 
of attentional strategies. These studies consistently showed that when children were 
given attentional strategies that helped to focus attention externally, they were able to 
wait significantly longer. In other words, by directing attention away from the control 
demanding action (external focus), children became less aware of their self-regula-
tory efforts, resulting in an improvement of self-control performance. With regard to 
internal focus of attention, this finding may also implicate that the awareness of ones 
self-regulatory efforts contributes to self-control failure. Past research findings indeed 
suggest that self-control performance is unlikely to benefit from constantly being con-
fronted with ones self-control attempts. For instance, in a delay of gratification study 
by Yates and Revelle (1979), the immediate and delayed rewards were either exposed 
or concealed. The results showed that having rewards available for attention dramati-
cally reduced children’s ability to wait. Likewise, Karniol and Miller (1983) found that 
the more people think about the instant pleasure associated with immediate stimuli 
that trigger impulses to engage in a behavior, the harder it becomes to resist it. 
 In order to explain the processes that underlie the findings of the above described 
studies using the delay of gratification paradigm, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) pro-
posed a neural network model in which self-control occurs through an interaction be-
tween a hot, affective, ‘‘go’’ system and a cool, cognitive, ‘‘know” system. While the hot 
system develops early and is under stimulus control, the cool system develops later 
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and is under self-control. According to the model, an external focus of attention can 
best be understood in terms of directing attention away from hot reward properties 
of a stimulus. Focusing attention externally leads to less input for the hot system, and 
thus to less influence of this system on behavior. The result is a facilitation of self-con-
trol. In contrast, focusing attention internally is expected to direct attention toward 
hot reward properties of a stimulus, thereby increasing input for the hot-system. As a 
consequence, the likelihood of a go reaction will be increased and self-control is more 
likely to fail (see also Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
 The purpose of the present study was to examine the influence of attentional con-
trol strategies on self-control performance. Our reasoning for the present study was 
based on indirect evidence from past research, namely that the awareness of one’s 
regulatory efforts is an important factor contributing to self-control failure (Karniol 
& Miller, 1983; Yates & Revelle, 1979). In the current study, we aimed to test this ra-
tionale more directly. In doing so, we differentiated between an internal and external 
focus of attention. Past research findings using the delay of gratification paradigm have 
demonstrated that when children decrease awareness of their regulatory efforts by fo-
cusing attention away from the control demanding action (external focus), self-control 
performance improves. The present research aims to extend these findings. First, un-
like past studies on attention focus and self-control in which participants were mainly 
children, the current experiment involved adult participants. Second, the delay of 
gratification paradigm entails a more passive form of self-control, namely waiting for a 
reward. The present study used an alternative, more active measure of self-control per-
formance, namely physical endurance. Third, more important, we also considered the 
implications of increasing awareness of regulatory efforts (internal focus). The effect 
of an internal focus of attention on self-control performance has not yet –to our knowl-
edge- been investigated directly and experimentally. Therefore, in order to gain more 
insight in the influence of attentional control strategies, the present study concerned 
a direct comparison of the effect of an external and an internal focus of attention on 
self-control performance. Based on previous observations (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; 
Karniol & Miller, 1983) as well as predictions made by the 2-system framework (Met-
calfe & Mischel, 1999) we anticipated that self-control performance is facilitated when 
attention is directed away (external focus) from the control demanding action. In ad-
dition, findings from previous research (Miller, 1983; Yates & Revelle, 1979) provided 
indirect evidence that when attention is paid to the aspects related to the self-control 
action, a decline of self-control is more likely to occur. Therefore, we expected that par-
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ticipants whose attention is directed towards (internal focus) the control demanding 
action, will show poorer self-control performance compared to both participants who 
use external focus strategies as well as control participants. 
 As a measure of self-control we chose a physical exercise task, namely lifting a 
1.5 kg weight as long as possible. Physical exercise tasks proved a successful measure 
of self-control in prior research (see for example Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998, 
Study 1; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001, Study 2; Martijn, Huijts, Alberts, Mer-
ckelbach & De Vries, 2006). Because lifting a weight becomes fatiguing and even a 
little painful after a short period of time, the person feels the urge to stop lifting. Over-
coming this fatigue and overriding the urge to quit, requires self-control. We adopted 
the physical stamina measure as main dependent variable because it is a relatively in-
conspicuous measure for self-control; most people think that a weightlifting primarily 
depends on muscular strength. Internal focus of attention was manipulated by instruct-
ing participants to pay close attention to physical sensation in their arm while lifting 
the weight. In this way, we ensured that during the self-control operation, attention 
was predominantly directed towards the self-control demanding action. Moreover, in 
order to increase participants’ awareness of their self-regulatory efforts more directly, 
they were also presented with an anatomical drawing of an arm and were explained 
which specific muscles and tendons are typically involved when a person lifts a weight. 
An external focus was instigated by presenting participants with an intensive calcula-
tion task while they were lifting a weight. Since this calculation task was cognitively 
demanding, participants’ attention was expected to be mainly directed to this task and 
to a far lesser extent to the control demanding action.  
 In order to control for interpersonal differences in physical strength, performance 
at the weightlifting task was measured twice; at the beginning and at the end of the ex-
periment. Differences in performance at the first and second physical stamina measure 
formed the main dependent variable.
Method
Design and Participants
The design consisted of two experimental conditions in which type of focus (internal 
versus external) was varied and two comparison or base-line conditions. Self-control 
was measured by a physical endurance task, namely lifting a 1.5 kg weight and holding 
it as long as possible. In order to be able to furnish a baseline and to control for indi-
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vidual differences in physical strength, weightlifting was measured twice; at the begin-
ning and at the end of the experiment. Eighty first year psychology students (60 men 
and 20 women, mean age = 20.5 years, SD = 1.8) of Maastricht University received 
course credit for their voluntary participation. Men and women were divided equally 
across conditions by means of a random procedure. The experiment was approved by 
the standing ethical committee of our faculty.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in 20 min sessions. The experiment was present-
ed as a study on mental and physical skills. The experimenter briefly explained the 
general procedure of the experiment after which participants signed a consent form. 
Next, participants were seated and asked to lift a 1.5 kg weight with their dominant 
arm. The experimenter started a chronometer at the moment the participant lifted the 
weight at a 90o angle of the arm with the torso. The chronometer was stopped at the 
moment that a participant eased his or her arm and was not longer able to maintain 
the 90o angle. After the first weight-lifting task, participant filled out a questionnaire 
that measured experienced fatigue and their mood. Next, type of focus was manipu-
lated in the two experimental conditions. Participants in the internal focus condition 
were instructed to fully concentrate themselves on their arm and hand muscles that are 
involved when lifting a weight. To illustrate this, an anatomical illustration of an arm 
and hand was shown and the experimenter pointed at the muscles and tendons that 
are generally used to lift a weight. After this instruction, that lasted 3 min, participants 
lifted the weight again following the same procedure as in the first weight-lifting task.
 Participants in the external focus condition received instructions about a cognitive 
calculation task that they were required to perform during the second weight-lifting 
task. This task was the Star Counting Task (SCT; De Jong & Das-Smaal, 1990) that is 
designed to measure working memory capacity and requires the alternation of for-
ward and backward counting. Each item in the Star Counting Test consists of a pattern 
of stars with plus signs, minus signs and empty spaces in between. The plus and mi-
nus signs specify the direction (adding or subtracting, respectively) in which the stars 
should be counted. Since the stars are presented in a table, empty spaces are added in 
order to prevent participants from counting multiple stars at once. Participants were 
instructed to start counting from a given number and sum the total number of stars. 
After completing each calculation, they had to indicate whether their answer matches 
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or mismatches the number displayed at the top of each item. This number either rep-
resents the correct or an incorrect solution for the item concerned. Participants were 
asked to count aloud in order to make it possible for the experimenter to register the 
total number of stars counted. We used the SCT because its performance almost com-
pletely absorbs participants working memory and therefore leaves less capacity for 
other thoughts about the physical self-control. Thus, the crucial difference between 
the two experimental conditions was that participants in the internal focus condition 
were explicitly asked to concentrate themselves on their arm and hand muscles when 
lifting the weight whereas in the external condition such thoughts were made impos-
sible. 
 The third condition was added to furnish a base-line against which weight-lifting 
performance in the two experimental conditions could be compared. Participants in 
the base-line weight-lifting condition received no specific focus instructions and simply 
lifted the weight again with a 3 min interval between the first and the second weight-
lifting task. The fourth condition served a base-line to compare the performance at 
the SCT. After the first weight-lifting task, participants in the base-line SCT condition 
were given the SCT during 3 min and the number of calculations was registered. After 
performing the SCT, they lifted the weight for the second time. In all four conditions, 
the time interval between the first and the second weight-lifting task was the same (3 
min). Also, all participants used their same arm for both weight-lifting tasks.
 After the second weight-lifting task, participants received two questionnaires to 
check their mood and their compliance to the instructions (manipulation check). Fi-
nally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Dependent measures
All questionnaire items were answered on 4-point Likert scales ranging from “totally 
disagree”(1) to “totally agree”(4). 
 Mood. In order to check whether manipulations led to mood differences, partici-
pants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS, Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) 
directly after the second weight-lifting task (Cronbach’s α = .90). The BMIS consists 
of 16 adjectives, tapping eight mood states (happy, loving, calm, energetic, anxious, 
angry, tired and sad) with 2 adjectives each. Participants were instructed to rate “How 
well does each adjective or phrase describe your present mood”. 
60
 Subjective fatigue. In order to measure subjective fatigue, participants indi-
cated their agreement on 8 statements (I feel tired / energetic / fit / drowsy / dull/ 
exhausted/ I don’t feel like doing anything / I have the feeling I can handle the world). 
Reliability of this scale was sufficiently high (Cronbach’s α = .80). 
 Star counting task. On top of each item of the star counting task, a number was 
presented that either represented the correct or an incorrect solution for the item con-
cerned. Participants were asked to indicate whether their answer matched or did not 
match this solution. However, since participants did not always complete their last 
item and often stopped halfway though, we reasoned that determining performance 
by the number of correctly indicated matches or mismatches implies omission of in-
formation. Therefore, performance was solely determined by the total number of stars 
participants were able to count during weightlifting time. 
 Manipulation check. Participants also completed one manipulation check question 
about what they were thinking about during the second physical measurement (Dur-
ing the physical task, I fully concentrated on my arm and hand).  
 Physical performance. Using a stopwatch, during the first (baseline) as well as sec-
ond measurement time (in msec) was measured that a participant lifted the weight. 
Results
Self-control performance was represented by the difference in weight lifting time at 
the first and the second measurement. Five participants had deviant scores on the dif-
ference score of the two weight lifting tasks (z > 2) and were recognized as outliers. 
Hence, analyses described below included the data of the remaining 75 participants 
 Participants were asked to indicate what they were thinking of during the second 
physical measurement. Analysis revealed that the internal focus condition concentrat-
ed more on their hand and arm compared to the external focus condition, t(37) = 5.30, 
p < .001 (2-tailed) (M internal focus = 3.25, SD = .85, M external focus = 1.89, SD = 
.74).  A similar pattern of results was found for the internal focus condition versus the 
base-line weight-lifting condition, t(36) = 7.19, p < .01 (2-tailed) (M base-line weight-
lifting condition = 2.5, SD = .79) and for the base-line weight-lifting condition versus 
the external focus condition, t(35) = 5.84, p = .02 (2-tailed). In sum, these findings 
implicate that our manipulations successfully directed participants’ attention in the in-
dicated direction. 
 An analysis of the fatigue and mood questionnaires revealed no significant differ-
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ences among the four conditions, F(3, 71) = .64, ns and F(3, 71) = .84, ns, respec-
tively. This makes it unlikely that differences in physical self-control measurements 
between the four conditions can be attributed to a fatigue or mood effect. 
 One-way ANOVA showed that the scores on the first physical task did not differ 
by condition, F(3, 71) = .83, h2 = .034. For the analyses of a possible difference in 
the handgrip time at the first and second measurement, we used an analysis of vari-
ance with condition as independent variable, handgrip time 2 as dependent vari-
able and handgrip time 1 in the first questionnaire as covariate. Performance on the 
first handgrip was a significant predictor of performance on the second handgrip, 
F(1, 70) = 121.52, p < .001, h2 = .64. Also, we found a significant effect of condition, 
F(3, 70) = 15.10, p < .001, h2 = .40. Further inspection of the latter effect were estab-
lished by means of planned contrasts. In order to compare the external focus condi-
tion with the other conditions, the external focus condition was coded as -3, whereas 
the other three conditions were coded as 1. In accordance with our expectations, par-
ticipants in the external focus condition outperformed participants in the other three 
conditions, t(71) = 2.56, p < .05 (2-tailed). Also, in order to compare the external 
and internal focus condition, the external focus condition was coded as -1, the internal 
focus condition as 1 and both control conditions as 0. It was found that participants 
the external focus condition performed significantly better than participants in the in-
ternal focus condition, t(71) = 2.01, p < .05 (2-tailed). A comparison of the internal 
(coded -1) and base-line weight-lifting condition (coded 1) failed to reach significance, 
t(71) = .51, p = .61 (2-tailed). The means are summarized in Table 1 and show that 
participants in the external focus condition were able to keep their performance stable, 
while participants in the remaining conditions exhibited a decline in performance on 
the second physical measurement. 
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Table 1. Self-control performance
Condition Time 1 Time 2 Change
External Focus 125 (1.05) 119 (0.43) - 6.0 (0.33)
Internal Focus 104 (0.45) 77 (0.23) - 27.0* (0.34)
Control Physical measurement 101 (0.54) 6 (0.2) - 32.0* (0.35)
Control Star Count measurement 106 (0.35) 0 (0.24) - 25.0* (0.26)
Note. Values under Time 1 and Time 2 represent mean times (in sec) that participants held the weight. Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses. Values under Change represent change in performance (in sec), from Time 1 to Time 2. Means with an 
asterisk differ significantly at p < .05.
In order to investigate whether stable self-control performance negatively interfered 
with performance on the calculation task, calculation task performance of participants 
who focused their attention externally was compared to performance of participants in 
the base-line SCT condition (control condition). Participants in the base-line SCT con-
dition counted stars for a fixed period of time, namely three minutes. In the external 
focus condition, participants performed the task while lifting the weight. Since weight-
lifting time varied among participants, the time they spent on solving calculations var-
ied as well. Therefore, for participants in the external focus condition, we calculated 
the total number of stars they were expected to count in 3 minutes. For instance, the to-
tal numbers of stars of a participant who lifted the weight for one minute and counted 
30 stars during this period of time, was 90 (3 x 30). Subsequently, one-way ANOVA was 
conducted in order to compare the expected number of calculations of participants in 
the external focus condition with the observed number of calculations of participants 
in the base-line SCT condition. No significant difference was found, F(1, 35) = 1.12, 
ns. This finding suggests that relatively good self-control performance, as a result of an 
external focus strategy, did not negatively influence calculation task performance.   
Discussion
This study tested whether self-control performance can be improved by employment of 
attentional control strategies. More specifically, it was hypothesized that self-control 
performance increases when one focuses attention externally, away from the control 
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demanding action. In contrast, it was expected that this enhancement of self-control 
performance will not occur when focusing attention internally; on the control de-
manding action and the feelings that are experienced during a control attempt. In line 
with our expectations, it was found that participants who were distracted by a calcula-
tion task (external focus) while exerting physical self-control, performed significantly 
better than participants who focused their attention on the physical self-control task 
(internal focus). Interestingly, in contrast with our expectations, it was also found that 
performance of people who focused attention internally did not significantly differ 
from control participants’ performance who did not receive any focus instruction. This 
absence of differences might imply that directing attention internally can be perceived 
as a default process or natural tendency that emerges when people exert self-control. 
Clearly, this issue warrants further research. Moreover, it was demonstrated that per-
forming relatively well on a self-control task by using an external focus strategy, did 
not negatively influence performance on the distractive calculation task. Thus, focus-
sing attention away from the control demanding action seems useful in improving self-
control performance, without suffering negative consequences for the task that one 
chooses to be distracted by. 
 The current findings are compatible with the hot-cool system theory (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999). When people adopt an internal focus of attention, they may become 
highly aware of their desire to quit performing the exerting self-control task. In this 
case, the positive aspects related to quitting (e.g., relaxation) are comparable with 
“hot” reward properties. Since increased salience of tempting aspects associated with 
giving up is expected to cause activation of the hot-system, self-control is more likely 
to fail. In contrast, by focusing attention externally, thoughts about the hot reward 
properties associated with quitting are less salient, implicating less activation of the 
hot-system. In line with the current findings, the expected result is relatively better 
self-control performance. 
 The present study illustrated that attention strategies can be considered as a useful 
way to improve self-control performance. However, at this point, it still unclear which 
psychological processes underlie the current findings. A possible explanation in terms 
of processes comes from the field of sport psychology. According to Wrisberg, Franks, 
Birdwell, and High (1988) “an internal focus of attention during exercise increases 
cognizance of the fatigue element of bodily sensation present during exercise”. In the 
same way, an internal focus of attention during self-control performance may increase 
cognizance of the effort present during self-control attempts, whereas an external focus 
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may reduce this cognizance. The awareness of one’s efforts may initiate a chain of cog-
nitive and evaluative processes that negatively contribute to self-control performance. 
In addition, the present results may also be explained in terms of regulatory strength. 
According to the strength model, controlling the self is psychologically demanding and 
results a state of so-called ego depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998). When people control themselves, they use an amount of energy that is not 
available anymore for future self-control tasks, resulting in decreased performance on 
subsequent self-control attempts. In accordance with this model, we also found that 
people performed worse on the second physical self-control task when they were not 
focusing attention externally. The fact that participants who were distracted by the 
calculation task kept their self-control performance stable might imply that the usage 
of attention strategies can circumvent the effects of ego depletion. Focusing attention 
externally may circumvent the need for active and conscious self-control, thereby de-
manding less cognitive resources than focusing attention internally. Future research 
should address this issue more directly, providing more insight in the psychological 
processes that underlie self-control improvement by usage of attentional strategies. 
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Abstract
Previous studies on the influence of self-focused attention on self-regulation have re-
vealed an inconsistent pattern of findings. Some studies suggest a control enhancing 
effect of self-focused attention; other studies rather suggest the opposite. The current 
investigation attempted to provide more insight in these divergent findings. A distinc-
tion was made between two types of self-focused attention, namely cognitive associa-
tion and self-awareness. The present study used an ego depletion paradigm to test the 
hypothesis that the type of self-focus determines the effect of self-focus on regulatory 
performance. It was found that initially depleted participants who were exposed to a 
self-awareness manipulation kept their physical self-control performances constant. 
These participants outperformed both control participants as well as participants who 
were also exposed to the cognitive association manipulation. However, this control en-
hancing effect was absent when participants were highly self-aware but at the same 
time aware of internal states indicating self-regulatory efforts (cognitive association). 
Introduction
Self-focused attention has repeatedly been shown to enhance self-regulatory behavior. 
For instance, in a study by Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1998) it was found that 
heightened self-focus enhanced spontaneous suppression of social stereotypes. Highly 
self-focused participants were better able to exert cognitive inhibition by producing less 
stereotypic descriptions compared to control participants (see also Carver & Scheier, 
1981, 1990; Monteith, 1993). Although these findings demonstrate a positive relation 
between self directed attention and performance, self-focused attention has also been 
found to impair (self-regulatory) performance (e.g., Gill & Strom, 1985). For instance, 
in a recent study by Alberts, Martijn, Nievelstein, Jansen, and de Vries (2006) it was 
found that participants who focused attention on their inner sensations during a self-
control task, performed significantly worse on this task than participants who focused 
attention outward while performing the task. 
 In the present investigation, we address these seemingly contradictory findings. 
We propose that one way of explaining these divergent findings arises from the way the 
concept of self-focus is defined. Self-focused attention is often used as a synonym for 
objective self-awareness. Objective self-awareness is defined as becoming aware of the 
self’s existence in the world and involves selective processing of information about the 
self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Carver, 2002). Objective self-awareness has repeatedly 
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demonstrated to enhance self-regulatory performance. The proposed mechanism that 
underlies this finding is that self-focused attention increases the salience of an internal-
ized, social and/or situational standard. As a result, people are more inclined to adjust 
or regulate their behaviour in order to meet this standard. Imagine a dieter at a party. 
The presence of other guests at this party may increase the dieter’s self-awareness. As 
the dieter is confronted by a waiter with a tempting tray of snacks, he or she may be-
come very aware of the (internalized) standard that he or she should stick to the diet. 
Consequently, the self-aware dieter tries to meet the standard (not eating the food) by 
regulating his or her eating behaviour. 
 Past research on self-awareness has mainly focused on the differential effects of 
directing attention toward the self, with mirrors and cameras, and away from the self 
through various experimental distractions (see for instance Bailey, Leonard, Cranston, 
& Taylor, 1983; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Hutton & Baumeister, 1992). The manipu-
lations that have been used to induce self-focused attention cause people to become 
aware of themselves as they can become aware of any other person or object in the 
world. However, self-directed attention does not always involve the perspective tak-
ing that is induced by manipulations such as cameras, audience and mirrors. People 
may also direct attention inward, without becoming aware of the self as an object per 
se. Imagine the same dieter from the earlier mentioned example. Again, he or she is 
exposed to tempting food. While being confronted with this food, he or she may be-
come aware of the desire to eat and the effort it takes to refuse the food while being 
exposed. In other words, instead of becoming aware of the self as an object, the person 
now becomes predominantly aware of internal states that indicate that one is exerting 
or has to exert self-control. The type of self-focused attention that is addressed here 
bears great similarity with a phenomenon that sport and exercise psychologist label 
cognitive association. Cognitive association is a type of self-focus in which attention is 
directed toward the sensations experienced during physical exertion (Goode & Roth, 
1993; Masters & Ogles, 1998). It involves a narrowed type of attention in which one is 
predominantly aware of self-relevant internal sensation. Although cognitive associa-
tion has been used as a synonym for self-focussed attention (see for instance Wrisberg, 
Franks, Birdwell, & High, 1988), its negative effects on (self-regulatory) performance 
suggest that it differs from self-awareness. 
 Together, the previous findings suggest that self-focused attention is a complex 
and dynamic phenomenon, which does not always automatically cause improve-
ment of regulatory performance. Although self-focused attention necessarily involves 
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awareness of internal states, the nature and function of these internal states can differ. 
We argue that the stimulus by which attention is directed to the self, influences the 
nature and function of these internal states. In other words, stimuli that cause people 
to become objectively aware (e.g., mirrors and cameras), can influence internal states 
differently than stimuli that draw people’s attention inward without making them ob-
jectively aware (e.g., presence of self-control demanding stimuli). With regard to the 
first example of the dieter, the presence of the guests can be regarded as a stimulus that 
primarily triggers objective self-awareness. Consequently, the dieter becomes aware of 
internal standards (refrain from eating) and is likely to notice any discrepancy between 
her present state and the salient standard (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The notion of this 
discrepancy implies awareness of an internal state, namely the current status (desire to 
eat) and the need to improve this state. In this case, awareness of the internal state(s) 
can be considered as a part of a regulatory progress that is affected by the salient stan-
dard. Here, internal state awareness serves as a monitor that keeps track of progress 
towards the intended goal (refrain from eating). This monitor function has also been 
referred to as a “test” phase (see TOTE model, Carver & Scheier, 1981). In other words, 
the main function of the internal state is monitoring progress towards a goal or stan-
dard. 
 In the second example, the presence of the tempting food can be regarded as the 
stimulus that triggered awareness of internal states more directly (cognitive associa-
tion), rather than awareness of the self as an object. In this case, the internal state 
(awareness of desire and effort to refuse) becomes the object of regulation. In other 
words, rather than being part of a regulatory cycle, now the internal state itself has to 
be regulated. The distinction between internal states as part of a regulatory cycle and 
internal states as object of self-regulation shows close resemblance to what is known as 
“state orientation” and “action orientation” (Kuhl, 1982; 1984). The theory of action 
control (Kuhl, 1982) proposes that in order to successfully perform intended behav-
iour, one needs to ensure that competing action tendencies are neglected. Two dif-
ferent states of the organism, namely state versus action orientation, are expected to 
determine the success of the process of action control. State orientation can be defined 
as a condition in which a person excessively focuses on his or her past, present or future 
state without attending to any action plan which may cause a change in the present sit-
uation. Action orientation occurs when an individual is attempting to implement an ac-
tion or plan and focuses simultaneously on his or her present state, an intended future 
state, the discrepancy between these two and action alternatives which may change 
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the current state into the intended future state. Now imagine that the dieter at the 
party is suddenly confronted by the waiter with a dish of snacks. The lovely smell of the 
snacks makes the dieter so aware of his or her effort to refuse the food (cognitive as-
sociation) that it becomes almost impossible to resist the temptation. In this situation, 
the smell of the snacks can be regarded as a stimulus that triggers internal state aware-
ness to the extent, that the regulatory enhancing effect of the standard is overruled by 
the concern to deal with the internal state. Whereas the internal state initially served 
as a part (test or monitor phase) of a goal oriented process (refrain from eating), the 
internal state (awareness of desire and effort to refuse) now attracts so much attention 
that regulation of this state becomes the primary concern. In other words, the initial 
action oriented process has become a more state oriented process. According to action 
control theory, the effectiveness of ones (regulatory) intentions decreases as a function 
of the proportion of processing capacity absorbed by state oriented processes. 
 The present study was designed as a direct test of the hypothesis that type of self-
focus determines the effect of self-focus on regulatory performance. Where previous 
studies addressed the effect of either self-awareness or cognitive association on self-
control performance, the current study combined these two different types of self-fo-
cussed attention in order to establish a direct comparison between both types. In order 
to isolate the effect of cognitive association, some participants were exposed to a ma-
nipulation that increased self-awareness whereas others received a manipulation that 
increased both self-awareness and cognitive association. Based on previous findings, 
it was hypothesised that when a self-focus involves self-awareness, self-regulatory 
performance will improve. However, when a self-focus involves both self-awareness 
as well as awareness of ones regulatory efforts, we expect that this will result in worse 
performance compared to self-awareness alone. 
 In order to test these predictions, we used a so-called ego depletion paradigm. 
Self-control performance has been shown to decrease when people exert self-control 
repeatedly. The dominant explanation for this finding is that the exertion of self-con-
trol consumes some kind of energy, leaving the person in a state of ego depletion. Al-
though a growing number of studies indeed prove impaired performance after self-
control, recent findings reveal that this decline in performance does not always occur. 
For instance, Muraven and Slessarava (2003) demonstrated that ego-depletion may be 
compensated by increasing people’s motivation to perform well on a subsequent self-
control task. In addition, a study by Martijn, Tenbült, Merckelbach, Dreezens and De 
Vries (2002) showed that by changing depleted peoples’ expectancies, their self-con-
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trol performance increased.  Likewise, in the current experiment we expect that under 
conditions of depletion, participants who are highly objective self-aware outperform 
both participants who are aware of their regulatory efforts (cognitive association) as 
well as control participants. 
 The first part of the study aimed to manipulate the level of depletion. In order to 
induce a high level of depletion, participants were exposed to a self-control demand-
ing task in the form of an attentional control task. Participants were asked to solve 
difficult calculations while they were auditively distracted during the task. Since par-
ticipants had to pay attention to the calculations and needed to override their impulse 
to listen to the interfering noise, this task required self-control. A low level of deple-
tion was induced by a version of the task in which relatively easy calculations were 
presented and no interfering stimuli were present. Since participants could perform 
the (relatively easy) calculations without having to control their attention by ignoring 
the interfering stimuli, this task was expected to require considerably less self-control. 
Similar manipulations of attention control have been used to elicit depletion in previ-
ous studies of self-regulatory resources (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Faber 
& Vohs, 2004; Alberts, Martijn, Greb, Merckelbach, & de Vries, 2006). The second part 
of the study intended to manipulate type of self-focus. To do so, half of the participants 
were primed with sentences related to the self by means of a Scrambled Sentence Task 
(SST; Srull & Wyer, 1979; see also Araya, Akrami, Ekehammer, & Hedlund, 2002). In 
order to induce self-awareness, participants unscrambled 25 scrambled sentences that 
started with “I” (e.g., “I buy some bread”). Priming of self-related personal pronouns 
has been successfully used as a method to induce self-awareness in previous research 
(i.e., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Utz, 2004; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). In order to 
induce cognitive association, a version of the task was presented in which 15 of these 
sentences were replaced with sentences that were specifically related to the self-con-
trol demanding action that was about to follow (e.g., “I feel my hand”; “I use my mus-
cles”). The remaining half of the participants received 25 neutral scrambled sentences 
in which no self-relevant pro-verbs or self-control related words were present (e.g., 
“Henk buys some bread”). The only difference between the content of these sentences 
and the content of the self-awareness version of the task was the replacement of “I” 
with surnames. We choose for a SST because the nature of the task makes it suitable 
for subtle manipulation of the concept that is activated by the task (i.e., self-focus). In 
addition, SST is an implicit priming technique that reduces demand characteristics or 
other self-presentational concerns (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
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 The third task of the study was a physical stamina task adapted from Muraven 
et al. (1998) and consisted of squeezing a handgrip. Physical exercise tasks proved a 
successful measure of self-control in prior research (see for example Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998, Study 1; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001, Study 2). Because 
squeezing a handgrip becomes fatiguing and even a little painful after a short period 
of time, the person feels the urge to stop lifting. Overcoming this fatigue and overrid-
ing the urge to quit, requires self-control. We adopted the physical stamina measure 
as main dependent variable because it is a relatively inconspicuous measure for self-
control; most people think that sqeeuzing a handgrip primarily depends on muscular 
strength. In order to be able furnish a baseline and to control for individual differences 
in physical strength, handgrip performance was measured twice; at the beginning and 
at the end of the experiment. Differences in performance at the first and second physi-
cal stamina measure formed the main dependent variable.
Method
Design and Participants
The design consisted of two experimental and two control conditions. Whereas level 
of depletion was high in both experimental conditions, type of focus (cognitive asso-
ciation versus self-awareness) was varied. Two control conditions were added to the 
design in order isolate/compare the effect of the depletion and the focus manipulation. 
In the first control condition (high depletion – neutral prime), a high level of depletion 
was induced whereas a low level of depletion was induced in the second control condi-
tion (low depletion – neutral prime). In both control conditions, no focus of attention 
was induced. Eighty first year psychology students (60 men and 20 women, mean age 
= 23.1 years, SD = 7.63) of Maastricht University received course credit for their vol-
untary participation. The experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee 
of our faculty.
Procedure
The experiment was presented as a series of unrelated tasks that tested participants’ 
cognitive and physical abilities. After signing a consent form, participants filled out 
the first mood scale, the Brief Mood Inspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). 
Next, all participants took part in the muscular endurance test to furnish a baseline 
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against which to compare the second endurance task. The experimenter asked par-
ticipants to place a handgrip in their dominant hand and inserted a coin between the 
two handles as the participant squeezed them together. Participants were instructed 
to squeeze the handgrip as long as possible. The moment the participant relaxed his 
or her grip, the coin fell out. The experimenter started a stopwatch at the moment he 
placed the coin between the handles and stopped timing when the coin fell out. 
 Next, high level of depletion was induced through an attention control task 
(Alberts et al., 2006). This 8 min task required participants to calculate and name 
the sum of digits presented on a computer screen. The difficulty of the calculations 
increased throughout the task. In the high attention-control conditions (high level of 
depletion), these calculations involved various 2-digit numbers. Additionally, partici-
pants were auditively distracted while performing the task: by means of headphones, 
participants were exposed to a voice randomly naming one and two number digits and 
thereby interfering with their calculations. Thus, participants in the attention-control 
conditions had to pay attention to the calculations on the screen and try to override 
their impulse to listen to the interfering noise. Whereas participants in the high deple-
tion conditions performed the above described self-control demanding version of the 
task, participants in the low depletion condition were exposed to a less self-control 
demanding version of the task. This last mentioned group summed combinations of 
two 1-digit or 2-digit numbers without being exposed to auditory interference. After 
finishing the calculations, participants indicated their mood on a 5-point scale.  
 Subsequently, participants in the self-awareness  condition were asked to com-
plete a so-called “verbal ability task”. In fact, this was a SST that intended to induce 
self-awareness. Participants unscrambled 25 scrambled sentences that started with 
“I”. Participants in the cognitive association condition were also presented with this 
verbal ability task and asked to unscramble 25 scrambled sentences that started with 
“I”. However, in order to narrow self-directed attention, 15 of these sentences were 
specifically related to the self-control demanding action (e.g., “I feel my hand”; “I use 
my muscles”). Participants in the two control conditions received 25 neutral scram-
bled sentences that did not contain any self-relevant words (e.g., “Henk buys some 
bread”).
 After completing the SST, participants squeezed the handgrip for the second time, 
following the same procedure as for the first handgrip measurement. After partici-
pants indicated their mood once more, they were finally asked to write down what they 
thought the experiment was about. The latter served to determine whether partici-
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pants were aware of a possible influence of the SST. Participants were debriefed and 
thanked. 
Dependent measures
All questionnaire items were answered on 5-point Likert scales. 
 Mood. In order to test whether participants differed in their mood before they 
started with the experiment they completed the BMIS (Cronbach’s a  = .92). The BMIS 
consists of 16 adjectives, tapping eight mood states (happy, loving, calm, energetic, 
anxious, angry, tired and sad) with 2 adjectives each. Participants were instructed to 
rate “How well each adjective or phrase describes your present mood”. In addition, to 
check whether manipulations led to mood differences, participants were asked to rate 
their mood on a 5-point scale directly after the depletion manipulation and after the 
second handgrip performance.  
 Manipulation check.  Participants were asked to indicate how boring, difficult and 
unpleasant they had experienced the calculation task. 
 Physical performance. Using a stopwatch, time (in msec) was measured that par-
ticipants squeezed the handgrip. 
Results
Self-control performance was represented by the difference in handgrip time at the 
first and the second measurement. Three participants had deviant scores on the dif-
ference score of the two weight lifting tasks (z > 2) and were recognized as outliers. 
Hence, analyses described below included the data of the remaining 77 participants.
 As far as can be inferred from the description of the study given in their own words 
in the final questionnaire, none of the participants realized the true purpose of the 
experiment. In general, participants considered “the link between mood and physical 
power” as the main goal of the experiment. On a 5-point scale, the distraction calcu-
lation task was rated as relatively more difficult than the no distraction calculation 
task, F(1, 75) = 30.99,  p < .01, h2 = .29 (M = 3.23, SD = .93 vs. M = 2.00, SD = .56; 
resp.). Meanwhile, participants rated the distraction  calculation task as more unpleas-
ant than the no distraction calculation task, F(1, 75) = 5.06, p = .03, h2 = .06 (M = 
2.93, SD = 1.22  vs. M = 2.25, SD = .97; resp.). The distraction calculation task was 
rated equally boring (M= 2.81, SD =1.09) as the no distraction calculation task (M = 
74
2.6, SD = 1.05), F(1, 75) = .47, h2 = .007. 
 In order to investigate whether the attention control task successfully induced ego 
depletion, we compared the physical performance of participants who solved difficult 
calculations with the performance of participants who solved easy calculations under 
neutral priming conditions (high depletion – neutral prime versus low depletion – neu-
tral prime). An ANOVA with the mean scores of the first and second physical mea-
surement as a repeated measurement factor, and level of depletion as between subject 
factor revealed a significant interaction effect of physical measurement and level of 
depletion, F(1, 37) = 9.79, p < .01, h2 = .21. This suggests that the attention control 
task successfully induced ego depletion. In other words, within the neutral priming 
conditions participants who were highly depleted (distraction) exhibited a more pro-
nounced decrease in performance at the second physical measurement than partici-
pants who were less depleted (no distraction) (Ms handgrip time 2 – handgrip time 1 
= -9.66 vs. -18.84, and SDs = 21.54 vs. 14.86; resp.). Additional analyses revealed a 
significant correlation between the two physical measures within the high depletion 
condition, as well as within the low depletion condition (r =.73, p < .01 vs. r = .72, 
p < .01 resp.). Hence, it seems unlikely that lowered performance on the second hand-
grip measurement should be attributed to relative extreme effort on the first measure-
ment or vice versa. 
 Multiple regression analyses were used to test the main hypothesis that under 
condition of ego depletion, induction of self-awareness leads to relatively better self-
control performance than no focus or cognitive association. Multiple linear regression 
was utilized since it allows the specification of which comparisons to be made, without 
any loss or reduction of statistical power. The main dependent variable, self-control 
performance, was measured by entering the second physical measurement as depen-
dent variable, whereas the first measurement was included as covariate in the regres-
sion analyses. In order to compare the effect of type of focus, the four conditions were 
dummy-coded. 
 Regression analysis was conducted with time on the second physical measurement 
as dependent variable, the four conditions as independent variable and time on the first 
physical measurement as covariate. Time on the first physical measurement was found 
as a significant predictor of time on the second measurement, b =.77, t(76) = 2.67, 
p < .01. In order to further explore this effect, dummy coding was used to compare 
self-control performance among the four groups. First, we tested the effect of the self-
awareness manipulation by comparing participants who were depleted and exposed 
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to the self-awareness manipulation with depleted participants who were not exposed 
to any focus manipulation. The self-awareness condition and high depletion – neutral 
prime condition were dummy coded as -1 and 1, whereas the other two conditions 
were both coded as 0. Regression analysis confirmed our prediction and revealed that 
depleted participants who were exposed to the self-awareness manipulation performed 
significantly better than depleted participants who did not receive any focus manipula-
tion, b = .78, t(76) = 59.11, p < .01.  Next, the effect of the cognitive association was 
investigated by dummy coding the cognitive association condition and high depletion 
– neutral prime condition 1 as respectively -1 and 1, and the two remaining conditions 
as 0. This time, no significant effect was found, b = .75, t(76) = .56, p = .58, indicat-
ing that when participants were exposed to the cognitive association manipulation, no 
control enhancing effects were observed. Finally, in order to compare the effect of self-
awareness with the effect of cognitive association, both focus-conditions were coded 
as –1 and 1, whereas the two control conditions were coded as 0. Results showed that 
participants who were exposed to the self-awareness manipulation performed signifi-
cantly better than those exposed to the cognitive association manipulation, b = .79, 
t(76) = 3.95, p < .01. Mean times on both physical self-control performances and their 
difference per condition are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.  Self-control Performance
Condition Time 1 Time 2 Change
Difficult calculations  + cognitive association 7.41 (45.69) 59.37 (24.97) -19.04 (29.09)
Difficult calculations  + self-awareness 72.20 (42.36) 0.30 (41.41) .97 (1.74)
Difficult calculations  + neutral prime 61.55 (29.2) 51.9 (27.35) -9.66 (21.54)
Easy calculations  + neutral prime 76.9 (20.31) 5.77 (19.95) .79 (14.6)
Note. Values under Time 1 and Time 2 represent mean times (in sec) that participants squeezed the handgrip. Standard devia-
tions are given in parentheses. Values under Change represent change in performance (in sec), from Time 1 to Time 2.
Analysis of the BMIS, taken at the beginning of the experiment, revealed that par-
ticipants did not differ in their mood before they started with the experiment, 
F(3, 73) < 1.0, h2 = .005. Moreover, in order to investigate whether the depletion 
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manipulation caused differences in mood, we analyzed scores on the second mood 
measurement under neutral priming conditions. It was found that solving easy or dif-
ficult calculations did not result in a mood difference, F(1, 38) < 1.0, h2 = .005. This 
makes it unlikely that differences in physical self-control measurements between the 
four conditions can be attributed to a mood effect. Likewise, scores on the last mood 
questionnaire, taken after the second physical measurement revealed no differences 
for participants who were exposed to the priming manipulation, F(1, 38) < 1 , h2 = 
.007. This indicates that the priming manipulation did not affect participants’ mood. 
Furthermore, changes in mood were analyzed by comparing the difference second and 
the first mood measurement. ANOVA did not result in any significant main or interac-
tion effects (all F’s < 1).  This absence of changes indicates that participants did not 
experience a change in mood during the course of the experiment. 
Discussion
Previous studies addressing the effects of self-focused attention on self-regulatory per-
formance have revealed a non-consistent pattern of findings. Whereas some studies 
demonstrated a self-control enhancing effect of self-focused attention, other findings 
rather suggest the opposite to be true. The current investigation attempted to provide 
more insight in these divergent findings. It was argued that the type of self-focused 
attention plays a crucial role in explaining its effects on self-control performance. Self-
focused attention may involve awareness of the self as an object (self-awareness) but 
may also involve a different process called cognitive association. The latter involves at-
tention directed directly towards internal sensations and may lead to increased aware-
ness of ones regulatory efforts, causing a negative effect on regulatory performance. It 
was hypothesized that the crucial difference between these forms of self-directed at-
tention is the nature of the internal states to which attention is directed.  When a stimu-
lus induces awareness of the self as an object (self-awareness), appropriate standards 
have been found to become more salient and self-regulatory performance is enhanced 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The internal states that are present during self-awareness 
are expected to be related to the standard and function as a monitor: they are part 
of a regulatory process and keep track of progress toward the intended standard. In 
contrast, when people’s attention is predominantly directed towards internal states in-
stead of standards, these internal states may serve a different function: they become 
object of ones regulatory efforts. In order to test the hypothesized influence of internal 
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states, an ego depletion paradigm was used in which one group of participants was 
exposed to a self-awareness manipulation whereas another group was given the same 
manipulation but was also made highly aware of their self-control related internal 
states (cognitive association). In line with previous findings, it was found that initially 
depleted participants who were exposed to a self-awareness manipulation kept their 
physical self-control performances constant. This group outperformed both control 
participants as well as participants who were also exposed to the cognitive association 
manipulation. This control enhancing effect was absent when participants were highly 
self-aware but at the same time aware of internal states indicating self-regulatory ef-
forts (cognitive association). These findings show that self-focus does not always lead 
to increased self-control performance and suggest that the nature of internal states 
plays an important role in determining the effect of self-focused attention. When these 
internal states cause relatively greater stress on ones regulatory efforts, no control en-
hancing effect seems to emerge. 
 The current findings and theoretical assumptions may also provide some new in-
sights in the ego depletion phenomenon. The fact that performance of depleted partici-
pants did not significantly differ from depleted participants who were also exposed to 
the cognitive association manipulation is in line with previous findings (Alberts et al., 
2006) and implies that depletion may cause people to involve in cognitive association. 
By linking the current findings to the theory of action control (Kuhl, 1982), we already 
suggested that cognitive association may reflect state orientation. Depleted partici-
pants as well as participants who become very aware of their regulatory efforts may 
focus excessively on the present state, namely exerting self-control. Or, in terms of ac-
tion control theory, ego-depleted people may become more state oriented than action 
oriented. According to action control theory, an important reason why state orienta-
tion often inhibits performance is because the excessive focus on the present withholds 
people from making action plans. If true, this implies that by making action plans, self-
control performance should improve and the effects of depletion should be less evi-
dent. Indeed, research by Webb and Sheeran (2003) found that by forming implemen-
tation intentions (action plans that detail when, where, and how to proceed toward a 
goal), it is possible to enhance self-regulatory performance and overcome the effects of 
ego depletion (see also Oyserman, Terry & Bybee, 2002). In addition, a recent study by 
Hofmann, Rauch and Gawronski (2006) addressed the impact of automatic attitudes, 
dietary restraints standards and ego-depletion on eating behaviour. They found that 
the behavioural impact of personal standards was reduced under conditions of ego 
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depletion. More specifically, when self-control resources were high, candy consump-
tion was mainly predicted by participants’ dietary restraint standards. However, when 
self-regulation resources were low, rather than dietary restraint standards, candy con-
sumption was strongly predicted by participants’ attitudes towards candies. From this 
perspective, the current finding that self-awareness helped to overcome the effects of 
ego-depletion may implicate that self-awareness helps people to become more action 
oriented by making present goals or standards more salient. These goals or standards 
then function as an intended future state, causing the individual to regulate the pres-
ent state into the desired future state. 
 We have mainly argued that the nature and function of internal states play a key 
role in explaining the effects of self-focused attention on self-regulation. However, it 
must be acknowledged that the present study offered no direct measure of the supposed 
difference in internal states. For instance, if internal states of self-aware individuals 
indeed serve as a monitor of a goal oriented process (action orientation), than a dif-
ference in availability of certain goal-related concepts should be observed compared to 
individuals who are more involved in cognitive association (state orientation). Clearly, 
future research should benefit from implementing ways to measure these proposed 
differences. In addition, the present investigation revealed that under conditions of 
cognitive association, no self-regulatory enhancing effects were observed. However, 
internal states that become salient during cognitive association mainly concern a spe-
cific type of self-relevant information, namely ones regulatory efforts. In order to gain 
a better understanding of the relationship between self-focused attention and inter-
nal states, future research should address the impact and possible interplay of internal 
states with a different nature as well. 
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Understanding impulsive crime: The role of state self-control
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30-43.
0
Abstract
The aim of the present chapter is to provide more insight in the psychological processes 
underlying impulsive criminal behaviour. More specifically, an overview of psychologi-
cal findings and theories is presented in order to gain more knowledge about why and 
under which conditions impulsive crimes are likely to occur. Instead of focusing on 
stable, personality related factors, the current article mainly addresses a state oriented 
approach, by identifying factors that influence the momentary occurrence of impul-
sive (criminal) acting. Self-control is introduced as a central psychological construct. 
Research findings and theories addressing momentary self-control failure are linked 
to the emergence of (impulsive) criminal behaviour. In addition, guidelines for pre-
venting failure of impulse control and improvement of self-control performance are 
provided.
Introduction
Criminality is a widespread and serious problem that confronts our society. The nega-
tive consequences of criminality are not restricted to the victim(s) involved, but also af-
fect society as a whole, for instance by reducing feelings of safety and trust. A common 
way to prevent and fight against the emergence of criminality is by focusing on exter-
nal control, ranging from gun laws to prison terms. In some cases, especially cases in-
volving organized crime or planned criminal activity (referred to as intentional crime; 
Stark, 1989), the deterring effect of external control attempts, like imprisonment, may 
actively prevent people from committing crimes. From a psychological perspective, 
there is also an alternative way to prevent and fight against the emergence of criminal-
ity, namely by gaining more insight in the causes of and processes underlying criminal 
behaviour. In this case, the focus is more on internal control.  
 Many social problems and discontents, such as assault, sexual abuse and robbery, 
can be summarized under the term impulsive crimes (Stark, 1989). In contrast to in-
tentional crimes, these crimes are characterized by a tendency to give in to violent or 
other disastrous impulses. When committing an impulsive crime, people lose control 
and behaviour is guided by their dominant impulses. Since impulsive behaviour is 
based on sudden desires and impulses rather than arising from careful and deliber-
ate thought (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994), the consequences of the act often 
become apparent after the crime has been committed. For instance, most people will 
agree that impulsively attacking someone in response to a verbal insult is certainly not 
1
chapter 6 | understanding impulsive crime: the role of state self-control
worth going to prison. However, the consideration of this long-term context will often 
not occur until the violent act has been committed (see also Berkowitz, 1978). Clearly, 
in these cases, the introduction of severe punishments may not always be the most 
optimal way to prevent occurrence of criminal acts. In stead, we suggest that attempts 
to prevent and counteract the occurrence of impulsive crimes, are likely to benefit from 
knowledge about the causes and processes concerning the deviant behaviour. In line 
with this, Stark (1989) suggested that in contrast to intentional crimes, which have 
rates well-predicted by societal variables such as population turnover rates and propor-
tion of churchgoers, impulsive crimes are better explained by psychological variables. 
Moreover, taking these psychological variables into account by identifying why some 
people posses a higher propensity to engage in impulsive crimes and when (under 
which conditions) impulsive crimes are likely to be committed, not only leads to a bet-
ter understanding of criminal behaviour, it also helps to formulate concrete prevention 
guidelines. 
Self-control as an essential capacity
The commitment of an impulsive crime reflects the inability to control oneself success-
fully. In psychological terms, impulsive crimes are considered as manifestations of self-
control failure. Self-control can be defined as the override or inhibition of urges, be-
haviours or desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1993). 
For instance, a person who is seriously offended is likely to experience anger and may 
even feel the urge to aggressively attack the offender. In order to prevent him or herself 
from harming the other, the offended person must exert self-control; he or she needs to 
control destructive emotions and the urge to physically express aggression.  
 Another important aspect of self-control concerns its relationship with goals. Self-
control is needed in order to pursue goals successfully. Goals can be conflicting; short 
term, proximate goals may negatively interfere with the accomplishment of long term 
goals. In order to accomplish the (often more rewarding) deferred long term goal, 
people have to overcome their impulse to enjoy the proximate goals. The eventual re-
wards that accompany long term goals may be far greater than the immediate reward 
of a proximate goal, but the immediate reward is often more tempting simply because 
it is immediate. For instance, after release from prison, ex-detainees may decide to 
start up an honest life and keep to the straight and narrow. While they search for jobs, 
they soon notice that their criminal record reduces their chance to find a job. As a re-
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sult, their financial situation becomes perceptibly deteriorating. In the past, financial 
problems would prompt them to gain money by committing a theft; their intention to 
keep to the straight and narrow, however, may prompt them to override this response 
and keep searching for potential jobs. In other words, in order to successfully choose 
for the long term goal (keeping to the straight and narrow), one needs to control the 
urge or desire to fullfil the short term, proximate goal (immediately gaining money by 
committing a theft). Clearly, in the long run, pursuing the long term goal is far more 
beneficial than giving in to the temptation of the short term goal. The benefits of long 
term goal pursuit in the context of crime is well reflected by the fact that most financial 
benefits gained by crimes are relatively small and short lasting (Gotfredson & Hirschi, 
1990; Katz, 1988). Obviously, however, people often fail to successfully pursue their 
long term goal and succumb to the attraction of short term satisfaction. 
 Although self-control is often used as a synonym of self-regulation, we will use it 
here in a more narrow sense. Self-regulation refers to a broad, regulatory cycle of com-
paring the self against a relevant standard, operating on the self to reduce a possible 
discrepancy, testing again and continuing the process until a test reveals that the stan-
dard has been reached, whereupon the person exits in the circle (test, operate, test, 
exit (TOTE); cf. Carver & Scheier, 1981). According to Baumeister and Exline (2000), 
self-control refers to the “operate” phase, in which the self alters itself in order to move 
closer to the desired standard. This active and conscious process aims to reduce the 
risk that any thought, feeling or behaviour that might be incompatible with the cur-
rent intention could take over. Depending on the situation, self-control can be defined 
in terms of activation or inhibition of the self. Continuing to perform an unpleasant 
task illustrates a form of self-control which requires activation of the self. On the other 
hand, resistance to temptation during recovery from an addiction clearly involves inhi-
bition of the self. 
 Self-control can be conceptualized as a relatively stable personality trait and as 
a behaviour that varies in different situations. Trait self-control refers to an individ-
ual’s general self-control capabilities. Trait self-control develops during lifetime and 
concerns a relatively stable personality characteristic. State self-control, on the other 
hand, applies to a specific situational context. State self-control can be defined as a 
temporary state that varies with intensity. Trait self-control is associated with state 
self-control since state-self-control can be regarded as an observable manifestation of 
trait self-control. 
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The role of trait self-control: A general theory of crime
Today, a large amount of studies have mainly focused on why some people posses a 
higher propensity to engage in (impulsive) crime. Many of these studies are guided 
by the assumptions made by the influential “General Theory of Crime” (Gottfredson 
& Hirschi, 1990). According to the General Theory of Crime, the main reason why 
some people posses a higher propensity to engage in criminal or analogous behaviour 
(e.g. smoking, gambling, excessive drinking) is because of interpersonal differences 
in self-control abilities. The theory mainly focuses on trait self-control and proposes 
that individuals can be arrayed on a continuum of self-control; those who possess low 
self-control abilities are expected to have a higher likelihood of criminal activity than 
those with strong self-control abilities. Low self-control increases the chance that an 
individual will be unable to resist the easy, immediate gratification that crime and 
analogous behaviour offers in daily life. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, people 
who lack self-control abilities are characterized as “impulsive, insensitive, physical (as 
opposed to mental), risk taking, short-sighted and non-verbal”. Self-control is consid-
ered as an essential construct, however, the theory also states that low self-control only 
results in criminal behaviour when the opportunity to engage in the behaviour is pres-
ent. Although not without criticism and controversy, a relatively large number of stud-
ies have indeed found support for this core assumption of the theory and showed that 
poor self-control (and opportunity) related to various sorts of criminal and analogous 
acts, across different countries (Arneklev, Grasmick, Tittle, & Bursik, 1993; Cochran, 
Wood, & Sellers, 1998; Forde & Kennedy, 1997; Gibbs & Geiver, 1995; Grasmick, Tit-
tle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Higgins & Makin, 2004; Junger, West, & Timman, 2001; 
Longshore & Turner, 1998; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Po-
lakowski, 1994; Sellers, 1999; Vazsonyi, Pickering, Junger, & Hessing, 2001; Wood, 
Pfefferbaum, & Arneklev, 1993). 
 Since conduct problems first emerge early in life, the General Theory of Crime 
states that interpersonal differences self-control are established in early childhood so-
cialization. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) emphasize the importance of family and 
the family environment. They argue that the family plays a vital role in ensuring the 
child adheres to social norms and non-deviant values. The most effective way to social-
ize a child correctly is to monitor, recognize, and punish the child’s deviant behaviour. 
Children whose parents supervise and punish their misconduct are likely to develop 
the self-control needed. These children will not only be better able to resist the easy 
gratification offered by misbehaviour, they will also develop the will to succeed in so-
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cial institutions (e.g. school and job market). Several studies have indeed found some 
support for these predictions related to socialization (see Cochran et al., 1998; Gibbs, 
Giever, & Martin, 1998; Hay, 2001; Polakowski, 1994). 
The role of state self-control: investigating momentary failure
The fact that the General Theory of Crime has occupied an essential presence in crimi-
nology today as well as the large number of studies that support the assumptions of the 
theory confirm the importance of self-control in criminal behaviour. Moreover, when 
explaining interpersonal differences in criminal behaviour, these studies illustrate the 
value of taking interpersonal differences in trait self-control into account. However, 
limitations become apparent when investigating the conditions under which self-con-
trol failure or impulsive criminal acts are likely to occur. Trait oriented approaches 
of self-control, like the General Theory of Crime, are not capable of specifying when 
breakdown of self-control is more likely nor do they explain why a specific situation 
may lead to urge driven behaviour. In order to gain more insight in the processes and 
causes that underlie momentary failure of self-control, a state oriented self-control ap-
proach is needed. This approach will be the main focus of the current paper. More 
specifically, recent (social) psychological research findings and theories addressing 
momentary self-control failure will be linked with the emergence of (impulsive) crimi-
nal behaviour. In addition, based on recent findings, guidelines for preventing failure 
of impulse control and improvement of self-control performance will be provided. 
Self-control failure and ego depletion
In many cases, failure of self-control can be considered relatively harmless. For in-
stance, a dieter who gives in to his urge and fails to refuse a fattening snack is unlikely 
to cause any societal problem. However, in some cases failure of self-control does have 
severe implications: the inability to control one’s sexual desires may lead the person to 
commit an indecent assault or rape, failing to inhibit aggressive impulses may result in 
violence and so on. Given the negative, sometimes even harmful consequences of self-
control failure, an important question is why people often fail to inhibit their responses 
and give in to their urges and desires. 
 According to the so-called strength model, the answer to this question is that self-
control is costly (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). In this view, control-
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ling oneself consumes energy or strength of some central, limited resource. After an act 
of self-control, the resource becomes temporarily depleted leaving the individual in a 
state of ego depletion. Therefore, performance on a subsequent self-control act is im-
paired because of lack of resources. A wide range of studies using divergent manipula-
tions of self-control, such as thought suppression, emotion regulation, impulse control, 
deliberate decision-making and memory tasks have indeed shown that when people 
exert self-control repeatedly within a relatively short period of time, performance on a 
subsequent act of self-control is likely to decrease. 
 The literature on ego depletion ascribes a number of features to the concept of en-
ergy resource. First, the resource is non-specific and used for a broad variety of self-con-
trol operations such as overriding or inhibiting impulses, regulating emotions, making 
choices and so on. Second, the resource is limited, that is, the energy required to resist 
a cigarette is no longer available to suppress sexual urges. This implies that control of a 
particular behaviour has a negative influence on future control attempts, even if these 
future control attempts involve different kinds of behaviour. In other words, the rea-
son why a person commits an impulsive act may be determined by the relatively large 
amount of self-control that the person has exerted prior to the impulsive act. When 
investigating the possible causes for the commitment of an impulsive act, one should 
take the amount of self-control that has been exerted prior to the impulsive act into ac-
count, realizing that even at first sight meaningless control attempts can have a serious 
impact on the eventual failure of self-control. In line with this explanation, occurrence 
of crime appears to be more likely late in the evening or night. (Baumeister, Heather-
ton & Tice, 1994). Gottfredson and Hirschi noticed that crimes (in particular crimes 
involving personal violence) tend to occur disproportionately between 1:00 and 2:00 
A.M. (one exception to this pattern is burglary; about half of all burglaries take place 
during the day, because employed people leave their homes during the day, thereby 
making daytime the best opportunity for burglars). In other words, repeated control 
attempts during daytime may cause depletion of regulatory resources, making break-
down of self-control more likely in the late evening or night. Third, energy is similar to 
a muscle. Like a muscle, self-control becomes tired after use and needs rest to recover. 
 In one of their first studies on the ego depletion phenomenon, Baumeister, Mu-
raven, Bratslavski and Tice (1998) confronted hungry participants with two displays 
of food: a stack of fresh chocolate cookies and a bowl of radishes. Next, one group 
of participants was instructed not to eat from the cookies but only from the radishes 
(high self-control), while the other group was instructed to eat only from the cook-
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ies (low self-control). In this way, participants’ amount of self-control was manipu-
lated; participants in the radish condition had to control their desire to eat from the 
deliciously smelling cookies. Subsequently, all participants were asked to complete a 
‘problem-solving task’ that consisted of a series of geometrical figure-tracing puzzles. 
In fact, these puzzles were unsolvable and time spent on this frustrating task served 
as a measure of self-control performance. A group of control participants did not take 
part in the food part of the experiment but started directly with the puzzle task. It was 
found that participants who exerted self-control by resisting the tempting chocolate 
cookies, spent significantly less time at solving the puzzles than participants who were 
allowed to eat chocolate cookies and control participants who were neither hungry nor 
exposed to food. In other words, participants who exerted a high amount of self-con-
trol, performed relatively worse on a subsequent self-control task. 
 Today, the phenomenon of ego depletion is a well researched phenomenon and 
empirical tests have confirmed that self-regulatory resources underlie a wide range 
of domains. For instance, Muraven, Collins, and Nienhaus (2002) manipulated initial 
self-control by instructing half of their participants to suppress a forbidden thought 
(high self- control), whereas the other half worked on simple arithmetic problems (low 
self-control). Next, all participants participated in a 20 minute beer drinking session 
in which they were asked to rate the qualities of different beers. Although participants 
were allowed to drink as much beer as they liked, they were also provided a reason 
to reduce their alcohol intake, namely performing well on a subsequent driving test. 
In spite of the prospect of the driving test, participants who suppressed a forbidden 
thought drank significantly more beer than participants who exerted low initial self-
control. 
 Other demonstrations of ego depletion are related to emotion regulation and il-
lustrate that participants who suppressed or exaggerated their feelings performed less 
well on a subsequent self-control task than participants who were allowed to act natu-
rally (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). In addition, initial depletion has been prov-
en to affect consumer behaviour in the sense that ego depleted individuals are more 
likely to engage in impulse purchases (i.e., buying items that one did not intended to 
buy) than non-depleted individuals (Baumeister, 2002; Faber & Vohs, 2004). 
 In sum, the results of these studies support the assumptions of the strength model 
and illustrate that after repeated self-control, ego depletion emerges and self-control 
performance decreases, raising the probability of impulsive (criminal) acting. 
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Improvement of self-control
In order to prevent people from committing impulsive crimes or similar kinds of self-
control related deviant behaviour it is important to explore ways to improve self-con-
trol abilities. In many cases, especially cases involving people who possess a higher 
propensity to engage in criminal behaviour, the benefits of improved self-control abili-
ties will not only appear on an individual level, but are likely to be reflected in society 
as well. Unfortunately, however, the implications of the limited strength model can be 
considered as relatively pessimistic. The model proposes that controlling the self con-
sumes energy, causing an almost inevitable loss of self-control. Although the theory 
states that improvement of self-control can be established by means of training or re-
peated exposure, it is assumed that there is not much more one can do against the loss 
of energy. Fortunately, findings of recent studies favor a more positive view towards 
the improvement of self-control by demonstrating that the concept of energy is likely 
to be more complicated and dynamic than initially suggested. These findings implicate 
that the success or failure of self-control not only depends on available energy, but can 
be influenced by wide range of factors. They show that ego depletion can be counter-
acted by various means, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
External focus of attention: Focusing away from the self-control de-
manding action
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), most crimes are easy to commit and 
require little skill. Crime offers immediate gratification (e.g., violence to the victim, 
money, and sex), rather than deferred rewards. To date, numerous psychological stud-
ies have addressed the issue of immediate versus delayed gratification. Many of these 
studies involved research on self-control in children, and made use of the so-called de-
lay-of-gratification paradigm (Mischel, 1974; Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970).  This paradigm 
captures the dilemma of choosing between an immediate, small award or a greater, 
delayed award. Children are presented with food that they desire (candy). The experi-
menter instructs the children that they will be left alone in the room. The instructions 
that follow pose the children to the dilemma. The child has to choose between waiting 
for the experimenter to return and to get two or more pieces of the desired candy as a 
reward, or he or she can hit a bell and the experimenter will return immediately, but 
in this case only one piece of candy will be given. Although children try to wait for the 
return of the experimenter, soon the delay becomes very trying and temptation to ring 
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the bell will be experienced. An important finding in these studies was that some chil-
dren were noticeably better able to delay gratification than others. It appeared that the 
success of these children was due to the usage of control strategies: they shifted their 
attention to objects in the room, or dissociated themselves by focusing on the abstract 
properties of desired stimuli (“thinking about candy as little clouds, or imagining that 
they were just a picture and not real”). In other words, when attention was focused 
away from the control demanding action, self-control performance improved. 
 In a study by Alberts et al. (2006), the influence of focus of attention on self-control 
performance was investigated more directly. The aim of the study was to test the effect 
of an external versus self-focus on physical self-control performance, namely lifting a 
1.5 kg weight as long as possible. Physical exercise tasks, such as lifting a weight, have 
been found to be a sensitive measure of self-control in prior research (see for example 
Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998, Study 1; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001, 
Study 2). Because lifting a weight becomes fatiguing and even a little painful after a 
short period of time, the person feels the urge to stop lifting. Overcoming this fatigue 
and overriding the urge to quit, requires self-control. The physical self-control task was 
performed twice. In order to control for interpersonal differences, the first measure-
ment was taken at the beginning of the experiment and served as a baseline of weight 
lift strength, against which the second, relevant measurement was compared. During 
the second performance on the physical task, participants in the internal focus condi-
tion were instructed to fully concentrate themselves on their arm and hand muscles 
that are involved when lifting a weight. To illustrate this, an anatomical illustration 
of an arm and hand was shown and the experimenter pointed which muscles and ten-
dons are used to lift a weight. Participants in the external focus condition performed 
a difficult cognitive calculation task during the second weight-lifting task. The high 
complexity of this task leaves less capacity for other thoughts about the physical self-
control. The results showed that the performance on the second physical self-control 
task remained stable when attention was focused on an external stimulus (calculation 
task). When participants focused their attention on an internal stimulus (muscles), 
performance on the physical self-control task decreased significantly. 
 In sum, the above discussed findings implicate that self-control performance can 
be improved by using attention related control strategies. When attention is focused 
away from a control demanding action, self-control performance has been found to im-
prove. In contrast, when attention is focused internally, on the control demanding situ-
ation and the feelings one experiences during this condition, self-control performance 
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is expected to decrease. A positive aspect with regard to self-control improvement is 
that people can (often easily) be taught to learn and apply strategies. In addition, even 
when people posses relatively low self-control abilities, using control-strategies can 
still be regarded as an option for self-control improvement.  
Internal Focus of attention:  Self-awareness
Self-awareness can be described as a state in which one is aware of oneself as an object 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Looking in a mirror and speaking in front of an audience 
are both examples of situations in which people may become highly self-aware. Being 
self-aware makes sure individuals come to know their own emotions and other internal 
states, partially by inferring them from observation. Self-awareness is closely linked to 
self-control performance and engagement in criminal behaviour: loss of self-aware-
ness contributes to failure of self-control. Under conditions of low self-awareness, peo-
ple loose the capacity to think about themselves and evaluate themselves. Moreover, 
people become less able to consider the implications of current events for the future 
and seem less capable of comparing themselves to appropriate standards. When self-
awareness decreases, people start focusing on immediate sensations, movement and 
events. This attention narrowing favors giving in to temptation and has been proven to 
make urge driven behaviour, like violent offending, significantly more likely to occur 
(Nagin & Pogarsky, 2004).  In sum, when people lose self-awareness, they lose the ca-
pacity to monitor themselves. They stop to attend to what they are doing and do fail to 
evaluate their actions against appropriate standards (i.e. non-criminal behaviour). As 
a result, ordinary restraints and inhibitions are suspended and people are more likely 
to perform dangerous and violent acts that they would normally not engage in.  
 The negative consequences of low self-awareness are well reflected in the acts that 
often accompany the consumption of alcohol. Alcohol consumption has been shown to 
reduce self-awareness (Hull, 1981). It is well known that under the influence of alco-
hol people are more likely to engage in violent and aggressive acts and do things that 
they often regret afterwards. Moreover, the emergence of these aggressive and violent 
acts is not because alcohol increases or evokes them, but because alcohol lowers self-
awareness and consequently reduces inhibitions against these acts (Steele & South-
wick, 1985). Another illustration of the consequences of reduced self-awareness comes 
from research by Mullen (1986). In this study, a large sample of incidents involving 
lynch mobs was analysed in order to find out whether the violence committed by lynch 
90
mobs could be accounted for in terms of self-attention processes. More specifically, the 
study focused on the relation between ratio of mob members to victims and atrocity 
(hanging, shooting, burning etc.) in lynch mobs. The results showed a positive relation 
between the number of lynchers relative to number of victims and the viciousness with 
which the victims were killed. In other words, the higher the number of lynchers, the 
more violence. It was suggested that as the lynchers became more numerous relative 
to the victims, the lynchers became less self-aware (more de-individuated), causing a 
breakdown of self-control, which in turn led to an increase in violent behaviours. 
 Recent findings on self-control and self-awareness suggest that enhancement of 
self-awareness may help to improve self-control performance and overcome the ef-
fects of ego depletion. In a study by Alberts, Martijn, and de Vries (2006) participants 
were initially depleted by means of an attention self-control task. This 8 minute task 
required participants to calculate and name the sum of digits presented on a computer 
screen. During the task, they were auditively distracted by a voice randomly naming 
digits and thereby interfering with their calculations. Thus, participants had to focus 
their attention on the calculations on the screen and try to override their impulse to 
listen to the interfering noise. A control group performed the same calculations, but 
was not exposed to the interfering noise. Next, participants were asked to complete a 
“verbal ability task”. In fact, this was a Scrambled Sentence Task (SST) that intended to 
activate high self-awareness in participants. Participants in the high self-awareness un-
scrambled 25 scrambled sentences which were related to the self (e.g., “I  read books”); 
Participants in the low self-awareness condition received 25 neutral scrambled sen-
tences. Depleted participants who were highly self-aware outperformed depleted low 
self-aware participants on a physical self-control measurement. When self-awareness 
of participants was increased by means of the scrambled sentence task, participants 
did not show any sign of ego depletion and were able to perform relatively well. 
 Obviously, attentional processes can be considered as important moderators of 
self-control performance. It was already demonstrated that when people focus their at-
tention externally, away from a control demanding situation, self-control performance 
increased. In contrast, when attention was directed towards the control demanding 
situation, self-control performance decreased. In addition, the current paragraph 
stressed that self-control performance can also be enhanced by making people aware 
of themselves. Although self-awareness and focusing on a control demanding situ-
ation may both be considered as forms of internal attention, they are not the same. 
When people focus on a control demanding action, they are applying a specific focus. 
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In this case, people are primarily dealing with the experience of exerting self-control 
and the unpleasantness of this experience. On the other hand, when people become 
self-aware, they apply a more general focus on the self. As a consequence, evaluative 
processes are expected to be initiated and people start to compare themselves to appro-
priate standards. This evaluative aspect that accompanies heightened self-awareness 
has repeatedly been proven to result in improved self-control performance. 
Self-control related expectancies
As discussed before, the strength model stresses the limits of self-control by suggest-
ing that a limited resource underlies self-control performance. An important question 
with regard to this suggestion concerns the subjectivity of these limits. Does it matter 
whether people think of their resources or self-control capacities as limited or unlim-
ited? In other words, do expectations and beliefs about the limits of one’s resources 
influence self-control performance? Recent studies have addresses this issue and in-
vestigated whether expectations or implicit beliefs about the nature of self-control 
affect people’s self-control performance. In a study by Martijn et al. (2002), it was 
demonstrated that the notion of limited energy is relative and flexible and that the 
perceived boundaries of one’s self-controlling abilities are apt to change. In that study, 
participants watched a highly disgusting video fragment and were asked to suppress 
their emotions. A control group watched the same video, but received no suppression 
instructions. Immediately after, half of the participants who suppressed their emotions 
were informed that “often people think they have to rest after an effortful task. How-
ever, scientific investigations prove that this is not the case after emotional effort…” 
(Martijn et al., 2002; p. 446, Experiment 1). On a subsequent self-control demand-
ing task, participants who received this information outperformed control participants 
and participants who received no such information. These results suggest that people 
expect that exercising self-control leads to fatigue and, hence to worse performance 
on a second self-control demanding task. If such expectancy is challenged, decline in 
performance is less self-evident and people may even achieve better.
 In addition, in another study by Martijn et al. (2002, Experiment 2) some evidence 
was found that people distinguish between two classes of beliefs about exercising self-
control. The first class of beliefs characterizes self-control as energy and comes close to 
the strength model of Baumeister and colleagues. Thus, people expect and believe that 
they have only a limited amount of energy available for their self-control operations 
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and that they are likely to fail when demands are too high. Furthermore, for optimal 
performance one needs to be well-rested and free of other self-control demands. At 
the same time, albeit to a lesser extent, people adhere to the belief that self-control is 
primarily a matter of motivation: if you really want to, you can do it and if you really 
make an effort you can do much more than you think. The distinction between these 
two classes of beliefs about self-control was recently corroborated by a comparable 
classification by Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2005) who showed that participants who 
think that self-control is an unlimited and malleable ability tend to set more goals. 
 The influence of beliefs and expectancies on self-regulatory efforts was further 
demonstrated in a study by Bushman, Baumeister, and Philips (2001). This study tested 
the hypothesis that people often exhibit aggressive behaviour because they expect that 
aggression will enable them to feel better. In other words, aggression may be caused by 
the expectancy that negative affect can be regulated by acting aggressively. This impli-
cates that if people believe that their affective state will not be improved by aggressing, 
they will not aggress. In order to test this hypothesis, participants were given a bogus 
mood-freezing pill. They were led to believe that this pill temporarily “freezes” emo-
tional states. As a consequence, emotional states cannot be changed, thereby making 
affect regulation efforts ineffective. The results of this study showed that participants 
who had been induced to accept the value of expressing aggression as true, responded 
significantly more aggressively than control participants to an offensive. However, feel-
ings of  aggression were eliminated by the mood-freezing pill. Thus, aggressive feelings 
depended on the expectation that their negative mood (resulting from an offense), 
could be changed by acting aggressively. When this expectation was removed by the 
mood-freezing pill manipulation, aggression decreased.    
 The research findings presented in this paragraph stress the importance and impli-
cations of expectancies. These findings indicate that self-control performance and ego 
depletion are highly susceptible to how people think self-control operates. Self-con-
trol performance was found to benefit from positive self-control related expectancies. 
Rather than limitedness and failure, positive control expectancies are characterized by 
motivation and the accomplishment of goals. In the light of these findings, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that positive control expectancies can help to control the impulses 
that underlie many forms of criminal behaviour. 
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Motivation
Muraven and Slessarava (2003) conducted a series of experiments in which they 
demonstrated that ego depletion may be compensated by increasing people’s motiva-
tion to perform well on subsequent self-control task. They showed that initially deplet-
ed individuals persevered longer at a subsequent self-control task if they were led to 
believe that their persistence would be beneficial to others or to themselves. Depleted 
participants, who were not motivated, lowered their persistence and thus showed ego 
depletion. Thus, by increasing the motivation to exert self-control, self-control perfor-
mance may be enhanced.
Guidelines
The research findings discussed in the previous section highlighted the changeable na-
ture of self-control and provided optimistic and practicable perspectives for improving 
self-control performance and prevention of impulsive acting. These findings are par-
ticularly useful for improving the likeliness of taking the right form of action and can 
be translated into practical guidelines. Concrete guidelines for better self-control are 
presented in the paragraphs below. 
Training
Like muscles profit from a balanced mix of training and recovery, self-control may also 
be strengthened by a regime of training and rest. Some evidence for this was provided 
by Muraven, Baumeister and Tice (1999), who instructed students to engage in self-
control trainings (such as keeping food diaries or improving posture) for a 2-week 
period. After that period, students showed improved performance on a physical self- 
control measurement when compared to a control group. In line with this, a study con-
ducted by Oaten and Cheng (2006) revealed that a study intervention program, a form 
of self-control training, improved regulatory performance. Students who participated 
in this study program were asked to repeatedly perform various acts of self-control, 
such as self-monitoring and creating artificial early deadlines, during two months. Af-
ter these two months, they reported no increased stress during exam time and signifi-
cant improvements in many self-control related behaviours. These students not only 
studied more and enhanced their study habits; they also displayed improvement of 
regulatory behaviour outside the context of academic habits compared to those who 
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did not participate in the study program. For instance, experimental group showed a 
decrease in alcohol, tobacco and caffeine consumption. Also, an increase in healthy 
dietary habits and emotional control were observed. Additional findings on laboratory 
tasks suggested that the program helped to reduce (but not eliminate) the effects of 
ego depletion: the deterioration of performance after completing a self-control task 
was significantly greater for control participants than for participants who were ex-
posed to the study program. 
 Although the above described findings consistently show that training can help to 
increase self-control abilities, it is important to take the difficulty of the self-control re-
lated goal into account. According to Baumeister and Exline (2000), some self-control 
tasks may be highly depleting. For instance, ex-detainees who attempt to start up an 
honest life and keep to the straight and narrow may find it extremely difficult to give 
up their delinquent habits that may have become routine for many years. It is assumed 
that the control of these routine behaviours can pose a major challenge for the energy-
resource. The authors state that “they might represent a constant drain on the res-
ervoir, a marathon-like demand on the “muscle” (Baumeister & Exline, 2000, p. 36). 
They propose that in these cases, improvement of self-control is best established by 
gradual increases of self-control instead of sudden ones. However, many criminal and 
analogous behaviours demand rigid and immediate adherence, such as the inhibition 
of violent impulses. In these cases, it is suggested that a “one-day at a time” strategy 
may be the best option. If people can consider the self-control challenge as being only 
for the current day (or hour or minute), they may be able to exert the amount of self-
control required to prevent failure. It is suggested that social support plays an essential 
role in such situations, namely by offering positive modeling as well as by increasing 
social pressure in favor of self-control related behaviour. These functions can make the 
desired action automatic, which will decrease the amount of self-control needed.
Increasing self-awareness
Self-awareness can be enhanced by several means. A common way to enhance self-
awareness in an experimental setting is by means of a mirror or cameras (e.g. Buss, 
1980; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). The effect of cameras and mirrors was well demon-
strated in a study by Bailey, Leonard, Cranston and Taylor (1983). In their study, the 
effect of self-awareness on the aggressive behaviour of intoxicated individuals was in-
vestigated. Participants competed in a task in which they could hurt and/or be hurt 
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by their opponent. In the high self-awareness condition, participants competed in the 
presence of a mirror and video camera. In the low self-awareness condition, no mirror 
or video camera was present. Results showed that intoxicated and non-intoxicated par-
ticipants in the high self-awareness condition were significantly less aggressive than 
those in the low-self-awareness condition. Moreover, the finding that intoxicated par-
ticipants were just as responsive to the camera and mirror as the sober participants, 
even under conditions of increasing provocation, illustrates the potential power and 
effectiveness of these manipulations. Therefore, these manipulations may well be used 
outside the laboratory. For instance, in order to reduce violence at nightclubs or disco-
theques cameras could be installed at positions were aggression is most likely to take 
place (e.g., near the exit of the building). When doing so, one should make sure that 
people are aware that they are being monitored, for instance by placing signs on the 
wall indicating the presence of cameras. 
 Interventions like cameras and mirrors concern temporary and momentary chang-
es in self-awareness. In contrast to these short-lived changes of self-awareness, self-
awareness may also be enhanced in a more long term context, by gaining an overall 
increased sense of self-awareness. Self-regulatory goals are more likely to be accom-
plished when people become aware of their own abilities, interests, limitations, biases 
and so on. Crime (relapse) prevention programs that aim at preventing offenders (or 
non-offenders) from committing crimes are often contributing to an overall increased 
sense of self-awareness. An example of such a program was the so-called “Operation 
Kick It”. This project recruited imprisoned drug offenders to describe their criminal 
histories and the consequences in order to prevent young people and delinquents from 
committing crimes. In Scott, Hawkins, and Farnsworth (1994) the success of “Opera-
tion Kick It” was investigated. It was shown that only 20 percent of released prisoners 
who had taken part in Operation Kick-It relapsed and returned to prison. Among the 
matched ex-prisoners of the control-group (who did not participate in the program), 
the recidivism rate was significantly higher, namely 66 percent. The success of the pro-
gram was partly attributed to the establishment of increased self-awareness among 
the participants. During the program, participants openly and honestly confronted and 
judged their own behaviour. Self-awareness was also enhanced in presentations that 
honestly disclosed past mistakes that led to lawbreaking and imprisonment to a public 
forum. Moreover, the program stressed the acceptance of the view that past behav-
iour of participants was wrongful by society’s standards. The alteration of standards 
is essential with regard to self-awareness, since increased self-awareness encourages 
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individuals to compare themselves to available standards and norms. Obviously, self-
control enhancing effect of increased self-awareness will only serve its purpose when 
the available standards concern appropriate behaviour.
Changing expectancies
The findings on the link between expectancies and self-control, as discussed in the pre-
vious section, show the influence of people’s beliefs on self-control efforts and perfor-
mance. First, findings of a study by Bushman and colleagues (2001) suggested that ag-
gressive behaviour often occurs because people expect that by engaging in aggression, 
they will get rid of their anger and feel better. When this expectation was challenged 
or absent, aggressive responses were significantly reduced. This finding not only il-
lustrates the influence and importance of beliefs, it also implicates that by changing 
aggression related beliefs, the harm that accompanies aggression can be reduced.  Sec-
ond, it was found that positive control expectancies can help to overcome the control 
inhibiting effects of ego depletion, making successful self-control more likely (Martijn 
et al., 2002). Positive control expectancies are closely related to the concept of self-ef-
ficacy (Bandura, 1986). Self-efficacy is defined as “people’s judgments of their capa-
bilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated types of 
performance” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391). In other words, self-efficacy refers to the extent 
that people believe they can successfully carry out the behaviour required to produce a 
certain outcome. It is efficacy expectations that affect both the initiation and persever-
ance of coping behaviour. As shown by recent studies, some people believe that they do 
not (or to lesser extent) possess the capacity or resources to successfully deal with the 
urges and desires they experience (Martijn et al., 2002). Since individuals’ perceptions 
of self-efficacy can influence their choice of activities and settings, and can determine 
how much effort they will invest when facing obstacles, these people are more likely 
to experience difficulties when trying to overcome the immediate gratification offered 
by impulsive crimes.
 Self-efficacy theory provides a useful framework for treatment programs and in-
terventions tailored to deviant (criminal) behaviour. Self-efficacy can be modified 
through learning experiences such as task mastery and vicarious learning (Bandura, 
1986). For instance, a concrete way to improve positive control beliefs is by exposure 
to self-control activities that become incrementally more challenging. By mastering 
these activities, people not only achieve mastery over their immediate environment, 
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they also develop the self-efficacy that is assumed to transfer this mastery to daily life. 
 A more passive learning method to enhance feelings of self-efficacy is by means 
of verbal persuasion; telling one that he or she can competently perform a particular 
behaviour (Bandura, 1986). Verbal persuasion may entail a “pep talk” or specific per-
formance feedback and may provide a “boost” to counter occasional obstacles. Being 
told by others that one can competently perform a particular behaviour can lead to 
increased self-efficacy and improvement of self-control. In line with this, findings of a 
study by Martijn, Alberts and Goedegebuure (2006) revealed that when people were 
led to believe that they possessed good self-control abilities, their self-control perfor-
mance improved significantly. When participants exerted self-control repeatedly and 
received positive feedback on their self-control performance, performance on a subse-
quent self-control task remained relatively stable and no signs of ego depletion were 
present.  
 Since verbal persuasion is easy to provide and generally available (Liebert & 
Spiegler, 1994), relapse preventions may well benefit from implementing programs in 
which people are helped to believe that they are capable of resisting the urge to commit 
(impulsive) crimes and able to keep to the straight and narrow. Although verbal per-
suasion has its limits, under the proper conditions it can be very effective (see Bandura, 
1986 for an overview of these conditions). In combination with more active learning 
experiences, verbal persuasion techniques may help to increase self-efficacy expecta-
tion, positively contributing to the success of future self-control attempts. 
Using attention strategies
Whether people attend to immediate rewards offered by (impulsive) crimes or are ca-
pable of avoiding the immediate reward is often a crucial factor. In order to overcome 
the immediate pleasures and outcomes associated with criminal behaviour, research 
has suggested that strategies can help to delay gratification and successfully control 
oneself. It has been shown that the more people think about the instant pleasure, the 
harder it becomes to resist it (Karniol & Miller, 1983). There a several strategies that 
can help people to focus their attention away from the immediate stimuli that trigger 
impulses to engage in a behaviour, making successful self-control more likely. Among 
these are self-instructions, focusing on the better reward (imagining the temporally re-
mote goal) and learning to distract oneself with other thoughts of behaviour. However, 
attention strategies are not necessarily restricted to distractive cognitions. Research 
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by Alberts, Martijn, Nievelstein, Jansen, and de Vries (2006) demonstrated that self-
control failure can also be overcome when engaging in distractive activities. Preferably, 
in order to successfully attract attention away from the self-control demanding situa-
tion, these activities should not directly be related to the self-control task at hand and 
require a considerable amount of concentration. These strategies can be learned and 
internalized by repeated practice and may be implemented in educational programs 
aimed at improving self-control abilities. 
Discussion
The present chapter attempted to provide more insight in the causes of and processes 
underlying impulsive criminal behaviour. More specifically, an overview of psychologi-
cal findings and theories was presented in order to gain more knowledge on why and 
under which conditions impulsive crimes are likely to occur. Instead of focusing on 
stable, personality related factors, the current article mainly addressed a state oriented 
approach, by identifying factors that influence the momentary occurrence of the im-
pulsive (criminal) act. 
 Self-control was introduced as an essential psychological construct that underlies 
impulsive behaviour. It was argued that the commitment of an impulsive crime reflects 
the inability to temporarily control the self. Recent findings on self-control offers a 
reason why people fail to control themselves and commit impulsive acts. According to 
the strength model, controlling the self is psychologically demanding and results in a 
state of so-called ego depletion. When people control themselves, they use an amount 
of energy that is not available anymore for future self-control tasks, resulting in de-
creased performance. Although a considerable number of studies have indeed found 
support for this assumption, recent studies have also shown that successful self-control 
is not dependent on energy or previous control attempts alone and that the emergence 
of ego depletion can be overcome. Several studies implicate that under certain condi-
tions, people can control themselves successfully. These conditions include: focusing 
attention away from a control demanding action, increased self-awareness, and pres-
ence of positive control expectancies. Instead of external control attempts, like impris-
onment and introduction of severe punishments, these findings offer an alternative 
way for preventing criminal behaviour, namely by focusing on improvement of inter-
nal control. In the present article we provided some concrete guidelines that may help 
to improve self-control performance and inhibition of (destructive) impulses. These 
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guidelines may be implemented in treatment programs and interventions tailored to 
deviant (criminal) behaviour. Moreover, the overall complexity of these guidelines is 
limited, making them also suitable for more auto-didactic application. Beside the use 
of these guidelines, a better understanding of how self-control operates, for instance by 
making people aware of ego depletion and its consequences, can help to improve im-
pulse inhibition as well. Future research should investigate the impact of the suggested 
guidelines on impulsive (criminal) behaviour more directly, for instance by conducting 
longitudinal studies in which delinquents are exposed to treatment programs that are 
based on self-control related findings as presented in the current paper. 
 For the sake of generalisation, in the current chapter we mainly concentrated on 
the issue of momentary self-control failure (state self-control) and paid relatively little 
attention to the role of individual differences in self-control abilities (trait self-control). 
Obviously, people do differ in their self-control abilities; some people are noticeably 
better than others in remaining patient, saving money, regulating emotions and so on. 
Moreover, people may posses relatively good skills in one domain of self-control and 
few skills in another domain. In order to prevent impulsivity and understand when and 
why impulsive crimes occur, the role of individual differences should not be neglected. 
Optimization of treatment programs requires knowledge of the self-control skills an 
individual possesses, but also of other factors related to self-control performance, such 
as the expectancies that people hold about the nature of self-control.  
 Many of the causes of criminal behaviour, such as dysfunctional family conditions, 
lack of educational opportunities, and poverty are often difficult to alter. However, the 
research findings and guidelines presented in the current chapter favor a more positive 
viewpoint and suggest that (impulsive) criminal behaviour can be reduced by focus-
ing on ways to enhance momentary self-control. In addition, by gaining more insight 
in the psychological processes that underlie impulsive crimes, it becomes clear that 
dealing with problems associated with criminal behaviour is not necessarily restricted 
to the usage of external control measures. Acknowledging that situational factors and 
psychological control processes play an important role in the realization of criminal-
ity, leads to the awareness that people not always deliberately choose for giving in to 
impulses and desires. The difference between not willing and not always being able 
to control oneself is crucial here; preventing deviant behaviour of those who are sim-
ply not willing to inhibit their impulses and desires may primarily be accomplished 
by means of external control measures. In contrast, those whose deviant behaviour is 
caused by an inability and lack of knowledge how to successfully control oneself, are 
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also expected to benefit from internal control measures that are aimed at long-term 
improvement of self-control related skills.  
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CHAPTER 7
General Discussion
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A topic that gained a considerable amount of attention by ancient philosophers like 
Socrates and Plato was that of so-called “akratic” action. An akratic action refers to an 
action that is done despite the fact that the agent considers a different course of ac-
tion preferable. Many modern philosophers and psychologist have used terms such as 
“weakness of will, ”moral weakness” and “lack of self-control”, to describe this phenom-
enon (Elster,1979). Indeed, the question why people often fail to inhibit their responses 
and yield to temptation, despite the negative, sometimes even harmful consequences 
of this failure is not only theoretically, but also practically interesting. According to the 
strength model (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), 
akratic actions emerge as a consequence of limited energy. In this model, self-control 
draws on a general source of energy and people are assumed to have a limited amount 
of energy available. After an act of self-control, the resource becomes depleted and an 
individual finds him- or herself in a state of ego depletion. Consequently, a second act 
of self-control results in impaired performance. Although the strength model seems 
intuitively plausible, it does not devote much attention to the possible processes of the 
mechanisms involved. As a result, the precise nature of ego depletion and processes 
that underlie failure of self-control remain unknown. The aim of the present disserta-
tion was to gain more insight in these processes. More specifically, it was argued that by 
identifying distinct factors that influence (effective) self-control, more insight can be 
obtained in the processes that underlie self-control and potential avenues for improve-
ment can be created.  In this concluding Chapter, the main findings of the research pre-
sented in this dissertation will be discussed. In addition, suggestions for improvement 
of self-control and future research will be formulated. 
Automaticity
Chapter 3 addressed the role of automatic processes in self-control and ego depletion. 
More specifically, two studies were conducted in order to investigate whether ego de-
pletion can be reduced or even eliminated by means of manipulations that operate at 
an automatic level. Two different priming manipulations were used to unconsciously 
activate of the concept of persistence. The results of both studies consistently show that 
activation of persistence can have robust effects on self-control performance. Depleted 
participants who were primed with persistence outperformed depleted participants 
who were exposed to a neutral prime. Depleted participants who were exposed to the 
neutral prime displayed the standard ego depletion pattern: their performance de-
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creased significantly. Whereas the strength model regards self-control as a conscious, 
active process, these findings illustrate that self-control may also be guided by pro-
cesses that operate outside awareness. The impact of these automatic processes was 
further demonstrated by their potential to circumvent the occurrence of ego depletion. 
Interestingly, a first attempt to investigate the possible downside of unconscious activa-
tion revealed that its control enhancing effect is unlikely to be followed by any kind of 
rebound effect; participants who kept their self-control performance stable due to the 
priming manipulation did not exhibit any tendency to reduce their self-control efforts 
later on. Note, however, that the findings of Chapter 3 do not necessarily contradict to 
the strength model. Since the strength model regards ego depletion as a consequence 
of active (conscious) self-control, it is possible that nonconscious self-control, because 
it does not concern active involvement by the self, will not drain regulatory resources. 
Although the findings of Chapter 3 do not necessarily conflict with the strength mod-
el, they do illustrate a possible limitation of this model. After all, the limited strength 
model is only concerned with conscious self-regulation and does not devote any at-
tention to its unconscious counterpart. The present findings show the importance and 
impact of automatic self-control and suggest that the strength model may well ben-
efit from incorporating both types of self-regulation. Interesting in this respect are so-
called dual-process models (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Fazio, 1990). Such models 
have been developed and applied in the field of cognitive and social psychology and are 
characterized by a differentiation between conscious and automatic processes working 
either in conjunction or opposition. 
 The findings presented in Chapter 3 are also important since they provide further 
empirical foundation for a direct link between unconscious processes and self-control. 
Previous research by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, 1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, & Troschel, 2001) already revealed that goal pursuit can take place with-
out any conscious guidance or intervention. It was found that goals can be triggered 
outside awareness and that, once activated, these goals function in the same way as 
consciously chosen goals (see also Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). 
In a similar vein, the findings of Chapter 3 illustrate the impact of automatic processes 
and provide further support for the notion that self-control does not always require 
conscious awareness to be effective. Moreover, whereas previously discussed studies 
on automatic goal pursuit mainly addressed unconscious activation of self-regulatory 
goals, the results presented in Chapter 3 extend this body of research by showing that 
self-control may also be automated by unconsciously activating a behavioural con-
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struct rather than a (specific) goal. 
 An intriguing question in the light of the findings of Chapter 3 concerns the impact 
of automatic processes in our daily life. In line with Bargh’s and Chartrand’s claim that 
“… most of daily life is driven by automatic, nonconscious mental processes” (1999, p. 
464), the two studies presented in Chapter 3 show that relatively subtle manipulations 
can have a significant effect on regulatory performance, without people being aware 
of this influence. Likewise, in everyday life, self-control attempts are likely to be influ-
enced by unconscious processes set into motion directly by one’s environment, like bill-
boards, conversations, television and so on. Although people may not be directly aware 
of these processes, they can become aware that these processes exist and that they can 
have a serious impact on self-control performance. Consequently, this knowledge may 
be used to prevent oneself (if possible) of exposure to, or deal more effectively with 
“daily life manipulations” that are likely to have a detrimental effect on ones regula-
tory abilities. For instance, similar to the screensaver manipulation in Chapter 3, candy 
commercials on television may unconsciously trigger the desire to eat palatable food 
and may cause a dieter to get up from the couch to get some chocolate, thereby break-
ing his or her diet (see e.g., Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2006). 
Attentional focus
Research presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 investigated the role of attentional 
processes in self-control. In Chapter 4, a distinction was made between directing at-
tention towards versus away from a control demanding action (internal focus or cogni-
tive association versus external focus). In order to increase awareness of regulatory 
efforts, participants were asked to pay attention to their arm and hand muscles that 
were involved while they were performing a physical self-control task (internal focus). 
An external focus was induced by a distracting calculation task that was completed 
by participants while they exerted self-control. It was found that participants who 
were distracted by this calculation while exerting physical self-control outperformed 
both participants who focused their attention on the physical self-control task (inter-
nal focus) as well as control participants who did not receive any focus instructions. 
However, no significant difference in self-control performance was found between par-
ticipants in the internal focus condition and control participants. With regard to the 
strength model, these findings suggest that attentional processes play an important 
role in the emergence of ego depletion and the failure of self-control. The fact that both 
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people who focused attention internally and control participants’ exhibited a decline in 
performance, might imply that the occurrence of ego depletion is partly mediated by 
ineffective or suboptimal attentional processes. Directing attention to one’s regulatory 
efforts while exerting self-control, may be a default process or natural tendency that 
emerges when people exert (conscious) self-control. In any event, it contributes to the 
emergence of ego-depletion. When this default attentional process is replaced by a pro-
cess that is not preliminary concerned with regulatory efforts, no negative influence on 
self-control performance seems to occur. A related finding in this respect comes from 
Vohs and Baumeister (2004) who showed that depleted participants had more prob-
lems to direct attention away from a control demanding situation. In this study, the 
authors argued that it would become more difficult for would-be faithful relationship 
partners to direct their attention away from attractive new partners under conditions 
of depletion. Consistent with this expectation, it was found that, compared with non-
depleted participants, depleted participants spent more time looking through a book 
of attractive, near-naked models. In other words, besides demonstrating a link between 
attention and ego-depletion, this finding also suggests that the employment of an ex-
ternal focus may become more difficult when regulatory resources are low. 
 The findings of Chapter 4 may also provide more insight in the results of Chapter 
3. The success of an external focus of attention may lie in its ability to circumvent ac-
tive, conscious involvement by the self, thereby taxing regulatory resources too a lesser 
extent. Imagine a person who quit smoking and who experiences the urge to smoke 
a cigarette. In this situation, calling a friend can be seen as an external focus that en-
ables the person to directing his attention away from his craving and the self-control 
demanding situation. In stead of engaging in an internal conflict, the self-control op-
eration is now handed over to the distracting activity. At this point, the need for active, 
conscious self-control is avoided. In other words, the phone call may function as an 
initiation of automated self-control. Then, the effectiveness of automatic self-control 
may also partly be determined by the fact that there is no awareness of the effort that 
is involved and that the self is not posed to an internal conflict. 
 In a broader perspective, attentional strategies may not only be beneficial for mo-
mentary self-control enactment, but may also be considered valuable in a long term 
context. By repetition, the employment of attentional strategies may become internal-
ized and automatic, thereby contributing to overall improved self-control abilities. 
That is, effective employment of attentional strategies may be a factor that contributes 
to interpersonal differences in self-control.  In line with this, Rosenbaum (1990) states 
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that peoples’ general repertoire of learned self-control skills are essential for goal ac-
complishment. He uses the term “learned resourcefulness” to indicate the acquired 
regulatory skills that help people to control their behaviour. Highly resourceful people 
have learned over their lifetime to use a diverse range of self-control strategies that 
help them to control themselves and pursue their goals in daily life (Rosenbaum, 2000; 
Rosenbaum & Ben-Ari, 1985; Kennett & Ackerman, 1995). In contrast, low resourceful 
people only use a limited number of self-control strategies and are more likely to aban-
don self-control in the eye of frustration. 
 Chapter 5 pursued the issue of an internal (self-) focus of attention in greater 
depth. Whereas the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that self-focused attention has a 
negative effect on regulatory performance, other studies have reported a positive ef-
fect of self-focused attention on self-control performance (see for instance Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; Carver and Scheier, 1981, 1990; Monteith, 1993). In 
Chapter 5, these contradictory findings were addressed by making a distinction be-
tween two types of self-focused attention, namely cognitive association and self-aware-
ness. It was found that the type of self-focus determines the effect of self-focus on 
regulatory performance. Exposure to a self-awareness manipulation caused initially 
depleted participants to keep their physical self-control performances constant. This 
group outperformed both control participants as well as participants who were also 
exposed to the cognitive association manipulation by which attention was directed to-
wards the self-control action. In line with the findings of Chapter 4, no improvement 
of self-control was observed when participants were highly self-aware but at the same 
time aware of internal states (cognitive association).  As stated previously, the positive 
effect of an external focus may be partly explained in terms of automatic processes. 
However, instead of automatic processes, the control enhancing effect of self-aware-
ness seems rather determined by motivational and action oriented processes. Self-
awareness increases the salience of an internalized, social and/or situational standard. 
Consequently, people become more motivated to reach the standard. Being motivated 
to reach a certain goal implies a focus on the accomplishment of a future state. In other 
words, the main focus is on action. Note that this is in sharp contrast with a focus on 
ones current state or efforts, as is the case with cognitive association. Following this 
line of reasoning, cognitive association and ego depletion may represent an excessive 
focus on the present, causing people to withhold themselves from reaching a future 
goal. Empirical support for this rationale was provided by Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) 
who found that when people are depleted, time perception alters. More specifically, 
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ego depletion caused participants to believe that they had been continuing an activity 
longer than people who did not engage in prior self-control. In other words, in a state 
of depletion, the present becomes extended and durations seem longer. People become 
caught in the present and are incapable of orienting their behaviour toward future out-
comes. This insight also sheds new light on the finding that priming of goals facilitates 
self-regulation. Goal priming may cause people to become more action oriented and 
focused on the accomplishment of the primed goal. If true, then goal priming should 
also be capable of avoiding the excessive focus on the present and offsetting the ego 
depletion effect. Although this idea has not been investigated yet, it may entail an in-
teresting avenue for future research. 
Expectancies
Chapter 2 addressed the relation between expectancies about self-control and self-con-
trol abilities. Whereas the strength model assumes that self-control is dependent on 
energy, the research in Chapter 2 focused on the question whether it matters if people 
expect that self-control relies on energy.  In three questionnaire studies, a moderate 
but consistent relation was found between people’s expectancies about self-control 
and their self-control abilities. The more people expect self-control to be dependent on 
(limited) energy, the less good self-control abilities they report.  In the light of these 
findings, it may be argued that self-control performance may be partly guided by peo-
ple’s expectancies about self-control. However, since the research in Chapter 2 relied 
solely on self-report measures, future research should further clarify the impact of such 
beliefs by using more behavioural self-control measurements. 
 The findings of Chapter 2 may also provide more insight in the underlying pro-
cesses of the results presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, priming the concept of per-
sistence was found to enhance self-control performance, thereby extinguishing the ego 
depletion effect. When faced with a series of control-demanding operations, uncon-
scious activation of persistence may circumvent people to act upon the implicit theory 
that self-control consumes energy. Activation of persistence may cause an alternative 
implicit theory, which is characterized by a more achievement focused vision on self-
control, to become more accessible. In other words, the regulatory behaviour of an 
individual who is primed with persistence may resemble the self-control actions of an 
individual who beliefs that self-control performance is mainly a matter of persistence 
and motivation (rather than energy). In that case, the salience of a self-control enhanc-
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ing state of mind may function as a strong determinant of the extent to which people 
are able to control themselves successfully. 
Limitations
The present dissertation is limited in several aspects. The first limitation includes the 
way self-control performance was measured. Most of the research presented in this 
dissertation relied on a physical measure of self-control. These physical measures have 
been proven to be a sensitive measure of self-control in prior research (see for example 
Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998, Study 1; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001, 
Study 2). However, for the sake of generalisation, future research aimed at examining 
the present findings in more depth should also consider different ways of assessing 
self-control performance. Possibilities include measuring persistence in the eye of frus-
tration (see for instance Baumeister et al., 1998) or tasks that assess the ability to post-
pone immediate reward (see for instance the Iowa Gambling Task; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).  
 A second limitation concerns the fact that the present (as well as previous) re-
search on ego depletion relied on procedures that typically involve a sequence of two 
self-control tasks. In most cases, the first task aims to manipulate the level of depletion 
whereas the second task attempts to measure self-control performance. At this point, it 
remains unclear how ego depletion operates in a larger sequence of self-control tasks. 
This seems especially relevant given the fact that in daily life, people often engage in 
numerous self-control attempts. Therefore, future research should investigate self-con-
trol and the emergence of ego depletion also in a more realistic context, namely by 
incorporating more instances of self-control into the research design. A possible way to 
gain more insight in how ego depletion operates in daily life is by means of an experi-
ence sampling technique. In this technique, people describe the experience of specific 
moments in detail (see for instance Larson, 1995). While people engage in their nor-
mal daily routines, they carry a device that is used to signal them periodically to record 
their current activities, feelings and so on. In this way, research may go beyond the 
finding that ego depletion emerges after a temporary phase of self-control, thereby 
providing more insight in the causality and implications of the phenomenon. 
 Another possible limitation concerns the homogeneity of the research population. 
Most studies included a homogenous group of psychology students. Although it can 
be assumed that self-control involves fundamental and general processes, it would be 
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interesting to apply the research design to other populations as well, in order to es-
tablish transferability. For instance, from a clinical perspective it may be interesting 
to investigate to what extent the manipulations used in the current dissertation can 
help to improve self-control performance of people who suffer from drug addiction, 
compulsive behaviour, eating disorders and so on. 
A dynamic approach of self-control
The research presented in this dissertation has highlighted the malleable nature of self-
control and has shown that ego depletion is less inevitable than initially suggested. 
Although these findings do not necessarily contradict the strength model, they chal-
lenge the view that self-control is dependent on energy alone. Self-control may indeed 
depend on limits. After all, people are not able to control themselves infinitely. How-
ever, findings in the current dissertation favor a more dynamic view on self-control in 
which the flexibility of self-control limits are taken into account. In this section, such a 
dynamic vision on self-control is presented. 
 The vision we are about to discuss can best be regarded as an extension to the 
strength model. In line with the strength model, the current vision assumes that self-
control performance is expected to be dependent on the current amount of energy an 
individual has. In addition, since ego depletion seems to be influenced by several fac-
tors like expectancies, attentional strategies and automatic processes, these factors are 
assumed to contribute to self-control performance and the emergence of ego depletion 
as well. These factors are able to compensate for the emergence of ego depletion. The 
factors that are present in a self-control situation are labeled as compensator. A com-
pensator is thus a generic term for one or more factors that influence(s) self-control 
performance and ego depletion. Each factor varies in its contribution to overall self-
control performance. For instance, the presence of positive self-control expectancies 
contributes positively to performance, whereas tempting short term goals will rather 
have a disadvantageous effect. The impact of the compensator is thus determined by 
the relative weight of the factors that are present in a given self-control demanding sit-
uation. While some factors may contribute positively to the compensator (e.g. positive 
control expectancies), others may lower the impact of the compensator (e.g. stress). 
Moreover, factors can counterbalance each other. For instance, while stress may con-
tribute negatively to the value and impact of the compensator, a high amount of mo-
tivation at the same time may higher the value of the compensator, thereby (partly) 
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covering the negative impact of stress. The higher the value of the compensator, the 
more positive its effect is expected to be. Note that a compensator may also contrib-
ute negatively to self-control performance. When for instance both stress and negative 
control expectancies are present too a large extent, this may actually inhibit self-con-
trol performance. In this case, a relatively high amount of energy is necessary for suc-
cessful self-control. 
 In sum, the current view states that the amount of self-control a person will exert 
in a given situation is expected to be determined by (1) the current amount of en-
ergy a person has and (2) the value (contribution) of the compensator. In other words, 
whereas the limited strength model predicts that a low amount of energy will cause 
breakdown of self-control, the current vision states that self-control performance is 
also determined by the contribution of the compensator. In concrete terms, this means 
that when a relatively low amount of energy is present in a certain situation, a high 
value of the compensator may compensate for the low level of energy, thereby increas-
ing the likelihood of successful self-control. A negative contribution of the compensa-
tor, on the other hand, requires a higher amount of energy for successful self-control. 
Fig. 1. Two situations in which a different amount of self-control is required. The left graph represents a situation in which more 
self-control is required than the right graph as indicated by the higher position of the threshold. 
Fig. 1 depicts a visual representation of this view. The x-axis represents the presence of 
the compensator. The position on the x-as shows the extent to which the compensator 
is present. Values of the compensator smaller than 1 represent a negative effect of the 
compensator, whereas values greater than 1 indicate a positive effect of the compensa-
tor. A value of 1 corresponds to a situation in which neither a negative nor positive in-
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fluence of the compensator is present (neutral value). The y-axis represents the amount 
of energy that is present at that moment. The higher the position on the y-as, the more 
energy is available. Since successful self-control implies a dichotomy, namely either be-
ing successful or unsuccessful, a threshold needs to be incorporated. This threshold is 
represented by the line that separates the darkened area from the white area1 . When a 
point is located in the darkened area, sufficient self-control is exerted. When a point is 
located in the white area below the threshold, an insufficient amount of self-control is 
exerted. Obviously, some situations or tasks require more self-control than others. The 
height of the threshold is therefore determined by the self-control requirements of a 
given situation. The higher the self-control demands, the higher the threshold will be. 
In Fig. 1, two different self-control situations are illustrated. Since the position of the 
threshold is higher in the left graph compared to the right graph, the left graph depicts 
a situation in which relatively more self-control is needed than in the right graph.  
 
Fig. 2. A self-control demanding situation in which a relatively high level of energy and a low value of the compensator are 
present. Point (c1, e1) is not located in the darkened area, indicating that the self-control requirements of this situation are not 
met.  
Fig. 2 illustrates a situation that is characterized by a high level of energy and a low 
value (negative contribution) of the compensator. Point (c1, e1) is located below the 
threshold, indicating that despite the high amount of energy, an insufficient amount 
of self-control is exerted. An example of such a situation is the fact that students often 
study insufficiently during the first week(s) of a course (causing them to do much of 
the work in the last week). In this case, the distance of the goal of passing the exam 
1 For the sake of simplicity, a straight line has been chosen to represent the threshold. However, it may be possible that in some 
situations the threshold for successful self-control is better represented by a non-linear curve.    
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may pose a significant negative contribution to the compensator. In addition, this nega-
tive value of the compensator may further be intensified by the presence of attractive 
alternatives, such as spending time with friends. 
 
Fig. 3. A self-control demanding situation in which a moderate level of energy and a moderate value of the compensator are 
present. Point (c2, e2) is located in the darkened area, indicating that it is likely that sufficient self-control will be exerted.  
Fig. 3 illustrates a second situation in which a moderate level of energy and a moderate 
value of the compensator are present. The fact that point (c2, e2) exceeds the thresh-
old indicates a sufficient amount and of self-control and a high likeliness of successful 
self-regulation in this situation. 
 
Fig. 4. A self-control demanding situation in which a low level of energy and a high value of the compensator are present. In this 
situation, it is unlikely that sufficient self-control will be exerted since point (c3, e3) is located outside the darkened area. 
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The situation indicated by point (m3, e3) in Fig. 4 concerns a low amount of energy 
and a high value of the compensator. In this situation, the relatively low amount of 
energy entails the main cause for the high likeliness of regulatory failure. An example 
of this situation is a student who studies the day before the exam and notices that, af-
ter numerous hours of studying, he or she is not able to successfully exert self-control 
anymore. Despite the proximity and importance of the exam (high value of compensa-
tor), breakdown of self-control is the inevitable result. In this case, the compensator is 
incapable of compensating for the low amount of energy.  
 The above described view attempted to integrate the findings of the present disser-
tation into the strength model. Rather than rejecting the strength model, this view can 
be considered as a framework that extends the strength model. The increased complex-
ity of the current vision may seem disadvantageous, but it also takes a more realistic 
view on self-control. After all, self-control entails complex cognitive processes that are 
unlikely to be explained in terms of a single metaphor (Cervone, 1996). Self-control 
performance is more likely to be susceptible to a wide range of constantly changing 
influences, both internal and external, that interact with each other. This interaction 
may be a fascinating area for future research. By addressing the interaction of multiple 
moderating factors and their relative weight, future research may shed more light on 
the nature and implications of this interaction, thereby gaining a clearer understand-
ing of how self-control operates. 
 The above described view illustrates the value of considering self-control from a 
more dynamic point of view. That is, such a view can account for some findings that 
are anomalies for the strength analogy. For instance, according to the strength model, 
self-control should become stronger with repeated practice. However, this assumption 
does not explain relapses of self-control failure such as cigarette smokers who refrain 
successfully for short periods, but do not succeed in definitely quitting their habit. 
The addition of compensators to the concept of strength may well explain why people 
sometimes fail to control themselves, even when this failure is preceded by a period of 
self-control “training”. For instance, situational factors like stress and negative effect 
may have a detrimental effect on the value of the compensator, thereby contributing 
negatively to self-control, even when the current amount of energy is relatively high 
(Oaten & Cheng, 2005; Santrock, 1976). 
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Implications: Improvement of self-control
Most suggestions to improve self-regulatory strength and, hence, to avoid ego deple-
tion are primarily inspired by the ‘self-control as muscle’ analogy (Baumeister et al., 
2000). Like muscles profit from a balanced combination of training and recovery, self-
control may also be strengthened by a regime of training and rest. Research has indeed 
found support for this notion (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 
2006). In addition to the training of self-control, the findings presented in the current 
dissertation imply that there are additional ways to improve self-control performance. 
 The findings of Chapter 3 illustrate the role of automatic processes and suggest 
that self-control may become less effortful, and thus less depleting when self-control 
operations are automated. A possible way to automate self-regulation is by repeated 
and consistent use of self-regulatory skills in response to specific cues (Kanfer, 1996). 
Repeated use of self-regulatory skills in reaction to specific cues enables people to de-
velop the capability to automatically trigger ways that will facilitate self-control. Stated 
differently, skills that are aimed at maintaining self-control can become automatically 
activated by environmental cues. As pointed out in Chapter 4, an example of a self-
control skill may be the ability to shift attention away from a control demanding ac-
tion. Imagine a dieter who is exposed to tempting food. Repeated use of attentional 
skills in the presence of “forbidden food” related cues may cause the dieter to associate 
the cues with these skills. Consequently, attentional strategies may eventually become 
triggered and successfully acted upon without any conscious intervention.
 Another way to facilitate nonconscious or automatic self-regulation is by using so-
called implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). 
These are action plans and refer to specific goal behaviour as well as to the situational 
context in which the planned behaviour will be enacted (e.g., when I encounter situ-
ation x, I will initiate goal-directed behaviour y). The process of self-control becomes 
automated because behavioural control is overtaken by anticipated environmental 
cues. The impact of implementation intentions on self-control and ego-depletion was 
demonstrated by research of Webb and Sheeran (2003).  In two studies, it was consis-
tently found that forming implementation intentions helped depleted participants to 
perform significantly better on a subsequent self-control task compared to depleted 
participants who did not form implementation intentions. Moreover, in a recent se-
ries of studies by Martijn, Alberts, Sheeran, Peters, Mikolajczak, and de Vries (2007), 
it was found that implementation intentions lead to more determined and constant 
goal-striving. When confronted with an unexpected barrier, participants who formed 
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implementation intentions were more tenacious, displayed a higher quality of repeated 
goal-directed behavior and used alternative strategies of goal-striving more frequently 
compared to participants who only formed a goal intention.
 Interestingly, an additional reason why implementation intentions may be benefi-
cial for self-control has to do with its conscious part, namely forming the intention. As 
pointed out earlier, the findings of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggest that ego depletion 
represents an excessive focus on the present, causing people to withhold themselves 
from achieving a future goal. By forming implementation intentions, people make ac-
tion plans and shift their focus toward a future goal, thereby reducing their focus on 
the present. In terms of action control theory (Kuhl, 1982), consciously choosing a goal 
and selecting appropriate cues may help people to become more action oriented, mak-
ing successful self-control more likely. 
 The findings of Chapter 4 demonstrated that self-control performance can be im-
proved when people focus their attention away from a control demanding stimulus 
or situation. Findings from previous research suggest that it is important to consider 
the way these attentional strategies are conceptualized (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 
1987; Wegner, Erber & Zanakos, 1993, Wegner, Broome & Blumberg, 1997). According 
to Wegner’s theory of ironic processes of mental control, trying not to think about some-
thing often causes the unwanted thoughts to come back stronger than before (Wegner, 
1994). Thus, the attempt to distract oneself by not thinking of a self-control demanding 
stimulus is, ironically, likely to result in thoughts about this stimulus. Wegner’s theory 
poses that attempts to avoid thoughts are driven by conscious, controlled searches for 
other thoughts. In order to check whether the attempt is successful, unconscious, au-
tomatic searches for the unwanted thoughts are present at the same time. Under con-
ditions of high load, the automatic search dominates over the controlled search and 
brings the unwanted thought back into consciousness. Fortunately, thought control is 
suggested to become more effective when it is conceptualized as efforts at the creation 
of states of mind, rather than the avoidance or suppression of states. Thus, instead of 
trying not to think about fattening food, it is more efficient for a dieter to think of all 
the tasty food that he or she is allowed to eat. In the same way, engaging in a distracting 
activity (see for instance Chapter 4) may facilitate the creation of a new state of mind 
that is not directly related to the control demanding situation. Taking Wegner’s claim 
that “intentional concentration seems to work better than intentional suppression” 
(1994, p. 41) into account, distracting activities should preferably require a consider-
able amount of concentration. 
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 The findings presented in Chapter 2 suggest that self-control performance may be 
partly guided by people’s beliefs and expectancies about how self-control operates. 
This may particularly be useful for interventions that concern a certain type of self-
control related behaviour, i.e., refraining from bad habits such as smoking or sticking 
to healthy habits such as regular exercise. Whereas many of these interventions al-
ready incorporated people’s expectancies about their own abilities (self-efficacy) (for 
an overview see Hevey, Smith, & McGee, 1998), the findings of Chapter 2 suggest that 
these interventions may also benefit from addressing people beliefs concerning the 
operation of self-control. For example, such interventions could start with an inven-
tory and the explicit formulation of such beliefs. If necessary, inappropriate control-
beliefs may be systematically challenged and in doing so, modified for more fruitful 
ones. Research in the field of alcohol prevention has already shown that programs that 
challenge incorrect beliefs about alcohol are effective in enhancing self-regulation by 
reducing problem use of alcohol (see for instance Marlatt et al., 1998). 
 Future research may also combine the findings of Chapter 2 with the findings of 
Chapter 4. Previous research from Kirsch, Mearns, and Catanzaro (1990) showed that 
expectancies for negative mood regulation were positively correlated with the use of 
active, problem-oriented coping strategies and negatively associated with avoidance 
strategies (see also Mearns, 1991). In addition, in a study by Akgun (2004) it was found 
that higher self-efficacy expectancies correlated positively with high resourcefulness 
(overall self-control strategy use). In the same way, energy related expectancies of self-
control may correlate with the use of self-control strategies, such as attentional strate-
gies. 
Future research
Although the previous sections already detailed some routes for further exploration, 
some additional avenues of future research are proposed in the current section. The 
present dissertation has detailed some marked findings regarding the potential pro-
cesses that underlie self-control performance. However, much of these processes re-
mains to be specified. This may be done in ways similar to those applied in the current 
dissertation, namely by investigating potential factors that circumvent the occurrence 
of ego depletion. However, the uncovering of these processes may also be accomplished 
in a different way. Whereas previous research has mainly addressed the impact of ego 
depletion on a certain outcome behaviour, future research may also investigate the 
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impact of ego depletion on cognitive functions that are known to influence self-con-
trol. Examples of such functions include goal setting (e.g. Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 
2001), alternate goal shielding (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002) and ruminative 
coping (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). A more detailed portrait of the link between such 
functions and ego depletion should add to our understanding of the nature of ego 
depletion and will therefore further elucidate the processes that underlie regulatory 
failure. 
 Another potential area for future research may be the relation between ego deple-
tion and exertion. If consecutive exercise of control depletes some energy source, it 
seems reasonable to assume that this should be reflected in an increased fatigue. A 
somewhat remarkable finding in this respect is that the studies described in Chapter 3, 
4 and 5 reveal that even when objective signs of depletion are present (e.g., worse per-
formance on physical self-control tasks) people still report no significant differences 
in fatigue. It is possible that the absence of differences in reported fatigue reflect the 
inability of people to correctly report inner states of fatigue. Autonomic process mea-
sures as indicators to detect changes in arousal and effort may circumvent this inability 
and may therefore be considered as a good alternative for testing the relation between 
ego depletion and exertion. By using autonomic measures such as skin conductance, 
heart rate and finger pulse volume, future research may not only shed more light on the 
link between ego depletion, but may also reveal to what extent subjective experience 
and autonomic activity match. 
 As mentioned before, research by Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) showed that par-
ticipants who took part in a self-control demanding task, as compared to a control 
group, systematically overestimated the duration of that task. This belief may result in 
abandonment of further self-control. This points to the fact that subsequent self-con-
trol efforts are, at least in part, guided by subjective interpretations of prior efforts and 
not by the ‘objective’ amount of energy invested per se. Interpretation of prior efforts 
may constitute an important process that contributes to self-control failure: prior self-
control efforts may be used to justify ones decision to give in to impulses or desires. In 
other words, the fact that people become aware of their effort investment during self-
control may function as a “legitimate” reason to quit future self-control attempts. This 
implies that the occurrence of ego depletion (at least partly) reflects the interpretation 
of one’s prior regulatory efforts. Moreover, the extent to which people involve in justifi-
cation is not only likely to determine reactions to success and failure, but may influence 
future goal-setting and goal-striving behaviour as well. Clearly, this issue awaits future 
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study and further highlights the utility of considering the role of processes in self-con-
trol performance. 
Concluding remarks
Almost 10 years ago, when the ego depletion phenomenon was first demonstrated by 
Baumeister and colleagues, it was presented as a default reaction that was inherently 
linked to self-control efforts. Indeed, a large amount of studies conducted so far has 
proven the robustness of the finding. In fact, we were one of the first researchers that 
were able to replicate the phenomenon in our own laboratory. However, the findings 
presented in this dissertation suggest that default does not mean inevitable. The cur-
rent results illustrate that people can exert self-control repeatedly without any signs of 
ego depletion or diminished performance. This finding has led to some new insights 
in the processes that underlie self-control and ego depletion. The occurrence of ego 
depletion seems to be linked to conscious and active self-control attempts. When self-
control is automated, no depletion effects seem to occur. In addition, also attentional 
processes seem to play a pivotal role in the emergence of ego depletion. Depletion may 
emerge as a consequence of excessive focusing on ones regulatory efforts. When atten-
tion is directed away from the self-control action, ego depletion can be circumvented. 
Finally, indirect findings from Chapter 5 as well as research by Muraven and Slessareva 
(2003) suggest that motivational processes underlie the occurrence of ego depletion. 
No signs of ego depletion are present when people are reminded or confronted with 
regulatory goals. Based on these findings, we believe that the claim that energy is re-
sponsible for failure after repeated self-control is only part of the story. In addition, 
there is some potential danger that hides within the vague Freudian concept of energy. 
First of all, reasoning from a limited strength model may stimulate an inappropriate 
causal inference. That is, assuming that self-control consumes energy may lead to the 
conclusion that failure of self-control automatically reflects a loss of energy. However, 
it remains questionable whether decrement of self-control performance always reflects 
a decreased level of energy or an attempt to conserve energy. While some instances of 
self-control failure may indeed primarily occur as the result of a default depletion reac-
tion, it seems likely that other instances indicate a conscious decision and are there-
fore rather determined by processes like justification and motivation. Secondly, the 
concept of energy does not contain any theoretical restrictions. As a consequence, it is 
possible to explain almost every finding, thereby restricting the insights provided by 
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future research. A possible way to overcome this restriction is simply by disconnecting 
the emergence of ego depletion from the strength model, rather than attempting to 
provide support for the model. In this way, a broader vision on self-control failure can 
be adopted that is more in line with human complexity and flexibility. 
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Self-control, or self-regulation, refers to the extent to which an individual exerts con-
trol over his or her behaviour. Self-control has been defined as the override or inhibi-
tion of urges, behaviours or desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Shallice 
& Burgess, 1993) and can be regarded as a fundamental aspect of our daily life. On a 
daily basis we attempt to remain patient, suppress unwanted thoughts or resist tempta-
tions. Research has shown that being able to control oneself is a vital ability: good self-
control abilities are associated with a range of positive life circumstances. For instance, 
people who posses relatively good self-control abilities have fewer conflicts with family 
members, higher self-esteem, lower chances of developing psychopathological prob-
lems and a better emotional life (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). In contrast, 
a lack of self-control has been found to be associated with various social and personal 
problems. Examples of such problems include obesity, unsafe sex, aggression and al-
coholism (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). In sum, these findings suggest that 
self-control can be defined as a key factor for a successful life. 
 Despite the importance of self-control, we often fail to control ourselves success-
fully. An important question in this respect concerns the reason for this failure. Ac-
cording to the strength model (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Muraven & Bau-
meister, 2000), self-control failure arises as a direct consequence of limited energy. 
In this view, self-control requires energy of which people have only a limited amount 
available. After an initial act of self-control, the energy resource becomes temporar-
ily depleted leaving the individual in a state of ego depletion. Consequently, a subse-
quent self-control attempt results in impaired performance because of a lack of energy 
or strength. Today, a relatively large amount of studies have indeed provided support 
for the strength model. Examples of findings are that the regulation of thoughts (i.e., 
suppressing a specific thought), altering one’s emotional state (i.e., suppressing happy 
or sad emotions), and decision making involve self-control and that each of these ac-
tivities results in impaired performance on a second self-control activity (see for an 
overview, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2004; Martijn, Alberts, & De Vries, 2006). So far, 
most studies on ego depletion have focused on demonstrating that different behav-
iours and outcome measures are influenced by ego depletion. Identifying these differ-
ent outcome measures can be considered as a valuable and necessary, however, it does 
not provide more insight in the processes that underlie self-control and ego depletion. 
At this point, little is known about the nature of limited strength and the psychologi-
cal process underlying this limitation remains unclear. This dissertation addressed this 
issue by attempting to provide more insight in the processes that underlie self-con-
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trol performance and ego depletion. In doing so, we adopted a somewhat different 
perspective on self-control than the earlier mentioned strength model. Whereas the 
strength model mainly focuses on the limits of our self-control abilities, the current re-
search was guided by a focus on the flexibility and relativity of regulatory capabilities. 
By focusing on possible ways to improve self-control and to circumvent ego depletion, 
it was argued that the strength model can be extended and room can be created for 
additional factors and processes that contribute to self-control performance.
 The studies described in second chapter of this dissertation addressed the role 
of expectancies on self-control. Previous research findings suggest that self-control 
performance and the occurrence of ego depletion may be influenced by people’s ex-
pectancies or schemata about self-control (Martijn, Tenbült, de Vries, Dreezens, & 
Merckelbach, 2002; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2005). The results of these studies imply 
that rather than the existence of a limited energy resource, the (naïve) expectancy that 
self-control is dependent on limited energy may explain self-control failure. After all, 
an individual who expects that self-control is a matter of limited energy is likely to be 
concerned with minimizing loss and the possible obstacles when exerting self-control. 
Such beliefs may cause one to quit self-control attempts sooner in order to minimize 
future failure. Holding and acting upon the belief that self-control is dependent on lim-
ited energy may therefore have serious implications for self-control performance and 
long term goal achievement. Three studies were conducted in order to gain more in-
sight in the relation between self-control abilities and self-control related beliefs. More 
specifically, it was investigated whether there is a relation between the extent to which 
people believe that self-control is dependent on limited energy and their self-reported 
self-control abilities. To do so, a scale was developed to assess the extent to which par-
ticipants believe that self-control is dependent on (limited) energy. In order to assess 
their self-control ability, participants completed the Self-control Scale (Tangney, Bau-
meister & Boone, 2004) (Study 1 and Study 2) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(Barratt, 1994) (Study 3). The results showed that stronger energy related beliefs of 
self-control are related to worse self-reported self-control abilities (Study 1 and Study 
2) as well as higher levels of overall impulsiveness (Study 3). In sum, these findings 
imply that when considering self-control failure (and the emergence of ego depletion), 
it may be worthwhile to consider the beliefs that people hold about the operation of 
self-control. Changing the belief that self-control strongly depends on energy may help 
to improve regulatory performance and circumvent the occurrence of ego depletion. 
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 In Chapter 3, two studies were presented that addressed the issue of automaticity 
and self-control. More specifically, it was investigated whether the automatic emer-
gence of ego depletion can be reduced or even eliminated by means of manipulations 
that are known to operate at the same automatic level as the occurrence of ego depletion 
itself. Whereas previous studies have demonstrated that self-control can be improved 
by means of explicit manipulations that require conscious attention or processing, the 
present experiments investigated whether the same effects can be accomplished by 
ways that do not require conscious attention or awareness. In two studies, the concept 
of persistence was unconsciously activated by means of different priming procedures. 
In Study 1, persistence was activated by means of a so-called Scrambled Sentence Task. 
Participants unscrambled 25 scrambled sentences of which 15 were related to persis-
tence (e.g., “Peter keeps going” ); the other 10 were neutral and were not related to 
persistence or self-control (e.g., “Sam buys bread”). In Study 2, a visual priming pro-
cedure was used to unconsciously activate persistence. While participants were per-
forming a physical self-control task, the experimenter activated a screensaver which 
appeared on a computer screen. In the persistence prime condition, the screensaver 
depicted a winning young man in a business suit and a logo saying: “www.you-can-
do-it.com, wallpapers and screensavers”. In the neutral prime condition, the screen-
saver showed a picture of a vase and a similar logo saying:  “www.myscreensaver.com, 
wallpapers and screensavers”. In both studies it was found that depleted participants 
who were primed with persistence performed significantly better on a subsequent self-
control task than depleted participants who were exposed to a neutral prime. Priming 
of persistence caused initially depleted participants to overcome ego depletion: their 
performance on a subsequent self-control task remained equal. In contrast, depleted 
participants who were exposed to the neutral prime displayed the classic ego depletion 
pattern: their performance decreased significantly. According to the strength model, 
self-control entails a conscious, active process. These findings, however, illustrate that 
self-control may also be guided by processes that operate outside awareness. 
 Research presented in Chapter 4 investigated the role of attentional processes in 
self-control. More specifically, this chapter addressed the effect of focusing attention 
on the control demanding situation (internal focus or cognitive association) versus 
directing attention away from the self-control action (external focus). In the present 
experiment, participants were asked to perform two successive physical self-control 
tasks. An internal focus was induced by asking participants to pay attention to their arm 
and hand muscles that were involved while they were performing the second physical 
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self-control task (internal focus or cognitive association). An external focus was in-
duced by a distracting calculation task that was completed by participants during the 
exertion of the second physical self-control task. It was found that participants who 
were distracted by this calculation task (external focus) while exerting physical self-
control outperformed both participants who focused their attention on the physical 
self-control task (internal focus) as well as control participants who did not receive any 
focus instructions. However, no significant difference in self-control performance was 
found between participants in the internal focus condition and control participants. 
With regard to the strength model, these findings suggest that attentional processes 
play an important role in the emergence of ego depletion and the failure of self-con-
trol. The finding that both people who focused attention internally as well as control 
participants exhibited a decline in performance, might imply that the occurrence of 
ego depletion is partly mediated by ineffective or suboptimal attentional processes. Di-
recting attention to the self-control task (and the regulatory efforts that are associated 
with this task), may be a default process or natural tendency that emerges when people 
exert self-control. When this default attentional process is replaced by a process that is 
not preliminary concerned with regulatory efforts, no negative influence on self-con-
trol performance seems to occur. 
 In Chapter 5, the influence of attentional processes on self-control performance 
was further elaborated. Previous studies investigating the effects of self-focused at-
tention on self-control performance have revealed a mixed pattern of findings; part 
of these studies highlight the self-control enhancing effect of self-focused attention, 
while others illustrate the regulatory downside of self-directed attention. The study 
presented in Chapter 5 was designed to provide more insight in these contradictory 
findings. It was reasoned that it is critical to differentiate between distinct types of 
self-focused attention. On the one hand, self-focused attention may involve the type 
of attention that was addressed in the study described in Chapter 4, namely atten-
tion directed towards the self-control action and internal sensations during this action 
(cognitive association). On the other hand, self-focus may also involve what is known 
under the term self-awareness. When self-focus concerns self-awareness, people be-
come aware of the self’s existence in the world and the salience of an internalized, 
social and/or situational standard is increased. The study in Chapter 5 attempted to 
establish a direct comparison between both types of self-focused attention. In order to 
isolate the effect of cognitive association, both types of self-focus were combined. More 
specifically, some participants were exposed to a manipulation that increased only self-
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awareness, whereas others received a manipulation that increased both self-awareness 
and cognitive association. It was found that the type of self-focus determines the effect 
of self-focus on regulatory performance. Exposure to a self-awareness manipulation 
caused initially depleted participants to keep their physical self-control performances 
constant. This group outperformed both control participants as well as participants 
who were also exposed to the cognitive association manipulation by which attention 
was directed towards the self-control action. In line with the findings of Chapter 4, no 
improvement of self-control was observed when participants were highly self-aware 
but at the same time aware of internal states. In sum, the findings of Chapter 4 and 
5 not only illustrate the importance of attentional processes in self-control and ego 
depletion but also demonstrate that the use of attentional strategies may help to over-
come ego depletion.
 In Chapter 6, self-control and ego depletion were presented in an applied context, 
namely criminality. It was argued that, in order to understand criminal behavior, one 
should not only focus on intentional crimes, which are characterized by organized or 
planned criminal activity, but should also consider the role of impulsive crimes. The 
latter involve a tendency to give in to violent or other disastrous impulses and strongly 
rely on momentary self-control. The results described in the present dissertation as 
well as other related findings were linked to criminality in order to gain more insight 
in the emergence of impulsive criminal behavior. Moreover, based on these findings, 
guidelines for preventing failure of impulse control and improvement of self-control 
performance were presented.
 In Chapter 7, the main results of this thesis were summarized and discussed. The 
research presented in this dissertation has led to some new insights regarding the op-
eration of self-control and ego depletion. Whereas the strength model regards self-con-
trol as a conscious, active process, the present findings illustrate that self-control may 
also be guided by processes that operate outside awareness. Unconscious activation of 
persistence can help people to overcome ego depletion and improve self-control per-
formance. In addition, also attentional processes seem to play a key role in the emer-
gence of ego depletion. The findings suggest that depletion emerges as a consequence 
of excessive focusing on ones regulatory efforts. When attention is directed away from 
the self-control action, ego depletion can be circumvented. Finally, the current studies 
on the role of expectancies suggest that beliefs on the operation of self-control may 
also underlie self-regulatory performance and ego depletion. Taken together, whereas 
the strength model stresses the limits of our capability to control ourselves, the present 
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findings rather illustrate the flexibility and relativity of these limits and suggest that 
that self-control and the emergence of ego depletion is more dynamic than initially 
suggested. The current findings favor a broader vision on self-control failure that is 
more in line with human complexity and flexibility. 
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Zelfcontrole, ook wel zelfregulatie genoemd, verwijst naar de mate waarin een 
individu controle over zichzelf uitoefent. Zelfcontrole wordt gedefinieerd als het on-
derdrukken of inhiberen van impulsen, gedrag of verlangens (Baumeister, Heatherton, 
& Tice, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1993) en kan worden beschouwd als een fundamen-
teel aspect van ons dagelijkse leven. Vrijwel iedere dag ondernemen we pogingen om 
onszelf te beheersen, vervelende gedachten te onderdrukken en verleidingen te weer-
staan. Ons vermogen tot zelfcontrole is een onmisbare eigenschap. Zo heeft recent 
onderzoek laten zien dat goede zelfcontrolevaardigheden samengaan met een keur van 
begerenswaardige levensomstandigheden: minder conflicten met vrienden en familie, 
hoger zelfvertrouwen, minder kans op psychopathologische problemen en een ge-
zonder emotioneel leven (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Omgekeerd leidt een 
gebrek aan zelfcontrole tot allerlei sociale en persoonlijke problemen. Bekende voor-
beelden van zulke problemen zijn overgewicht, onveilige seks, agressie en alcoholisme 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). Samenvattend zou men kunnen stellen dat 
zelfcontrole het sleutelwoord is voor een succesvol leven.
 Ondanks het belang van zelfcontrole, slagen we er lang niet altijd in onszelf te 
controleren. Waarom vinden mensen het zo moeilijk zichzelf in de hand te houden? 
Een mogelijke verklaring voor het falen van zelfcontrole wordt gegeven door het zoge-
naamde gelimiteerde energie model. Diverse studies hebben aangetoond dat mensen 
die twee opeenvolgende controle taken verrichten, aanzienlijk slechter presteren op de 
tweede zelfcontroletaak. Volgens het zogenaamde gelimiteerde energiemodel ligt een 
centrale, beperkte energiebron ten grondslag aan deze bevinding (Baumeister, Mu-
raven, & Tice, 2000). Iedere zelfcontrolehandeling doet een beroep op deze beperkte 
energiebron, waardoor er steeds minder energie beschikbaar is voor volgende zelf-
controletaken. Deze tijdelijke uitputting van de beschikbare energie wordt aangeduid 
met de term ego depletion of wilsuitputting. In een toestand van ego depletion zullen 
mensen op volgende zelfcontroletaken minder goed presteren. 
 In de laatste jaren is er relatief veel onderzoek verricht naar het ego depletion 
fenomeen. Deze studies laten zien dat het principe van zelfcontrole als gelimiteerde 
energiebron in verschillende domeinen optreedt. Voorbeelden van bevindingen zijn 
dat de regulatie van gedachten (bijvoorbeeld het onderdrukken van een specifieke ge-
dachte), het veranderen van een emotionele toestand (bijvoorbeeld het onderdrukken 
van positieve of negatieve emoties) en besluitvorming zelfcontrole vereisen en dat elk 
van deze activiteiten resulteert in verminderde prestatie op een tweede zelfcontrole 
handeling (voor een overzicht zie Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004; Martijn, Alberts, 
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& De Vries, 2006). De meeste studies die tot op heden zijn verricht naar het fenomeen 
ego depletion hebben voornamelijk gedemonstreerd dat verschillende gedragingen 
en uitkomstmaten worden beïnvloed door ego depletion. Hoewel de identificatie van 
deze verschillende gedragingen en uitkomstmaten als zinvol en waardevol kan wor-
den, wordt er niet meer inzicht verkregen in de processen die ten grondslag liggen 
aan zelfcontrole en ego depletion. Er is dan ook relatief weinig bekend over de pre-
cieze aard van gelimiteerde energie en de psychologische processen die van invloed 
zijn op deze beperking. In het huidige proefschrift is er getracht meer inzicht te krijgen 
in de processen die ten grondslag liggen aan zelfcontrole en ego depletion. Om dit te 
bewerkstelligen is er een perspectief gehanteerd dat enigszins afwijkt van het eerder 
beschreven gelimiteerde energie model. Terwijl het gelimiteerde energie model zich 
voornamelijk richt op de grenzen van zelfcontrole, werd het huidige onderzoek geken-
merkt door een focus op de flexibiliteit en relativiteit van onze regulatieve capaciteit. 
De gedachtegang achter deze visie is dat door de aandacht te vestigen op mogelijke 
verbetering van zelfcontrole en vermijding van ego depletion, het gelimiteerde energie 
model kan worden uitgebreid en ruimte kan worden gecreëerd voor additionele facto-
ren en processen die bijdragen aan zelfcontrole prestatie. 
 De studies die worden beschreven in het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift 
betreffen de rol van verwachtingen bij zelfcontrole. Eerdere bevindingen suggereren 
dat zelfcontrole prestatie en het optreden van ego depletion worden beïnvloed door 
de verwachtingen of schema’s van mensen over zelfcontrole (Martijn, Tenbült, de 
Vries, Dreezens, & Merckelbach, 2002; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2005). De resultaten 
van deze studies suggereren dat wellicht niet in eerste instantie het bestaan van een 
gelimiteerde energiebron, maar eerder de verwachting dat zelfcontrole energie kost, 
ten grondslag ligt aan het falen van zelfcontrole. Immers, een individu dat sterke, op 
gelimiteerde energie gebaseerde verwachtingen hanteert, zal voornamelijk bij het 
uitvoeren van zelfcontrole meer gericht zijn op zuinigheid, minimalisatie van verlies 
en de mogelijke valkuilen bij het behalen van een doel. Dergelijke verwachtingen 
zullen aanzetten tot het eerder laten varen van zelfcontrole, om de kans op mogelijk 
toekomstig falen te minimaliseren. De verwachting dat zelfcontrole afhankelijk is van 
gelimiteerde energie kan daarom belangrijke implicaties hebben voor zelfcontrole-
prestatie en het bereiken van lange termijn doelen. Drie studies werden verricht om 
meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de relatie tussen verwachtingen over zelfcontrole en 
zelfcontrolevaardigheden. Er werd onderzocht of de mate waarin mensen verwa-
chten dat zelfcontrole afhankelijk is van een gelimiteerde hoeveelheid energie, van 
132
invloed is op de inschatting van hun eigen zelfcontroleprestaties. Hiertoe werd een 
vragenlijst ontwikkeld om te meten in welke mate deelnemers verwachten dat zelf-
controle afhankelijk is van (gelimiteerde) energie. Om hun zelfcontrole vaardigheden 
in kaart te brengen dienden deelnemers de zogenaamde Self-control Scale (Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) (Studie 1 en Studie 2) en de Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(Barratt, 1994) (Studie 3) in te vullen. De resultaten toonden dat naarmate mensen 
meer geneigd zijn te denken over zelfcontrole in termen van (gelimiteerde) energie, 
zij relatief minder goede zelfcontrolevaardigheden (Studie 1 en Studie 2) en meer 
impulsiviteit (Studie 3) rapporteren. Samenvattend impliceren deze bevindingen dat 
wanneer men kijkt naar het falen van zelfcontrole (en het optreden van ego depletion), 
het waardevol zou kunnen zijn om de verwachtingen van mensen omtrent de werking 
van zelfcontrole in acht te nemen.
 In hoofdstuk 3 werden twee studies gepresenteerd over automaticiteit en zelf-
controle. Er werd gekeken of het automatische optreden van ego depletion ver-
minderd of zelfs geheel kan worden tegengegaan door gebruik te maken van ma-
nipulaties die op hetzelfde, automatische niveau opereren als het optreden van ego 
depletion zelf. Terwijl eerdere studies reeds hebben gedemonstreerd dat zelfcontrole kan 
worden verbeterd middels expliciete manipulaties die bewuste aandacht of 
verwerking vereisen, is er in de huidige experimenten gekeken of dezelfde effecten 
kunnen worden bewerkstelligd op manieren die geen bewuste aandacht vereisen. 
In twee studies werd het concept doorzettingsvermogen onbewust geactiveerd door 
middel van verschillende priming procedures. In Studie 1 werd doorzettingsvermogen 
geactiveerd door gebruik te maken van een zogenaamde woordvolgordetaak (Scram-
bled Sentence Task). Deelnemers vormden 25 zinnen waarvan 15 zinnen gerelateerd 
waren aan doorzettingsvermogen (bijvoorbeeld “Peter gaat door”); de andere 10 
zinnen waren neutraal van aard en niet gerelateerd aan doorzettingsvermogen of 
zelfcontrole (bijvoorbeeld “Sam koopt brood”). In Studie 2 werd een visuele priming 
procedure gebruikt om doorzettingsvermogen onbewust te activeren. Terwijl 
deelnemers een fysieke zelfcontrole taak uitvoerden activeerde de proefleider een 
screensaver die op een computer beeldscherm verscheen. De helft van de deelnemers 
kreeg een screensaver te zien met daarop een jonge man in pak die een hardloopwed-
strijd wint met het logo “www.you-can-do-it.com, wallpapers and screensavers” (hoge 
toegankelijkheid van doorzettingsvermogen). De andere helft zag een screensaver van 
een neutrale afbeelding (een vaas) en een vergelijkbaar logo “www.myscreensaver.
com, wallpapers and screensavers” (lage toegankelijkheid van doorzettingsvermo-
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gen). In beide studies werd gevonden dat uitgeputte deelnemers waarbij doorzettings-
vermogen werd geactiveerd significant beter presteerden op een volgende zelfcontrole 
taak dan uitgeputte deelnemers die bloot werden gesteld aan een neutrale prime. Het 
activeren van doorzettingsvermogen leidde ertoe dat uitgeputte deelnemers ego 
depletion overwonnen: hun prestatie op een volgende zelfcontrole taak bleef gelijk. 
Uitgeputte deelnemers die werden blootgesteld aan de neutrale prime vertoonden 
daarentegen het klassieke ego depletion effect: hun prestatie daalde significant. Vol-
gens het gelimiteerde energiemodel betreft zelfcontrole een bewust en actief proces. 
De huidige bevindingen illustreren echter dat zelfcontrole ook wordt gestuurd door 
processen die buiten ons bewustzijn opereren. 
 Onderzoek gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 4 betrof de rol van attentionele proces-
sen bij zelfcontrole. Er werd gekeken naar het effect van het richten van aandacht op 
de controle vereisende handeling (interne focus of cognitieve associatie) versus het 
afwenden van aandacht van de zelfcontrolehandeling (externe focus). In de huidige 
studie dienden proefpersonen achtereenvolgens twee fysieke zelfcontroletaken uit te 
voeren. Om een interne focus te induceren dienden proefpersonen zich tijdens het uit-
voeren van de tweede fysieke zelfcontrole taak zo volledig mogelijk te concentreren 
op hun eigen lichaam en dan voornamelijk op de arm- en handspieren die gebruikt 
worden bij deze taak (interne focus of cognitieve associatie). Een externe focus werd 
geïnduceerd door een cognitief belastende rekentaak, die deelnemers dienden op te 
lossen tijdens het uitvoeren van de tweede fysieke zelfcontroletaak. De resultaten lieten 
zien dat deelnemers die tijdens het uitvoeren van zelfcontrole werden afgeleid door de 
rekentaak (externe focus) significant beter presteerden dan deelnemers die hun aan-
dacht richtten op de fysieke zelfcontrole taak (interne focus) en deelnemers uit de 
controlegroep, die geen enkele focus instructie ontvingen. Echter, er werden geen 
significante verschillen in zelfcontrole prestatie gevonden voor deelnemers in de in-
terne focus conditie en deelnemers in de controlegroep. Met betrekking tot het ge-
limiteerde energiemodel suggereren deze bevindingen dat aandachtsprocessen een 
belangrijke rol spelen bij de totstandkoming van ego depletion en het falen van zelf-
controle. De bevinding dat zowel deelnemers die hun aandacht intern vestigden als 
deelnemers uit de controlegroep een afname in prestatie vertoonden, zou kunnen 
betekenen dat het optreden van ego depletion gedeeltelijk wordt gemedieerd door 
ineffectieve of suboptimale aandachtsprocessen. Het richten van de aandacht op de zelf-
controlehandeling (en de moeite die hiermee gepaard gaat) zou een standaard proces of 
natuurlijke tendens kunnen zijn die optreedt wanneer mensen zelfcontrole uitvoeren. 
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Wanneer dit standaard proces vervangen wordt door een proces dat niet in eerste in-
stantie gericht is op de zelfcontrole handeling en de moeite die hiermee gepaard gaat 
blijkt er geen negatieve invloed op zelfcontrole prestatie plaats te vinden.  
 In Hoofdstuk 5 werd de invloed van aandachtsprocessen bij zelfcontrole 
nader onderzocht. Eerdere studies naar de rol van zelfgerichte aandacht bij 
zelfcontrole demonstreerden een niet-consistent patroon van bevindingen: sommi-
gen van deze studies illustreren een zelfcontrole bevorderend effect van zelfgerichte 
aandacht, terwijl andere studies juist een negatieve invloed van zelfgerichte aandacht 
aantonen. Het hoofddoel van de studie die gepresenteerd werd in Hoofdstuk 5 was 
het verkrijgen van meer inzicht in deze tegengestelde bevindingen. Er werd veronder-
steld dat het essentieel is een onderscheid te maken tussen verschillende typen van 
zelfgerichte aandacht. Enerzijds kan zelfgerichte aandacht het type aandacht be-
treffen dat in Hoofdstuk 4 werd onderzocht, namelijk aandacht gericht op de 
zelfcontrolehandeling en de interne sensaties die aanwezig zijn tijdens deze 
handeling (cognitieve associatie). Anderzijds kan zelfgerichte aandacht ook betrekking 
hebben op zogenaamd zelfbewustzijn (self-awareness). Wanneer mensen in hoge mate 
zelfbewust zijn, worden zij bewust van hun bestaan in de wereld en worden bepaalde 
geïnternaliseerde sociale en/of situationele standaards in verhoogde mate saillant. De 
studie beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 probeerde een directe vergelijking te maken tussen 
beide typen zelfgerichte aandacht. Om het effect van cognitieve associatie te isoleren, 
werden beide typen aandacht gecombineerd: sommige deelnemers werden bloot-
gesteld aan een manipulatie die alleen zelfbewustzijn verhoogde, terwijl anderen een 
manipulatie ontvingen die zowel zelfbewustzijn als cognitieve associatie verhoogde. De 
bevindingen toonden aan dat het type zelfgerichte aandacht het effect van 
zelfgerichte aandacht op zelfcontrole prestatie bepaalt. Uitgeputte deelnemers die 
werden blootgesteld aan de zelfbewustzijn manipulatie wisten hun prestatie bij een 
volgende fysieke zelfcontrole taak constant te houden. Deze groep presteerde signifi-
cant beter dan deelnemers uit de controlegroep en deelnemers die ook waren bloot-
gesteld aan de cognitieve associatie manipulatie, waarbij de aandacht was gericht op 
de zelfcontrolehandeling. Overeenkomstig met de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4 werd 
er geen verbetering van zelfcontrole geconstateerd wanneer deelnemers in hoge mate 
zelfbewust waren en tevens zich bewust waren van interne sensaties (cognitieve as-
sociatie). Samenvattend tonen de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 niet alleen het 
belang van aandachtsprocessen bij zelfcontrole, maar demonstreren zij ook dat het ge-
bruik van aandachtsstrategieën kan helpen om ego depletion te overwinnen.  
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 In Hoofdstuk 6 werden zelfcontrole en ego depletion gepresenteerd in een toege-
paste context, namelijk criminaliteit. Er werd verondersteld dat om crimineel gedrag 
te begrijpen, men zich niet moet beperken tot intentionele misdaden, die worden 
gekarakteriseerd door georganiseerde of geplande criminele activiteit, maar tevens 
moet richten op de rol van impulsieve misdaden. Impulsieve misdaden betreffen de 
neiging om toe te geven aan gewelddadige of andere ongewenste impulsen en zijn 
sterk afhankelijk van zelfcontrole. Om een inzicht te krijgen in de totstandkoming van 
crimineel gedrag werden zowel de bevindingen beschreven in het huidige proefschrift 
alsook andere gerelateerde bevindingen in verband gebracht met criminaliteit. Boven-
dien werden er, gebaseerd op deze bevindingen, mogelijke richtlijnen geboden om 
verlies van impulscontrole te voorkomen en verbetering van zelfcontrole prestatie te 
realiseren. 
 In Hoofdstuk 7 werden de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift samen-
gevat en bediscussieerd. Het onderzoek dat werd beschreven in het huidige proef-
schrift heeft tot enkele nieuwe inzichten geleid wat betreft zelfcontrole en het feno-
meen ego depletion. Terwijl het gelimiteerde energiemodel zelfcontrole beschouwt als 
een bewust, actief proces, tonen de huidige bevindingen aan dat zelfcontrole wellicht 
ook wordt gestuurd door processen die opereren buiten ons bewustzijn. Onbewuste 
activatie van doorzettingsvermogen kan mensen helpen om ego depletion te over-
winnen and zelfcontroleprestatie te verbeteren. Ook aandachtsprocessen blijken een 
belangrijke rol te spelen bij het optreden van ego depletion. De bevindingen sugger-
eren dat ego depletion optreedt als gevolg van een excessieve focus op de zelfcontrole 
handeling en de moeite die hiermee gepaard gaat. Wanneer men aandacht van de zelf-
controle handeling afwendt, blijkt het optreden van ego depletion achterwege te blijven. 
Ten slotte impliceren de bevindingen omtrent de rol van verwachtingen dat ideeën over 
de werking van zelfcontrole van invloed zijn bij zelfcontroleprestatie en ego depletion. 
 Concluderend kan men stellen dat terwijl het gelimiteerde energie model de 
grenzen van ons vermogen tot zelfcontrole benadrukt, de huidige bevindingen ee-
rder de flexibiliteit en relativiteit van deze grenzen benadrukken en bovendien 
suggereren dat het optreden van ego depletion dynamischer is dan men 
in eerste instantie veronderstelde. De bevindingen pleiten voor een bredere visie 
omtrent zelfcontrole die meer in overeenkomst is met de menselijke complexiteit en 
flexibiliteit. 
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